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Introduction 
The study of military affairs in Australia has been 
largely ignored by historians and political scientists. A critical 
analysis of anything other than contemporary defence 
policies has likewise been neglected. Apart from the informa-
tion scattered throughout the official war histories, no 
account of the armed services nor of the formulation and 
implementation of defence policy exists for the interwar 
period. The aim of this book is to fill part of the gap. It is 
intended to examine the development of the air force and the 
relationship between air power and sea power in Australian 
defence in terms of the Imperial defence relationship as it 
existed between the formulation of the 1923 Imperial Con-
ference defence resolutions and the outbreak of war with 
Germany in September 1939. The strategic principles 
embodied in the "Fleet to Singapore" concept governed 
interwar defence planning. It follows that the attitude of the 
government and the Australian armed services towards the 
Singapore strategy will be given an extended analysis. The 
nature of the Imperial defence connection in the interwar 
years will be examined in an effort to show how the partner-
ship between Australia and the United Kingdom operated. It 
is hoped to demonstrate some of the solutions offered by 
Australian and United Kingdom defence planners to specific 
problems and to reach some conclusions regarding the value 
of the Imperial connection to Australian defence generally. 
Imperial defence may be defined as the joint defence of 
United Kingdom possessions and interests by a combination 
of United Kingdom, Dominion, and Colonial forces. 
Introduction 
Australian participation may be dated from 1885 when a 
mixture of fear and pragmatism led the Australian colonies to 
offer the United Kingdom troops to fight the Mahdi in the 
Sudan. For all its appearance as a spontaneous gesture,^ the 
dispatch of the Sudan contingent from New South Wales was 
a result of a realistic understanding that the colonies could 
only find protection through British sea power and inside 
some framework of Imperialism. In an early expression of 
"forward defence", Dibbs, premier of New South Wales, 
explained that Australia was defending itself in Egypt just as 
if "the common enemy menaced us in the colony";^ and that 
"upon the success of British arms in the Sudan, the fate of 
India in all probability hinges. And if that success concerns 
India it also concerns the Australian colonies."^ Dibbs was 
establishing what was to become a theoretical first principle 
of Imperial defence: that the Empire was composed of inter-
dependent parts. Thereafter it was made increasingly clear 
that Australian forces would be available to fight in Imperial 
wars. 
This principle, however, was not easily accepted by all. 
Australian nationalists, separatists, and republicans deplored 
Dibb's gesture and his conclusions. To the dissenters, dis-
patching troops to the Sudan had seemed to damage Aus-
tralia's erstwhile non-aligned position — it had been this very 
neutrality which had been the source of the country's 
strength. Alliance with the United Kingdom, they argued, 
offered disaster, it certainly did not guarantee protection. 
The Bulletin estabUshed its anti-Imperial policy by attacking 
the defence connection and in 1887 both the Republican and 
the Boomerang appeared to echo similar sentiments. William 
Lane wrote in 1888: 
We shall not be tolerably secure against the results of wars into 
which England may drag us unless we go to work and become ready 
to defend ourselves. We shall not be truly safe until we realize the 
aspirations that found a voice at Eureka stockade and hoist the 
starry cross above a free and United Australia.'* 
Military protection, it was argued, could be achieved only 
through the growth of a self-sufficient Australian nationalism 
which would free itself from the international machinations 
of the Imperial government. 
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Such opinion did not accord with the political realities and 
the imagined fears of the years before the 1914—18 war. The 
unification and growth of Italy and Germany, the American, 
Russian, French, and Chinese presences in and around the 
Pacific, the Germans themselves in New Guinea, combined to 
invest the concept of Imperial defence with a security value 
recognized both in the United Kingdom and in the colonies. 
The one definite result of the first Colonial Conference in 
1887 was the production of a scheme whereby the Australian 
colonies agreed to contribute towards the cost of maintaining 
the Royal Navy in Australian waters. And it was pragmatism 
more than sentiment which induced the colonies to accept 
the scheme. Faced with the problem of finding security 
without power, the Sydney Morning Herald posed a simple 
question — were Australians "willing to purchase the 
advantages offered by the Imperial government for a specific 
price?"* Certainly the Boomerang argued that it would be 
"death to rely on hirelings for defence . . . national suicide to 
throw ourselves defenceless under the shadow of the white 
ensign";^ but the most characteristic comment was made by 
a Queensland minister in 1891. He told the Colonial 
Assembly "as long as Australia enjoys the protection and 
grows up under the shield of Britain's might, surely she will 
not refuse to pay her fair share of an expense which at most 
is only insurance." The premium, however, was to become 
increasingly expensive. 
The Australian colonies, for instance, were to send 859 
officers and 15,604 other ranks to South Africa to fight an 
Imperial war. Again this commitment was regarded as a good 
investment or, as Edmund Barton pointed out, "a piece of 
the highest political self-interest".'^  The Empire had to 
remain strong: only through its power might Australia be 
secure. The utilization of colonial manpower could well con-
tribute to the Empire's strength. As the Elgin Commission, 
set up to investigate the British army after the early disasters 
of the Boer War noted, the colonies and dependencies con-
tained "a reserve of military strength which for many 
reasons, we cannot and do not wish to convert into a large 
standing army, but to which we may be glad to turn again in 
our hour of need as we did in 1899".* Consequently, the 
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newly federated colonies sent a small force to help suppress 
the Boxer Rebellion, and between 1914 and 1918, after 
Andrew Fisher, later to become an Australian Labor party 
prime minister, had pledged the last man and the last shilling, 
329,000 Australians served the United Kingdom overseas. 
More than 60,000 were killed in action or died from wounds. 
The territorial integrity of Australia was never threatened: in 
1914 the Anglo-Japanese alliance had stilled any southwards 
ambitions of the one possible aggressive Pacific power, and all 
the major battle-fronts were far removed from direct Aus-
tralian interests.' Nevertheless, a secure Australia was still 
seen to mean a powerful United Kingdom, and the first line 
of Australian defence the Royal Navy. 
Yet it was the experiences of the First World War, and the 
conscription issue, which reopened the Imperial defence 
debate in Australia in the postwar years. Although in 1937 
one well-known commentator on international affairs argued: 
with no written constitution at all, by means of just a "gentlemen's 
agreement", the world knows, for instance, that if Japan should 
invade Australia, the Commonwealth as a whole would stand for the 
defence of that particular member. The British Navy is an instru-
ment of Australia's defence, although Australia pays not one penny 
piece for its upkeep. Australian resources, human and material, 
would be available for the defence of Britain and the Common-
wealth as a whole although there is no article of any constitution 
which imposes this obligation.^'' 
it now seemed to a large section of the Labor party, for 
example, that the amount already collected to ensure Australian 
protection had been too high. Thus the self-sufficiency 
argument of the 1880s was revived — no longer would 
reliance be placed on the Royal Navy. Indeed, by the mid-
thirties it was deemed strategically unwise to do so — and 
unnecessary. The 1914—18 war had seen the introduction of 
air power as a weapons system which appeared to solve the 
problem of security without power and to make the pro-
position of "Fortress Australia" feasible. 
The writings of the interwar air power theorists have 
received extensive treatment elsewhere.* * Briefly, the 
doctrines of Douhet, Trenchard, and Groves were centred 
upon attacks on the morale of a state's urban population and 
Introduction 
the dislocation of industry and essential services by the use of 
a dominating bomber force. There were different points of 
emphasis, but an overwhelming agreement that the advent of 
air power had revolutionized warfare. Traditions and out-
moded forms had to be discarded. Douhet, the leading 
apostle of strategic bombing, wrote in 1921: 
The World War was only a point on the graph curve showing the 
evolution of the character of war; at that point the graph curve 
makes a sharp swerve showing the influence of entirely new factors. 
For this reason clinging to the past will teach us nothing useful for 
the future, for that future will be radically different from anything 
that has gone before.^ ^  
The conclusion was simply that air power was not only 
necessary but sufficient for victory. 
The strategic use of air poWer had a distinct European 
application and held little relevance to the problem of 
defending Australia until war broke out and the Empire Air 
Training Scheme was instigated in 1939. But the writings of 
the American Brigadier General William Mitchell did. The 
defence of America, like the defence of Australia, was 
founded upon sea power and the doctrines of Admiral 
Mahan, and Mitchell attacked such concepts with increasing 
vigour. Aircraft, he claimed, were capable of attacking and 
sinking any type of ship, thus any invasion force could be 
destroyed before it reached a landing point. It followed that 
armies and navies — except for a submarine arm — would 
eventually become obsolete; the prime weapon worth 
developing, therefore, was air power. Part of this book will be 
concerned with the acceptance or otherwise of Mitchell's 
ideas and the place of air power in Australia's defence. The 
main elements of air power to be examined are the 
organization and command of the air force, the policy of the 
government towards the development of air power, pro-
curement policy and the formation of the aircraft industry, 
the employment of the air force, and the attempt to 
formulate an indigenous air power doctrine. These aspects of 
Australian air power will be discussed in relation to the 
Imperial defence connection. 
In 1888, Thomas Mcllwraith, the Queensland premier, 
pointed out that he had been "taught to look sharp where 
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our own interests are concerned". The United Kingdom, he 
argued, could always be relied upon to place its own concerns 
above those of the colonies. The United Kingdom had not 
allowed Queensland to annex New Guinea; instead it went to 
Germany. Now worried about the influx of Chinese, he 
asked, "whenever has the Imperial government helped us?" 
He concluded: "We must take the business in hand ourselves 
and prevent by our own right arm and our own municipal 
laws the invasion of the persistent Mongolian."*^ By 1905 
Japan's victory over Imperial Russia established her, in place 
of China, as the main source of threat to Australia. Indeed, 
fifteen years later, Japan had become the enemy likely to 
threaten Australia's territorial integrity. The efficacy of the 
Imperial connection in defence extending back to 1885 was 
to be tested, and preparation for this challenge and the test 
itself invite examination. 
1 
The Strategic and Political 
Framework of Australian 
Defence Planning 1919-34 
The defeat of the central powers in 1918 meant 
that for the foreseeable future Europe could no longer be 
regarded as a main area of potential conflict.' Europe's pre-
1914 status was lost until Hitler gained office in Germany 
and backed his foreign policy with a rapid development of 
the armed forces. Until then, the Pacific was seen by Imperial 
defence planners as the most likely scene of a future major 
war. The development altered entirely their strategic 
calculations. 
By a direct result of the war, Japan had strengthened her 
strategic position and consequently her ability to challenge 
the status quo in the Pacific. Japan's 1915 demands on China 
had shown her eagerness to probe the validity of the Open 
Door policy, and when the United Kingdom agreed secretly 
in February 1917 to hand over to Japan the former German 
colonies in the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall groups her 
military prospects of sustaining an attempt to upset the 
Pacific power balance was increased. Once President Wilson 
agreed to this distribution at the peace conference, the 
domination of the central and western Pacific was virtually 
surrendered to Japan.^ 
Australia's strategic position, vis-i-vis Japan, was affected 
by the postwar redistribution of German colonies. Australia 
acquired, to administer under mandate, the Territory of New 
Guinea with its natural harbour at Rabaul. Thus Japanese and 
Australian territorial interests were brought together. As the 
point was made by a member of the House of Repre-
sentatives, the Australian back door and the Japanese front 
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door practically adjoined.^ Japan was not likely, perhaps, to 
covet New Guinea unless she were to become involved in a 
greater struggle with the United States, but such a struggle 
seemed possible. American interests ran from the Philippines 
through to Guam, Wake Island, and Hawaii. Thus any 
aggressive Japanese movement southwards of her home 
islands seemed certain to bring the two powers into conflict. 
Rabaul could thus become a significant naval base sought by 
both. Moreover, any protracted struggle could see the 
Australian mainland itself fought over as a supply base. 
Anxiety over such possible developments reinforced con-
cern which had been felt over Japan's ambitions before 1914. 
A week after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war. Major 
General Hutton, the General Officer Commanding the Aus-
tralian Military Forces, concluded that Japan's sudden rise to 
the rank of a "first rate military power" could only prove of 
the "utmost consequence to the political and commercial 
prospects of Australia" in the "near future".'* In August 
1905, with the future prime minister, Hughes, as a member, 
the National Defence League was formed in Sydney to lobby 
for the introduction of compulsory military training as one 
defence against Japanese invasion.* And the fact that Japan 
was an ally in the 1914—18 war did little to reduce such 
fears. In a report submitted to Hughes in 1915, Japan was 
regarded as the only possible danger and already, it was 
noted, Japanese and Australian interests clashed.* 
Evidence of postwar apprehension may be found in the 
government's initiative in asking Lord Jellicoe, when he 
visited Australia in 1919, to provide a strategic plan for the 
defence of the Pacific' At this time, Japan's navy ranked 
third in world terms, and to counter this Jellicoe called for 
the creation of a large Far Eastern fleet whose core would be 
eight battleships and eight battlecruisers, commanded by an 
admiral based at Singapore. The cost would be shared 
between Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.* Jellicoe saw 
the future course of Japanese planning to mclude an invasion 
of Australia, the seizure of New Guinea or the Dutch East 
Indies, a decisive sea action and concurrent thrusts at the 
British bases of Hong Kong and Singapore. If, at the same 
time, Britain were involved in a European conflict, it would 
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be most improbable that any substantial naval force could be 
sent to the Far East to contribute towards Australian 
defence. Thus, in jellicoe's view, a large, jointly maintained 
fleet based in the Pacific was essential to Australian 
security.' 
Jellicoe's report answered the questions posed by the Aus-
tralian government. The report, however, was at once acidly 
disowned by the Admiralty. In writing it, Jellicoe "had 
entered into a sphere never contemplated by the Admiralty 
and far beyond his terms of reference".' ° The four volume 
report — certainly the most perceptive interpretation of 
Japanese intentions offered to the Australian government 
between the wars — was promptly shelved. At the same time, 
however, the Admiralty was prepared to advise Australia that 
the Pacific promised to be the future "main theatre of 
operations",'' and in February 1921 invited her to consider 
the fact that "the strategic situation has undergone a 
complete change as a result of the late war . . . the oceans 
around the widely separated coasts of the U.S.A. and Japan 
have become the foci of naval interest.*"^ Given the 
economic and political climate of the twenties, however, the 
counter to this appreciation provided by Jellicoe was certain 
to be ignored. A future Japanese threat existed and the 
Australian government knew it, but to meet it realistically 
was impossible. Instead the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was 
abrogated and the Washington Treaties signed. The first 
measure, it seems, was the result largely of the financial 
pressure the United States could bring to bear on Britain; the 
second only temporarily alleviated a tense situation and was a 
diplomatic victory for Japan. 
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, made in 1902 to meet a 
possible Russian threat, was renewed in 1911 in an attempt 
to curb German influence in the Far East. By 1919 both 
determinants of British action had disappeared, yet the 
alliance itself was due for renewal in July 1921 when only 
Japan was a likely aggressor. Clearly it was in British interests 
to renew, albeit in a form which was consistent with the 
Covenant of the League of Nations.' ^ Both the Japanese and 
the United Kingdom governments agreed to do so, but the 
real point was not how the alliance was to be renewed but 
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whether it would be renewed at all. American pressure, in 
fact, denied the United Kingdom a real choice and con-
sequently the risk of severing a possible placating tie with 
Japan had to be accepted. 
The American lever was the fact that the British wartime 
debt had not been funded. The fear therefore existed that the 
United States would insist upon immediate repayment with 
the result that London's reputation as a financial centre 
would have been ruined. As Sir Maurice- Hankey, the 
secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, pointed out 
to the chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Archibald 
Montgomery-Massingberd, in 1933, "owing to the terms on 
which our debts to America had been contracted, they were 
in a position to make tremendous and immediate demands on 
us."i* According to this authoritative, indeed impeccable, 
source therefore the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was abrogated, 
not as a result of an objective, strategic, and political analysis 
of Pacific defence problems but rather as a measure to 
accommodate the Treasury in its American financial negotia-
tions. 
In United Kingdom eyes, Australian interests wartanted 
only minor recognition and there is no evidence which 
suggests that Hughes, the Australian prime minister, had any 
knowledge of this underlying consideration which was 
shaping United Kingdom policy. Yet it made the Australian 
debate on renewal superfluous and the expression of 
attitudes stemming from the debate even more so.' * Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, the Dominions with the most to fear 
from Japan, were both anxious to see the Alliance remain; in 
fact, Hughes left to attend the 1921 Imperial Conference 
with a mandate from Parliament to secure the renewal of it. 
Hughes had a formula: he made it quite clear in London that 
Australia would "never range itself against the United 
States", while urging at the same time an immediate renewal 
with ample provision for American consultation.' * Massey, 
the New Zealand prime minister, argued much the same 
opinion, while adding that an alliance with Japan could mean 
that a "certain control" would be exercised by the United 
Kingdom over her actions. 
With this kind of opinion held by the two Dominions most 
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interested in the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance the 
situation was potentially embarrassing and it was possibly 
with some relief that the United Kingdom saw the conference 
resolve to leave a discussion of the whole Pacific problem 
until the Limitation of Armaments Conference met in 
Washington. The Washington conference, however, did not 
produce a solution to the problem of containing Japan. A 
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance may have possessed 
only intangible benefits but it would have given Japan an 
international status which in 1921 she deserved: a close 
formal association with a major European power. Moreover, a 
renewal may have carried the possibility that some Japanese 
expectations were realizable and the hard lines which drew 
the status quo at Washington might have been softened. 
The discussions at Washington were tinged with unreality: 
Japan was treated as a satiated power, and the naval and 
territorial provisions of the Four Power Pact were based on 
the false premise that she was. The Nine Power Treaty 
insisted on maintaining the Open Door policy very much in 
the same spirit of 1898.' "^  Approximate equality in capital 
ships between the United States and the British Empire, 
followed by Japan, France, and Italy, was established but no 
agreement was reached regarding cruisers, destroyers, and 
submarines.'* British-American antagonism obscured the 
main issue of dealing with Japan'' and a consequence of this 
was that although the United States, the British Empire, and 
Japan agreed to scrap some forty per cent of their capital 
ships, the ratio was in Japan's favour.^" Moreover a Japanese 
building programme was approved and centred on the type of 
warship which contributed to making her home islands 
virtually impregnable.^' At Washington there wa's only a 
halfhearted attempt to limit the military application of air 
power, and yet aircraft at this time promised to upset the 
traditional concepts of naval warfare.^ 2 The irony of this was 
recognized by the leader of the Australian Country party, 
Earle Page, when he argued that the agreement among the 
powers not to build any more capital ships for ten years was 
arrived at so readily because of "the shrewd suspicion that 
the next war will be decided . . . in the air".^ ^  But the core 
of unreality displayed at Washington may be found in the 
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fact that all the agreements made there were backed simply 
by moral force while in power terms the containment of 
Japan was made more difficult to achieve than it had been. 
At Washington, the ability of both Britain and the United 
States to bring power to bear on Japan was sharply curtailed. 
As the Admiralty advised in July 1922, "the strategic 
position in the Western Pacific has been adversely 
affected".^* At Hong Kong, the only effective British naval 
base in the Pacific, neither the existing naval facilities for 
repair nor the coast defences could be increased. Certainly 
Britain did insist that the development of Singapore as a 
naval base should not be prevented by the agreements, but in 
1922 the Singapore naval base was no more than a half-
formulated plan. The neutralization of the American 
possessions of Guam, the Philippines, and Wake Island — all 
placed westward of Hawaii and thus much more suitable as 
points from which to counter Japanese sea power — not only 
hampered the execution of American policy but also had an 
unfavourable effect on British capability. The First Sea Lord, 
Earl Beatty, made this point when he argued in November 
1922 that "since the Washington Conference . . . the United 
States were now incapable of naval action in the Pacific, thus 
leaving the British Empire the sole power to counter with 
naval forces any aggressive tendencies on the part of 
Japan".^* As Japan's defence planning in 1918 had 
designated the United States as its primary potential 
enemy,^* a situation dangerous to Australia had been 
created. 
Hughes, in Australia, was realistic enough to understand 
that although the Washington agreements were accepted by 
Parliament without a vote being taken, they in no sense 
represented a permanent settlement of the Japanese problem. 
There was nothing in the treaties, he told the House, which 
guaranteed Austrdia protection in case of attack.^ "^  AH the 
result of the conference did was perhaps to ensure peace in 
the Pacific for some ten years.^s But it did not provide 
security: the Four Power Pact, not backed by force, could 
lead to weakness, and thus Australia's security lay where it 
always had, in the fact that she was "a partner in the British 
Empire".^ ' 
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Postwar Imperial defence received its first full-scale debate 
at the 1923 Imperial Conference, and the defence resolutions 
which this conference produced largely governed Australia's 
interwar defence policy. Before Stanley Bruce, then prime 
minister, left for England he told the Council of Defence that 
the role of the Australian armed forces, and particularly that 
of the army, was to mount a holding operation for not more 
than six months. What would happen then would depend 
upon the reaction of Britain "and no-one else".^° It followed 
that Bruce shared the attitude that the traditional and simple 
centre of Imperial defence would remain in the protection of 
the Empire's sea-lanes. It was agreed by the conference that 
the Royal Navy should be maintained at a one-power 
standard and that adequate naval bases to accommodate it 
should be provided; hence the note about the "special 
interest" Australia and New Zealand had in the completion 
of the Singapore base. The conference further resolved that 
the extent of each Dominion's participation in Imperial 
defence should be determined by the Dominion concerned 
and that each Dominion itself was responsible for its own 
local defence. The nature of Dominion air forces was also 
debated and it was agreed to develop them on a pattern 
basically standard to that adopted by the Royal Air Force.^' 
These resolutions largely gave formal recognition to a 
previously de facto situation. 
These arrangements for the conduct of Imperial defence 
possessed little strength. The weakness was partly due to the 
fact that the conference which agreed to them met under the 
influence of the Chanak crisis. ^ ^ Canada's prime minister, 
Mackenzie King, was a particularly outspoken critic of the 
United Kingdom's presumptions, while for Australia, Bruce 
looked back to August 1914 and told the conference, "the 
truth is that as soon as war broke out we all woke up to the 
fact that owing to a policy which we had no part in framing 
we had got to make the maximum effort that was possible 
for our own safety and the preservation of our own 
integrity".^ ^  Australia, he pointed out, had not appreciated 
that a similar response had been expected over the Chanak 
episode. Unless the conference could agree on the broad lines 
of foreign policy, he continued, then it might be better to 
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discontinue the whole system of defence consultation and 
cooperation. It is unlikely that Bruce meant this; all he was 
pointing out was that Australia had a measure of 
independence which demanded recognition. The provision 
that "the Conference expressly recognizes that it is for the 
parliaments of the several parts of the Empire, upon the 
recommendations of their respective governments, to decide 
the nature and extent of any action which should be taken 
by them"^* accurately reflected this aspiration.^ ^  
From a nationalist viewpoint such a stance had virtue; 
from a realist's position the stress placed upon Dominion 
identity in 1923 and upon Dominion status in 1926 was in 
contradiction to the readily admitted fact that Australia 
relied for protection almost solely on British power. Perhaps 
a realization of this explains in part the attitude of the 
National party and the United Australia party towards the 
Statute of Westminister. As Menzies remarked in 1939, "the 
great issues of peace will be much more determined by the 
gentleman who sits in a room looking across the Horse 
Guards Parade than it will by my colleagues in Canberra".''* 
And Menzies was right: in power terms Australia remained 
between the wars a political dependency. It followed that she 
had little influence upon Imperial policy. The abrogation of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is one example already cited, 
and more generally there seems little evidence to suggest that 
Australia wished to maintain any independent position and 
certainly not if it meant backing it with practical defence 
expenditure. The weakness of the 1923 Imperial defence 
resolutions as applied to the problem of providing for 
Australian security seems clear. Defence came to rest upon 
the dispatch of a British fleet to Singapore, but Australia as a 
dependency could not demand a guarantee that it would be 
sent. 
If the Australian realist could judge the 1923 resolutions as 
inadequate so also could his United Kingdom counterpart. 
The fact that Dominion forces were not automatically avail-
able to pursue Imperial ends meant that it was unprofitable 
to plan for their employment. In 1926 Bruce certainly argued 
that "the guiding principle on which all our defence pre-
parations are based, whether for the Sea, the Land, or the Air 
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Force, is uniformity in every respect... with the fighting 
services of Great Britain, in order that in time of emergency 
we may dovetail into any formation with which our forces 
may be needed to co-operate".^'' But this did not amount to 
a formal guarantee that they would cooperate. The statement 
sounded convincing but meant little. In 1909 Australian staff 
officers had been forbidden to prepare plans covering the 
cooperation of joint forces.^* Now with Japan as the 
acknowledged threat, it appeared that a similar attitude 
would prevail. In 1935, John Northcott, then a lieutenant 
colonel and attending the Imperial Defence College, pointed 
to the absence of any principle of cooperation or mutual 
support in Imperial defence and commented, "at present we 
are rather like a team which has no captain and is not sure 
which of its members will play".^' United Kingdom defence 
planners realized this; the Admiralty's concern over the 
establishment of the Royal Australian Navy and its con-
tinuance as a separate force after 1918 indicates awareness of 
the difficulties these loose arrangements were liable to cause. 
Participation in Imperial naval defence was first debated in 
the Australian colonies when the Imperial navy tribute 
scheme was presented to the various colonial parliaments in 
1887.'*° As early as 1892 the Admiralty began to worry that 
the local contribution might lead to an Australian insistence 
on the strategic disposition of the fleet. As Admiral Bridge, 
who became Commander in Chief on the Australian station, 
reported back to the Admiralty in 1895, "the only way of 
dealing with the local authorities is to firmly refuse to permit 
them to have any say as to the disposition or management of 
the squadron. They understand firmness: they do not under-
stand concession which they always take to be weakness.'"*' 
When the Royal Australian Navy was formed in 1909 the 
tribute system was modified and the contribution of material 
increasingly took the part of cash payments.'* ^  As Andrew 
Fisher, the Australian prime minister, argued, the Royal 
Australian Navy would be "part of the British fleet and 
would co-operate in every possible way".'*^ Nevertheless the 
creation of Dominion navies increased Admiralty fears that 
their control over the ships might be weakened and in 1911 
this concern seemed well founded. Australia, for example. 
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suggested that their vessels might operate independently of 
Admiralty command and, moreover, that they might be 
retained in Australian waters for the protection of local 
trade.** 
The fact that in 1914 the Australian fleet was placed at 
Admiralty disposal for the duration of the war failed to 
dispel a fear that it might not be on a future occasion. In 
1918, therefore, the Admiralty suggested the creation of one 
Imperial navy, controlled by local boards with a complicated 
system of Dominion representation in Whitehall. Ships would 
be "available to serve in any waters and officers and men in 
any ship".*^ The scheme was entirely rejected by the 
Dominions. As the Canadian prime minister, Borden, wrote 
to a member of the Lloyd George government. Sir Eric 
Geddes, after consultation with other Dominion prime 
ministers, "such proposals were not considered practical".** 
Strategically, it might be argued, they were; politically, they 
certainly were not, and politics defeated the fundamental 
strategic concept of concentration of force. 
Between the wars, however, the Admiralty was determined 
to exercise as much control as possible over the Australian 
navy. This is quite understandable: the Admiralty did have 
the naval defence of the Empire to consider at a time when 
the next naval battle was expected to be fought in the 
Pacific. Thus English admirals commanded the fleet and 
English naval officers occupied the highest positions in the 
service.*' The Admiralty advised the Australian government 
on the composition of the fleet and attempted always to 
divert attention away from home defence. Thus in February 
1921, Australia was advised to acquire submarines but "to 
resist the attempt to use them in home waters".** In June 
1921 the Admiralty pointed out that "there is perhaps a 
tendency on the Dominions to dwell upon the importance of 
purely defensive measures such as the defence of ports, 
minesweeping, and the local protection of trade".*' The 
Admiralty had more than this in mind: Amery, as First Lord, 
told the 1923 Imperial Conference, "there can be no more 
deadly error than to imagine that any part of the Empire can 
rely on purely local defence. Except for purely subsidiary 
purposes sea warfare cannot be sub-divided or localised".*<> 
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Amery was right, and Bruce realized it. In fact, Bruce agreed 
"with every word spoken by the First Lord of the 
Admiralty". Moreover, as Bruce argued, both the Empire as a 
whole and Australia itself could only benefit if the principle 
of naval cooperation were soundly established.*' 
Once again, however, this statement did not amount to a 
formal commitment of Australian forces. Yet Australian 
naval power was seen as an important contribution to 
Imperial defence. When General Hertzog, in South Africa, 
and at the head of a Nationalist-Labour coalition in 1928 
overtly implied South African neutrality in case of war. Sir 
Charles Madden, the First Sea Lord, wrote to Sir Maurice 
Hankey, "the non-cooperation of the Dominion naval forces 
would not in the present circumstances and probably will not 
for some time to come, be any serious handicap, "except in 
the case of Australia, and Australia judging from the utter-
ances of her Prime Minister, is sound on this question."^ ^  
Bruce, of course, did seem "sound", but what of his success-
or? 
ScuUin, trying to cope with a depression and a badly split 
Labor movement, had little time or inclination to please the 
Admiralty. In May 1930, the then First Lord, A. V. 
Alexander, was concerned that the Australian government 
had acted independently and without consultation when it 
decided "to put some vessels of the Austtalian Navy out of 
commission".*^ In May 1931, Alexander told the Australian 
High Commissioner, Sir Granville Ryrie, of the "grave 
concern with which we viewed the possibility of further 
reductions in the Naval Estimates, in view of the importance 
of the Australian Fleet in the British Commonwealth 
quota".** ScuUin had already refused to provide a replace-
ment for the obsolete cruiser Brisbane, * * and it might have 
appeared to the Admiralty that if a Labor government 
remained in office much longer then the Australian navy 
would entirely disappear. Scullin, possibly, could not be 
considered "sound". 
For the United Kingdom to rely on the support of 
sympathetic Australian prime ministers was clearly un-
satisfactory; yet while the 1923 defence resolutions remained 
there was no choice. Land, sea, and air forces were all 
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affected, and by 1930 it was seen as an impossible arrange-
ment by the British Chiefs of Staff. They failed to under-
stand why the decisions of 1923 should be regarded as 
immutable and rightly pointed out that although the Imperial 
Conference had "clearly laid down that each part of the 
Empire was responsible for its own local defence no express 
mention was made of collective responsibility for Empire 
defence".* * The Chiefs of Staff had a remedy: to add a rider 
to the 1923 Imperial defence resolutions which devolved 
responsibility on the Dominions "in respect of their 
territories and of the wider aspects of Imperial Defence".* "^  
Thus the Chiefs of Staff wished to introduce what Sir George 
Milne, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, referred to as 
"a new principle of Imperial Defence: the principle of 'area 
responsibility' ".* * Under such an arrangement Australia and 
New Zealand would be obliged to undertake definite 
commitments to contribute forces in defence of Singapore.*' 
The proposal came to nothing. To the bitter dis-
appointment of the Chiefs of Staff the 1930 Imperial Con-
ference failed to hold a plenary session on defence. Moreover 
it was in no mood to consider the increased defence 
expenditure that the acceptance of the idea of "area 
responsibility" would entail. Indeed, when Ramsay 
MacDonald made a short statement to the effect that a sub-
sequent Imperial gathering might care to examine the 1923 
defence resolutions, the conference recorded the statement in 
the minutes but "declined to put anything in the published 
report".* ° Between the wars, the unsatisfactory defence 
resolutions remained. 
There was Uttle concern in Australia that they did. The 
Australian Labor party tended to regard the innocuous 
principles as an accepted invitation to be drawn again into an 
imperialistic-capitalist war, but as the party was out of office 
for all but twenty-six and a half months of the interwar 
period, its direct effect on defence arrangements was 
minimal. Hasluck is a little contemptuous of the Labor 
party's sttategic ideas — the opinions of the party, he argues, 
"were not the results of considering a military task but rather 
the result of Labor's viewpoints regarding the nature and 
cause of war and the place of Britain and Australia in the 
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world".*' Much of his point, at least for the 1920s, can be 
taken. By the mid-thirties, however, moderate Labor party 
opinion was to be based on the shrewd strategic appreciation 
of the possible, and as such, was an opinion shared by the 
army and, to a lesser extent, by the air force. 
Until 1934, when Japanese aggression in the Far East and 
Hitler's consolidation of power in Germany combined to 
produce a disquieting prospect of a two-front conflict, pro-
vision for defence in both Australia and the United Kingdom 
was a matter of little interest and less action. In 1919 War 
Cabinet declared its famous "ten-year" ruling that "it should 
be assumed for the framing of revised estimates that the 
British Empire will not be engaged in any great war during 
the next ten years and that no Expeditionary Force is 
required for that purpose".*^ In 1925 the Committee of 
Imperial Defence specifically extended this ten-year ruling to 
Japan with the argument that "in the existing circumstances 
aggressive action on the part of Japan is not a contingency 
seriously to be considered".*^ Until 1932 successive 
Committee of Imperial Defence rulings proposed, and British 
governments accepted, these basic assumptions. In 1919 a 
ten-year no-war ruling was an acceptable prediction but what 
made the doctrine dangerous was the fact that an ambulatory 
clause was grafted to it by which the ten-year period began 
afresh with each succeeding year. Naturally it affected the 
development of the armed forces. 
To Admiral Schofield it still seems a surprise that the 
Royal Navy survived at all.** Lord Chatfield has argued that 
"never has there been such a successful attempt to hamstring 
the security of an Empire",** while Sir John Slessor has 
declared that "the ravages of the ten year rule" largdy con-
tributed to the fact that when war came "neither service was 
properly equipped for the responsibilities it had to carry".* * 
As Air Marshal Sir Richard Williams, who as a Wing 
Commander became Chief of the Air Staff to the newly 
formed Australian air force in 1921, has commented: "there 
was little point in asking for money to spend on a new service 
if there was no foreseeable enemy."*'' 
Only after the Mukden incident, the consequent creation 
of Manchukuo, and the dispatch of a Japanese expeditionary 
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force against Shanghai in February 1932 was the ten-year 
ruling lifted. The committee which considered the Far 
Eastern situation reported 
the assumption that there would be no major war for ten years was 
contrary to the lessons of history, had no counterpart in any foreign 
country and had produced dangerous results: notably, in the Far 
East, a situation wherein one could not count on being able to bring 
British sea-power to bear in time to avert the direct consequences in 
the event of an aggression by Japan . . . 68 
What the actions of the Kwantung army did towards infusing 
some reality into Far Eastern defence appreciation was 
repeated in a European context by Goering's development of 
the Luftwaffe.*' In March 1934 the British prime minister, 
Baldwin, promised that the United Kingdom would attain air 
parity with any continental power capable of attacking 
Britain; in November 1934 he specifically named 
Germany.''° 
In October 1934, Sir Archdale Parkhill had become 
minister for defence and Australia was preparing itself to 
rearm, but it was against this political and strategic back-
ground which has been described that the air force was 
developed. It is necessary now to consider this development 
and the role the service was expected to fill in providing for 
Australia's defence. 
2 
Air Power and Australian 
Defence 1918-34 
The Royal Australian Air Force was formed in 
1921. In 1928, Air Marshal Sir John Salmond of the Royal 
Air Force, at the request of the Austtalian government, 
reported on the state of the service. He concluded that 
Due to the obsolete types of service machines in use throughout the 
Air Force, to the entire absence of any reserve equipment, and to 
the low standard of training in these operational units, I have to 
report that I consider that the R.A.A.F. would be totally unfit to 
undertake war operations in co-operation with the Navy or 
Army . . . ' 
This criticism was justified. Indeed as far as equipment was 
concerned the air force was operating mainly with aircraft 
which the United Kingdom, embarrassed by war surplus, had 
donated to Australia in 1919.^ By 1934, these aircraft had 
been written off, but the Royal Australian Air Force still 
possessed only sixty-eight machines: twenty-six Westland 
Wapitis bought in 1929 for general purpose duties, six Bristol 
BuUdog single-seater fighters delivered in 1930, seven 
obsolete Supermarine Southampton and Seagull seaplanes, 
and the remainder were Moth trainers.^ 
Air force units were stationed only in Victoria and New 
South Wales. In Victoria there was the Royal Austtalian Air 
Force headquarters and a Flying Training School at Point 
Cook. Two squadrons were based at Laverton Aircraft Depot 
and one squadron at the Richmond Aircraft Depot which 
also housed a naval aviation flight. By 1929, the air force had 
an approved establishment of 110 officers and 860 other 
ranks while the Citizen Air Force, formed in 1925, had an 
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establishment of 54 officers and 285 other ranks.* In 1934 
there were 885 members of the permanent air force and 229 
members of the Citizen Air Force.* From 1924 (the first 
year that truly comparable figures are available) to 1929 and 
the onset of the depression, over $25 million was spent on 
the navy, $15 million on the army, and only $5 million on 
the air force. It is obvious that the air force occupied the 
lowest position in the triad of fighting services. Why this was 
so requires an explanation over and above the conditions 
already outlined which contributed to the general reluctance 
to provide for defence. 
Four main lines of explanation emerge. Firstly the 
Nationalist and later United Australia party governments 
were committed to the Blue Water school of strategy. A 
discussion of the efficacy of this strategy is reserved for 
chapter 3. Secondly, the air force worked within a defence 
planning sttucture which tended to hamper its development. 
Thirdly, given the limited performance of aircraft in the 
twenties and the importance which was attached to civil 
aviation as providing a defence potential, the air force had 
difficulty in arguing for itself a convincing, independent role 
in Austtalian defence. Finally there was a hostile attitude 
towards the air force as an independent service in the higher 
ranks of the army and navy. Naturally all are related and will 
be discussed accordingly. 
When Hughes told the House in 1921 that "we depend for 
our very existence on the maintenance of the control of the 
sea by Britain",* he was stating the first principle — the 
leitmotiv — of Australian and Imperial defence. Not everyone 
shared this opinion. Indeed, the air force was formed at a 
time when it seemed to many that the battleship would in 
the future no longer command the seas. The claims of 
Brigadier General Mitchell to be able to attack and sink 
capital ships with aircraft had wide currency. Even Bowden, 
the Nationalist minister for defence, remarked when speaking 
on the Air Defence Bill in June 1923, "at the present time 
there is a considerable difference of opinion as to the relative 
efficacy of the various arms of our Defence Forces, and as to 
the probable effect of advancing one as against the other".'' 
And once the Australian Labor party moved from the 
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position that air forces should be outlawed on humane 
grounds,* the party's defence theories were based explicitly 
on Mitchell and the argument that the "most effective arms 
of defence will be air and submarine forces".' It was not 
necessary, however, to be a member of the Labor party or a 
sympathizer with its political principles to hold similar views. 
The nationalist Australian Natives Association, for 
example, in March 1921 passed at their Jubilee Conference a 
resolution that "the development of aircraft is of supreme 
importance to Australia as the most effective and economical 
means of defence"."* Clearly it was thought that the 
development of Australian air power could conttibute 
towards Austtalian self-sufficiency and that this, in turn, 
would weaken the Imperial tie. For somewhat different 
reasons, the army also advocated a rapid and extensive 
development of air power. It will be shown that army 
opinion regarded aircraft simply as adjuncts to land forces. 
But in October 1918, air power was seen as vital to the 
success of such forces. As the Chief of the General Staff, 
Major General J. G. Legge, argued, "without an air service of 
400 planes, 600 officers and 7,000 other ranks it would be 
murder to send our men to meet a properly equipped 
enemy"." There were also doubts in army circles that 
British sea power would be available to face an enemy of 
Austtalia.' ^ This argument, which was developed at length 
during the thirties,' ^ could be used in an attempt to oust the 
navy as the prime consumer of defence funds. As Sir John 
Monash pointed out "a fleet of aeroplanes, at the cost of one 
battleship would be Austtalia's best investment".' * 
Early commercial aviation entrepreneurs also urged a 
reorientation of policy obviously in the hope of mixing 
patriotism with profits. After hearing evidence from six air 
operators' * — almost a third of the witnesses called — the 
Joint Committee of PubUc Accounts reported in 1923 that 
"with the rapid development of aviation it is quite within the 
realms of possibility that the Air Force may become 
Australia's first line of defence".' * If the later writings of 
Hudson Fysh and Major H. T. Shaw may be used as a guide 
to the evidence they gave before the Joint Committee, then 
they would have been outspoken proponents of such a 
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view. 
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The question is, however, what influence did this opinion 
have on the Australian government? Very little it appears, 
though from time to time the government was sufficiently 
concerned to question what effect the employment of air 
power might have upon the conduct of naval warfare and 
thus upon Austtalian security. It was unknown between the 
wars how successful aircraft would be under war conditions 
when pitted against the heavily armoured and armed battle-
ship or battlecruiser. Capital ships could certainly be hit by 
aircraft operating in perfect conditions, while in 1921 the 
ex-German Dreadnought Ostfrieland„ built in 1912 with 
special watertight compartments, sank in twenty-one minutes 
after being struck by six 900 Kg bombs.' * The American 
naval and marine officers who reported on this trial noted 
that "aircraft had the power to sink or seriously damage any 
naval vessel at present constructed".'' 
The British trials were less spectacular and the Air 
Ministry's attitude more cautious. Attacks made against 
H.M.S. Agamemnon (a much smaller target than the battle-
ship of the 1920s) resulted in 47 hits from 637 bombs 
dropped by individual aircraft. This percentage of hits (7.4) 
dropped to 3.5 when Agamemnon was subjected to attack by 
aircraft flying in formation. The Air Ministry's inference 
from these results was that a capital ship subjected to capable 
air attack could have its "fighting efficiency" seriously im-
paired.^ ** 
Such findings carried important implications for Australian 
defence planners to consider: Bruce, firstly as prime minister 
and later as high commissioner, realized it. In 1923 he was 
"particularly anxious" that the effect of air operations 
against capital ships should be discussed while the Imperial 
Conference was being held in London.^' In reply, Amery, as 
First Lord, made two points. Firstly he argued that air power 
would affect the deployment of naval forces in narrow seas 
and might eventually necessitate a reconsideration of "the 
whole structure and organisation of our armies and fleets". 
His second point seemed to contradict his first for he con-
cluded that capital ships could be sunk neither by submarine 
torpedoes nor by bombing attack and that the battleship 
would remain the "main pivot and kernel of the naval 
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battle". Air forces could only expect to perform an ancillary 
and complementary role.^^ Amery's statement was Janus-
faced. 
Bruce however seemed impressed when on his return to 
Australia he parroted Amery in the House and rejected the 
suggestion that aircraft could successfully attack a capital 
ship. The importance of an air force coiUd be appreciated, 
but air power was "really no menace at all to the modern 
capital ship".^^ 
Bruce may not have been as convinced as he sounded. In 
1926 the Admiralty advised 
No new developments since 1923 can be said to have in any way 
modified the view that the development of aviation, while destined 
to have a great influence on the tactical organisation of our naval 
forces, will not, outside narrow waters such as the English Channel 
or the Mediterranean, materially affect the problem of the control of 
the Ocean routes . . . ^* 
This was an official statement approved by the Committee of 
Imperial Defence. At a meeting, held in October 1926 at the 
Admiralty and attended by the Dominion prime ministers, 
Beatty, as First Sea Lord, was prepared to go further. 
According to Wing Commander P. Van Rynveld, director of 
South African Air Services, Beatty consistently "played 
down" the efficacy of air power even in narrow seas. Beatty, 
it was reported, argued that "the naval anti-aircraft gun was 
now the master of aircraft" and produced diagrams to show 
just how this mastery had been acquired. What followed was 
the statement that aircraft had only a very limited future in 
the conduct of the navl battle.^ * 
Van Rynveld had attended this meeting "unofficially", 
had taken notes, and then handed them to Trenchard, Chief 
of the Air Staff. Clearly Bruce, who naturally had attended 
the meeting also, had witnessed an example of interservice 
rivalry.^ * Possibly he realized it. Concerned that the balance 
between aircraft and capital ship might have altered since 
1923, he asked Trenchard direct for the views of the air 
force. Trenchard lacked Beatty's easy assurance. It was 
impossible, he argued, to sink capital ships with "one or two 
hits" but it was possible to sink any other sort of ship.^'' 
This difference in opinion continued to worry Bruce. In 
London in 1933 he still showed concern that Austtalia's 
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security might depend on whether or not aircraft could out-
fight warships. As he told Sir Maurice Hankey, he was "still 
worried about the problems of apportioning the [Australian] 
defence vote between the often conflicting claims of the 
three services".^* At a meeting attended by Hankey, Sir 
Harry Batterbee from the Dominions Office, and the First 
Lord, he argued "some day this question will have to be 
faced and settled and it is of the very greatest importance 
that the right decision should be taken".^' The question 
which Bruce suggested would have to be faced never really 
was. As long as Australia was a contributor to the Imperial 
system of defence a substitution of air power for sea power 
in defence policy was impossible. A complete reorientation 
of Austtalia's part in the system would have resulted. In 
October 1934, Hankey visited Australia to advise on defence, 
possibly because of this conversation.^ ° 
It was difficult to find a clearly defined Imperial function 
for the air force unlike the navy at least until the mid-thirties. 
Limited range and performance gave aircraft a local defence 
role. That Australian air power might be called upon to serve 
some Imperial end was often raised but then with only con-
siderable ambiguity and constant contradiction. When Major 
General Sykes, the first Chief of the Air Staff in the United 
Kingdom, considered the role of Dominion air forces in 1918 
he suggested the creation of an Imperial air force,^' but 
there was no mention of such a body nor of an Imperial 
function in the Committee of Imperial Defence document 
which in 1921 suggested lines of development for Dominion 
air power.^^ The 1923 Imperial Conference agreed on the 
advantages which could flow from a standard development of 
air forces but not how the results of this uniformity might be 
employed. Trenchard simply said "as in the past the 
Dominions have come to the assistance of the Mother 
Country with naval and military units, so I trust you will in 
the future come to our assistance in the air war".^^ There 
was no definite response. 
At the 1926 Imperial Conference, the Dominions were 
asked directly to consider in what ways they could con-
tribute to the "Air Defence of the Empire".^* Australia 
promised to provide "air reinforcements in certain eventu-
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alities".^* Little that was concrete could come from this 
vague declaration. Certainly in Salmond's report in 1928 
there was no mention of an Imperial role. In fact, his terms 
of reference were limited to giving advice on "the 
employment of the Royal Austtalian Air Force in the 
defence of the Commonwealth".^* In 1932, however, the 
Air Ministry evaluated Salmond's report and Australian air 
potential, and attempted to interpret them more widely. 
Singapore, it was claimed, could be defended by the "speedy 
reinforcement [of] fully trained Australian air squadrons".^"^ 
But again, there was no commitment.^ * It will be argued that 
this worked to the disadvantage of the air force. 
The defence planning structure 
With an Imperial role denied to the air force, and the 
Austtalian government's faith in the ability of the battleship 
to exercise command over the seas for practical purposes 
unshaken, the service was forced into filling a minor and 
auxiliary role in Australian defence. But functioning 
effectively even on this level was made difficult by a defence 
planning structure which placed the air force at a dis-
advantage in defence debate. It was even more difficult to 
state an aggressive air force policy. 
In 1921 the two service departments were merged into a 
single Department of Defence. When the air force was 
formed, it too was placed under the control of this depart-
ment. Administtation of the three services lay with their 
respective boards, but until 1926 the Air Board was not an 
autonomous administrative unit and did not, in theory, have 
a direct line of communication to the minister, nor one 
through the secretary of the Department of Defence. Until 
1926 when the Defence Committee was created by 
ministerial direction,^' an Air Council was superimposed 
between the Air Board and the minister. This body was 
composed of the minister for defence as president, and with a 
veto, the Chief of the Naval Staff, the Chief of the General 
Staff, the Controller of Civil Aviation, and two members of 
the Air Board. 
The Air Council was obviously formed as a compromise 
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between the exclusive control of Australian air power by 
either the army or the navy. As Bowden, minister for 
defence, pointed out, the function of the Air Council was "to 
provide for the harmonious workings of the Naval and 
Military Forces with the Air Force."*" There was another 
reason: the Chief of the Air Staff was Wing Commander 
Richard Williams and his second in command was Wing 
Commander S. J. Goble. Goble, who had been the navy's 
nominee for the chief executive position,*' had worked for 
the Victorian railways before going to England in 1915 to 
join the Royal Naval Air Service. There he came to command 
a single-seater fighter squadron and was awarded the O.B.E., 
the D.S.O., and the D.S.C. Williams, the son of a copper 
miner in Moonta, South Australia, entered aviation through 
the jobs of post office messenger boy, bank clerk, part-time 
sergeant, and then officer in the citizen force South 
Austtalian Infantry Regiment. In 1912 he resigned to become 
a sergeant in the small permanent army and later that year he 
won a commission. In August 1914 he was among the first 
four officers to be selected for flying training at Point Cook. 
During the war, Williams had first commanded No. 1 
Squadron of the Australian Flying Corps and later a full wing 
of the Royal Air Force. When the war ended, Williams was 
just thirty-one and had been awarded the O.B.E, and the 
D.S.O. and had been mentioned in dispatches. But even 
before the war had ended. Major General J. G. Legge had 
seen a problem. In arguing against the creation of an in-
dependent air force, he pointed to the fact that the Aus-
tralian Flying Corps was composed solely of young men with 
practically no experience in peace-time administtation and 
command. For some time, he sttessed, such men would need 
direction "from those who knew what it meant by 
expenditure under a responsible government".*^ Williams 
was obviously to be regarded as one such young man. 
The Air Council was designed in part, therefore, to control 
him. Formally its powers were very wide and involved all 
aspects of the employment of air power. Although it did not 
originate policy, it did consider and pass judgment on 
recommendations made by the Air Board. Naturally it had 
power to inhibit suggestion: it kept a close control over 
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finance. In fact, despite the title of Chief of the Air Staff, 
any air force expenditure over $200 had to receive Air 
Council approval, while the purchasing authority of the 
Director of Equipment did not extend beyond a $40 limit for 
the local acquisition of stores.* ^  
While the Air Council functioned, it was clearly impossible 
for the air force to propose any policy which was not tailored 
to meet navy and army requirements. In turn, the develop-
ment of an air power docttine was retarded. As Williams 
complained to Howse, minister for defence, in 1926, "the 
very fact that the Army and the Navy still contend that the 
Air Force is nothing more or less than an auxiliary to the 
older services is sufficient proof that they fail to realise the 
characteristics and possibilities of aircraft applied to war".** 
The Air Council sat until 1926 when it was replaced by the 
Defence Committee which had a function similiar to the 
Chiefs of Staff sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence. It was composed of the three Chiefs of Staff, a 
finance member, with a line of communication to the 
minister through the secretary of the department. The con-
servatism, mentioned by Williams, is well illusttated by the 
reaction of Vice Admiral Hall-Thompson who, when con-
fronted with proposals to form the Defence Committee, 
argued in June 1926 that the Air Council had been created to 
secure "for the Navy and Army a proper measure of 
control", and that any development away from this design 
would be viewed by the Naval Board with "apprehension".** 
And this was after Williams had attended the Royal Air Force 
Staff College at Andover and the Army Staff College at 
Camberley. 
Although the Air Council did cease to function* * and the 
air force did obtain administrative autonomy and control of 
its funds, the influence of the army and navy remained. This 
was exerted now through the Defence Committee and 
through the supreme defence planning body, the Council of 
Defence. As Williams, still complaining, wrote to Trenchard, 
the Defence Committee still wished to occupy itself with 
administtative matters.*'' And the air force was outnumbered 
on this body, and on the Council of Defence. Williams was 
not appointed to the latter until June 1925, and then as a 
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group captain he faced three admirals and three generals. In 
1929—30 there were four army representatives and three 
naval, and still only Williams to press an air force point of 
view.* * 
The only saving feature as far as the air force was 
concerned was that the Council of Defence rarely met. In 
1923, Sir John Monash, himself a member, noted that "it 
meets every two years and does nothing."*' And although 
Sir Harry Chauvel argued that one of its functions was to 
consider the service estimates each year,*" it did not carry 
out that duty. This rather became a task for the Defence 
Committee. As Senator Brand, a member of the Military 
Board from 1924 to 1933, recalled in 1946, the allocation of 
defence funds was a somewhat informal process which did 
not concern the supreme defence planning body. As Brand 
explained, "it was the practice of the Minister for Defence to 
send for the heads of the three services, and say to them 
'Here is £7,000,000 for you to divide', or 'There is 
£5,000,000 available. Arrange your own allotments'."*' 
From 1929 to 1935, the Council of Defence did not meet at 
all, and it was only after Sir Maurice Hankey's visit in 1934 
that the Council of Defence was reorganized and with the 
rearmament programme of the thirties, began to play a more 
active part in defence preparations.* ^ 
Williams realized by 1926 that he needed some support in 
defence debate. Although by 1934 a tenuous alliance with 
the army had been formed to combat the vigorous naval 
policy, fostered by Admiral Hyde with the support of the 
Admiralty, Army support could be secured only by making 
concessions to its view of the function of air power.* ^  In the 
long run, this policy could only be detrimental to air force 
interests. Instead, Williams turned to the Air Ministry, and 
attempted formally to link the Royal Australian Air Force 
with the Royal Air Force. In the middle of 1926, Williams 
suggested that the United Kingdom Chief of the Air Staff 
should act as a Chief of the Imperial Air Staff, and that the 
Air Staff of each Dominion air force should become sections 
of an Imperial Air Staff.* * 
The reasoning is clear: the navy was supported by the 
Admiralty, the army was linked with the Chief of the 
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Imperial General Staff; perhaps a similar tie for Williams 
could give his office more influence. But there was no 
response from London to his suggestion. Again the reason 
was clear, though not expressed until 1935. As the Plans 
Division of the United Kingdom Air Staff argued, an Imperial 
Air Staff would be inclined to result in a "dictatorship of a 
kind unacceptable to the Dominions or something akin to a 
Mothers' Meeting incapable of efficient control". Moreover 
there was a fear that the Dominions themselves might neglect 
to develop air power and that consequently the Air Ministry 
might find itself in the same position as the Admiralty, 
carrying what seemed to them to be the whole burden of 
Imperial naval defence. Better, argued the Plans Division, to 
leave things as they were.** It followed that Williams's 
approach to the Air Ministry had to be informal and often on 
a personal basis, frequently confidential, and certainly on 
matters of policy, hidden from his minister. 
Defence and civil aviation 
It has been argued that air force interests had to be 
pursued within an inhibiting defence planning structure and 
within a strategic and political framework which did not en-
courage the development of the service. The air force also 
had to counter the influence of the widely held view that 
commercial aviation possessed a viable and immediately 
attainable military significance in the event of war. It is true 
that such a view had the authority of the era's leading air 
power theoretician, but there is no evidence which suggests 
that Australian parliamentarians or civil servants had read 
Douhet in the 1920s.** The attraction was rather one of 
economy. 
The choice of H. C. Brinsmead as the first Controller of 
Civil Aviation and the fact that the Civil Aviation Branch was 
placed under the Department of Defence indicate that a 
defence role was in the government's mind when the branch 
was formed in December 1920. Brinsmead was another with 
a distinguished war record, rising from private to the rank of 
lieutenant colonel. After three months at a flying school in 
1917, he was appointed aviation staff officer serving on the 
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western front. There he was awarded the O.B.E. and a place 
in the British MiHtary Section which went to Versailles.*'' 
With this record, Brinsmead was certain to look for, and find, 
a distinct military value in civil aviation. 
The idea had much support. Aviation enttepreneurs were 
attracted by government subsidies and it was clearly in their 
interests to give their primitive activity military value. The 
example of Captain R. A. Larkin may be cited. Larkin's in-
come from operating an air mail service between Sydney and 
Adelaide came almost entirely from government subsidies.* * 
He argued before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on 
Public Works that he had been "induced to support aviation 
from patriotic motives backed by a promise of the Govern-
ment to support us".*' Larkin felt that he was contributing 
towards the nation's air power, and to some extent he was. 
The Australian press encouraged this attitude. The Sydney 
Morning Herald saw in commercial aviation "the cradle of 
our air defence service".*" When, on another occasion, the 
same newspaper argued that "commercial activity and 
competition will ensure not merely the ttaining of personnel 
but progressive improvement of machines",*' there was the 
implication that private enterprise, with some government 
assistance, would provide for a future air force. The Brisbane 
Courier made this very point: an air force could simply be 
drawn from the pool of commercial pilots, and air defence 
would be assured without the expense of maintaining it.*^ 
The Melbourne Herald agreed. It stressed the point that "the 
ultimate strength of Australia's air force will depend greatly 
upon the development of aerial transportation as a 
business".*^ 
Official attitudes expressed similar sentiments. Captain 
E. C. Johnston, the newly appointed Superintendent of Aero-
dromes, told a Brisbane audience "Australia [would] have to 
depend for some time to come upon the civil aviation corps 
for aerial defence";** Senator Pearce, minister for defence, 
foresaw "a large number of aeroplanes, which while used in 
time of peace for commercial purposes will be readily avail-
able for war should war unfortunately happen".** Goble, as 
Chief of the Air Staff in Williams's absence in England, tried 
to resist. He could see the advantages of a strong commercial 
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aviation system, but at the same time insisted that much civil 
activity simply consisted of "flying from one place to 
another". Air force pilots required more skills than this.** 
The government saw his point: Royal Australian Air Force 
facilities were used to train commercial pilots to air force 
standards. In 1923, for example, five civilians, nominated by 
the Controller of Civil Aviation, were undergoing an eleven 
months' course at Point Cook. Their pay was drawn from air 
force funds, and although they were expected to join 
commercial flying concerns after graduation, they were avail-
able for call-up as fully trained military pilots.*'' 
The air force also acted in some ways as an adjunct to 
commercial flying. It made available spare parts,* * while the 
preparation of the first air mail routes was cartied out by air 
force personnel. The government also hoped to tap the 
defence potential of civil flying by giving financial assistance 
to aero clubs, by providing hangers and aircraft, and by giving 
each approved club a bonus for each pilot trained to "A" 
class standard. This standard was virtually useless for defence 
purposes. Moreover, it was claimed that the aero clubs 
attracted the wrong sort of pupil, usually only the well-off. It 
was later noted that "the people who learn to fly are chosen, 
not for their aptitude, the promise they show, their physical 
qualities, or their value as defence reservists . . . but purely by 
a sort of means test".*' The inference is clear: there was 
little direct defence value to be gained from fostering this 
type of training in the interwar years. 
The same point may be made about the contribution 
commercial aviation itself made directly to defence. Until the 
depression sharply reduced government expenditure, 
$1,086,724 had been allotted to the development of civil 
aviation.''" By 1930 an impressive total of 13,012 Km of 
organized airways existed," but even the main Sydney-
Melbourne route was flown over by Australian National 
Airways without radio aids or communication, weather fore-
casts or terminal reports.''^ The large fleets of commercial 
aircraft envisaged by Pearce did not materialize. Services were 
operated by converted war aircraft. From 1920 to 1926 no 
modern aircraft at all were imported into Australia, while in 
January 1926, only fifty-five commercial aircraft were 
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registered - five more than in 1920.''^ From 1926 the DH50 
(the first type designed after the war as a commercial airliner) 
appeared, but the performance of this machine gave it a low 
defence potential."^ * 
Sufficient money was never allocated to commercial flying 
to realize its defence possibilities. At the same time the air 
force itself was allowed a minor defence vote. The lip-service 
paid to the value of commercial aviation in providing for air 
defence dettacted from the importance of the armed service, 
or at very least, helped to create an opinion which might 
agree to the abolition of the air force as a distinct service and 
the creation of specialist naval and military air arms. 
The attack upon an independent air force 
It has been noted that in 1918 the army was opposed to 
the formation of a separate air force. So was the navy, but 
neither was antagonistic towards the development of 
Australian air power provided it was under naval and military 
conttol.''* The navy was backed by the authority of Lord 
Jellicoe who, perhaps influenced by the poor information he 
had received at Jutland regarding the position of the German 
High Seas fleet,'' ^ planned to include 297 aircraft as part of 
his projected Far Eastern fleet.'''' In 1921 the navy felt that 
the cooperation of air units with any fleet could not be 
"overestimated"''* while in 1923 Commodore Hyde, Acting 
First Member of the Naval Board, argued that any fleet 
action would in future be decided in favour of the fleet 
possessing "the best air force"."" Naturally, it seemed to 
Hyde, such an important contribution to naval victory should 
be controlled by the navy. Legge's view on the importance of 
air power to the conduct of the land battle was shared by his 
successor as Chief of the General Staff, Sir Harry Chauvel. In 
1923 he saw an air force as "an essential adjunct" to the 
army*" and in 1924 made it quite plain that the army should 
control it.*' This army and navy pressure ensured that when 
the Air Force Bill was introduced into the House in June 
1923, it was stressed that the service was designed to nieet 
the "requirements" of the naval and military forces.*^ 
The air force found it most difficult to progress from this 
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assigned position and function in Australian defence. An 
a^ressive air force policy would only have sharpened army 
and navy hostility: indeed the air force is reported as agreeing 
to the interpretation that it should not be regarded as a 
"separate service".*^ As Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby 
recalled in 1953, an air force officer between the wars needed 
courage "to use the word 'air superiority' in a mixed service 
gathering, while the phrase 'independent air operations' was 
certain to land him in trouble".** The situation was similar 
in America. As the historians of the United States Army Air 
Force have remarked "the whole subject of aircraft in 
national defence involved delicate Army-Navy relations, and 
in that dread no-man's-land prudent men ttod softly".** A 
very soft ttead was needed in Australia. English naval 
officers, backed by the Admiralty and buttressed by success-
ive Committee of Imperial Defence rulings, commanded a 
fleet committed to employment within the scheme of 
Imperial defence. 
The first serious attack made on the separate identity of 
the air force after its formation did come from the navy. 
Superficially the issue was the conttol of personnel and air-
craft to be attached to the seaplane carrier Albatross and the 
projected creation of an Australian fleet air arm. Underneath 
this concern lay the deeper and more important question of 
the control of Australian air power. In October 1924, when 
Williams was attending Royal Air Force Staff College, the 
Naval Board proposed the creation of a fleet air arm which 
would be responsible for controlling the seaplanes operating 
from Albatross. One of Bowden's last acts as minister for 
defence was to approve the project a few days before leaving 
office. 
Goble's ex-R.N.A.S. background had obviously led him to 
agree readily to this naval scheme. Certainly if he did see a 
threat to the existence of the air force he failed to combat it. 
Williams did: as soon as he returned to Australia he tried "to 
put a stop to it".* * He was partly successful; the Naval Board 
agreed in November 1925 to hold the scheme in abeyance 
pending further examination. Shortly afterwards, however, 
Admiral Everett was replaced by Hall-Thompson as chief of 
the Naval Staff, and he at once withdrew the agreement to 
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hold the matter over. As Hall-Thompson minuted, there was 
"nothing to be gained from defetting discussion of the main 
issue, viz., the future organisation of the Defence forces of 
Austtalia in relation to air warfare". Hall-Thompson allowed 
for no ambiguity: the air force as a service lacked a raison 
d'ette, there was no enemy within air range, there was no 
need for an "independent striking force", and it therefore 
followed that "the correct objective should be the establish-
ment, as soon as practical, of two separate and distinct Naval 
and Military Air Arms".*'' 
Williams simply could not ignore this direct frontal attack 
on his command. To combat it he possessed two arguments: 
firstly he considered the navy's proposals absurd, and he 
presented them as such; secondly he manipulated the govern-
ment's wish for economy in the defence vote. As he pointed 
out to Howse, then minister for defence, the navy's 
suggestion "cannot be taken seriously". The Washington 
Treaty precluded the acquisition of an aircraft cartier, and 
yet the navy was prepared to send personnel to England to be 
trained in deck-landing techniques. More unreal was the 
proposed size of the force: for the foreseeable future, the 
strength of an Austtalian fleet air arm would not exceed 
twelve pilots and some forty ratings operating twelve sea 
planes. Thus in Williams' view such a duplication of a service 
which the air force was quite capable of operating could not 
be "seriously contemplated" on the grounds of expense 
alone.** However when the question was debated in the 
Defence Committee, Williams, outnumbered, found that it 
was. The committee reported itself "firmly of the opinion 
and recommended that the principle of the Fleet Air Arm 
already approved by the Minister in January 1925 should be 
confirmed".*' Williams's lone dissident views were recorded 
simply for procedure. 
It was now that Williams could turn his Air Ministry 
contacts to advantage. Howse, lacking the confidence to act, 
decided to raise the question in England while attending the 
1926 Imperial Conference. Williams, bypassing Howse, wrote 
direct to Trenchard and su^ested that he might try to use his 
influence on Howse. Williams pointed out, "if you get the 
opportunity of stressing the importance of a separate air 
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service from the point of view of economy as well as from 
the point of view of air defence as such, I think it would be 
an advantage to us".' ^  The fleet air arm question itself was 
still sensitive in England,'' yet Trenchard assured Williams 
that he would do his "best to help you at every point".'^ 
And he did. When the Dominion representatives met at the 
Air Ministry, he told them of the agreement made between 
the Admir^ty and the Air Ministry for the control of naval 
aviation, touched on the point that it was unwise and un-
economical to divide a small force, and ended with a plea 
that he hoped "the controversy was now dead".'^ 
It is not possible to show whether Trenchard did decide 
the question for Howse. What is certain is that Howse had 
taken the navy's suggestion seriously. Possibly it was a 
combination of Williams's logic, Trenchard's authority, and 
the plain desire to save money which shelved the project of 
an Australian fleet air arm until June 1947 when John 
Dedman, minister for defence, announced the Chifley govern-
ment's defence programme. And by this time all three Aus-
tralian Chiefs of Staff agreed that a carrier force would be a 
useful contribution to either collective security or local 
defence.' ^  
The outcome of the clash in 1926, however, had been a 
clear victory for Williams. Opposed by both the army and 
navy, his arguments had been sound and he had not been 
overawed by higher ranking English naval officers. He had 
been quick to realize that Trenchard might have influence 
and had shown no scruple in approaching him directly 
regarding a matter of policy. A compromise was reached over 
operating aircraft from Albatross When commissioned in 
January 1929, the air force undertook pilot training and the 
training of fitters and riggers, while the navy provided and 
ttained its own observers. The seaplanes were provided from 
the naval vote, and the only real concesssion which the air 
force made was that when Albatross was employed in 
operations, all personnel came under the command of the 
Naval Board.' * 
The respite for Williams was short-lived. In 1929, the 
threat against the existence of the air force was revived. The 
suggestion was made by the secretary of the Department of 
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Defence, H. L. Shepherd, that the air force should be merged 
with the army.'* Economy may have been Shepherd's motive, 
but the Defence Committee at once seized upon the 
opportunity to report that "the Defence Committee, with 
the Chief of the Air Staff dissenting, see no reason for main-
taining a separate organisation for the Air Force in Austtalia, 
as conditions are not comparable to those existing in 
European countties".''' Naturally, the Defence Committee 
could see no economy resulting: they wanted to share the air 
force vote between them. Scullin, sttessing the fact that the 
suggestion had not originated from the government, next 
brought the question before the Council of Defence. 
Their meeting was inconclusive. The main opposition to 
the existence of an independent air force came from Monash, 
Brudenell White, and Chauvel for the army; and Rear 
Admiral Munro Kerr and Rear Admiral Evans for the navy. 
Again the arguments were repeated: the air force was an arm, 
not a separate service. Separate arms should be created and 
placed under naval and military command because there was 
no sphere of action for an air force in Australia. It was un-
likely that Scullin would agree, and Theodore made his point 
well when he argued that the "opinion which was opposed to 
the air force was based upon prejudice due to knowledge 
which was not up to date".'* Consequently, a sub-
committee of the council reported that the air force should 
be retained." Perhaps it was possible for the army and navy 
to see that while a Labor government was in office the air 
force would survive. 
The Lyons government raised the question of abolishing it 
almost immediately. When John Latham, then attorney-
general, passed through London in April 1932 he took with 
him a proposal to divide the air force into a naval and 
military arm. Moreover, the air force faced a further threat: 
even if the air force were left intact, the Lyons government 
was to suggest limiting its strength to fifty-five aircraft or 
alternatively to abolish the air force or any other body in 
order to support a projected United Kingdom proposal to 
present the Disarmament Conference with a scheme to out-
law all naval and military flying. 
In April 1932 Latham saw the secretary of state for air, 
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Lord Londonderry, and "sprang upon him the news that the 
Australian authorities were again considering the abolition of 
the Air Force — the proposal apparently being to subordinate 
it to the Army".'"" The deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Air 
Vice Marshal Burnett and the permanent undersecretary for 
air. Sir Christopher Bullock, moved at once to defend air 
force interests. As Burnett argued, an air force "shackled" to 
an army was bound to result in the misuse of air power. To 
the army it was but a "means of indirect assistance to the 
soldier on the ground".'"' Williams, himself, had been 
Sttessing a similiar point of view in Australia since at least 
1926. Between them, Bullock and Burnett drafted a note for 
Lord Londonderry to hand to Latham. Naturally it was over-
whelmingly in favour of retaining the air force as a separate 
service. A merger, it was argued, could only result in false 
economy, and would be a "retrograde" step. War would 
make it necessary to recreate a separate service at the worst 
possible time. Finally it was sttessed that Empire defence 
might suffer if the cooperation between the Royal Air Force 
and the Australian counterpart were to cease or to be en-
dangered.'°^ 
Meanwhile, Williams was putting a similar point to Sir 
George Pearce, minister for defence. In an eight-point argu-
ment, Williams carefully stressed that an independent service 
was maintained in the United Kingdom, that aircraft offered 
"enormous possibilities" for the economical defence of 
Australia, and that Sir John Salmond had thought likewise. 
Moreover, to desttoy the organization built up over eleven 
years would not result in economy but in the misuse of air 
power in the event of war. Clearly Williams was losing 
patience: he demanded that a decision be made once and for 
all regarding the fate of his service "as the continued refer-
ence during recent years to the possibility of the Air Force 
being subordinated to the other services has been a disturbing 
influence in the service and dettimental to the contentment 
of officers and men as to their future."'"^ Obviously 
Williams himself was showing signs of strain. 
In May 1932, Williams advised Sir John Salmond that the 
merger of the army and air force was "still under discussion", 
and asked Salmond to help in defeating the move.'"* But it 
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was Londonderty's note to Latham which appears to have 
decided cabinet. Certainly the next time the matter was 
raised in Parliament, Sir George Pearce announced that the 
air force would retain its autonomy.' °* The army, however, 
never quite gave up hope that it would eventually control its 
own air force. In 1935, for example, Lavarack, Chief of the 
General Staff, was still writing to E. L. Piesse expressing his 
firm belief that the air force would eventually come under 
army command.'"* And the Chief of the Naval Staff gave 
encouragement by implication to this idea.' °^ 
Both, however, were to be disappointed, but in May 1932 
the air force still faced the prospect of extinction as a result 
of the Australian government's attitude to disarmament. 
Again Williams, who felt that a service limited to fifty-five 
aircraft was unrealistic, turned to the Air Ministty for help. 
He at once wrote to Air Vice Marshal Burnett (now heading 
the Air Ministty's delegation at Geneva) and suggested a force 
three times as large. Unless Latham could be persuaded to 
accept this figure, Williams felt that the air force would be 
quite useless.'"8 Burnett took the point: he went further 
than Williams, and argued that Australia should insist on the 
right to "build up" to a force of 228 aircraft.'"' What the 
outcome of this difference in opinion would have been is 
uncertain. In order to break the Geneva deadlock, the United 
Kingdom government decided to propose to the Dis-
armament Conference a total abolition of all naval and 
militaty flying and the imposition of a strict international 
control on civil aviation.''" 
Australia's part in this decision had begun in Januaty 1932 
when Major General Sir Granville Ryrie and representatives 
of the other Dominions had been summoned to a cabinet 
committee meeting to hear the United Kingdom's views on 
the progress made towards an agreed disarmament pro-
gramme. Sir John Simon, secretaty of state for foreign 
affairs, had argued that "he thought that evetyone would like 
vety much to see an effective method of preventing bombing 
from the air or even perhaps the complete abolition of 
militaty aircraft".'' ' When asked what Austtalia might think 
of this proposal, Ryrie said that although he "did not know 
his government's views on air power, he did think that great 
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dependence was placed in Australia on aircraft".'' ^ This 
view, oddly ill-informed for a high commissioner, did not 
affect United Kingdom policy. On 22 Februaty 1932, the 
United Kingdom suggested at Geneva that the conference 
should examine the bombing problem and then, without 
further consultation with the Dominions, the British cabinet 
decided on 11 May 1932 to present their complete-abolition 
proposals.'' ^ 
The Geneva Disarmament Conference was, of course, a 
failure, but the United Kingdom's reasons for wishing to 
abolish militaty aviation were clear. Baldwin may have been 
concerned about the danger air attacks posed to the existence 
of civilization, both for the immediate future and in "fifty 
years time", and certainly he appeared dismayed by the four 
months "manifest futility" which had been displayed at 
Geneva;'' * but it was equally true that, from the United 
Kingdom's viewpoint, abolition was seen to possess naval and 
militaty advantages. As the C.I.G.S. noted for cabinet, "an 
effective total abolition of all naval and militaty aircraft 
throughout the world cannot but be advantageous to this 
countty, as tending to restore to us the sea as our first line of 
defence and as removing the danger of air attack on 
London".'' * Eyres-Monsell, the First Lord, agreed;'' * only 
Lord Londonderty did not. In fact, the secretaty of state for 
air was "extremely sorty" to have seen the suggestion 
made."' ' It made no difference: on 1 June 1932, cabinet's 
decision was cabled to Australia.'' * 
It seems unlikely that Williams was told. Lyons was 
advised that "the utmost secrecy [was] essential especially 
from the point of view of the morale of the air forces con-
cerned". '" Not even the whole of the Austtalian cabinet 
was consulted before Latham was insttucted to give Aus-
tralian support to the proposal. The protection of London 
from air attack was seen as a vitsd Australian interest: 
bombing, it was feared, could affect the efficacy of naval 
power; and while it was realized that the conttol of civil 
aviation might be difficult, the Austtalian government was 
"prepared provisionally to give support [because] of the 
fundamental importance of achieving some real results at the 
Disarmament Conference".'^" Clearly there had been no 
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attempt to assess critically the implications for Austtalian 
defence of complete abolition. If it were in the United King-
dom's Sttategic interests to inflate the value of sea power, it 
was not necessarily in Austtalia's. The nonchalant Australian 
acquiescence in the United Kingdom's proposals might be 
considered ittesponsible. Neither Canada nor South Africa 
agreed to it.' ^' 
Fortunately for the air force, the United Kingdom 
proposal proved impractical and was never made at Geneva. 
By the middle of June, thinking was more along the lines of 
limiting the unladen weight of bombing aircraft, and on this 
technical point Williams was consulted.'^^ But finally the 
debate at Geneva was stopped dead by the withdrawal of 
Germany in October 1933. As illustrating the government's 
attitude to the air force, this episode seems illuminating. 
Sufficient evidence has been given to support the argument 
that the air force occupied a precarious position for the first 
eleven years of its existence. The two senior services were 
hostile and unsympathetic to the concept of an independent 
air force, and the government showed only a mild interest in 
developing it. Indeed, between 1929 and 1932 it showed 
more interest in its abolition. Yet the achievement in 
Australia compared favourably with those of other 
Dominions. Austtalia did follow closely the British pattern, 
and thus entered into rearmament with the nucleus of a force 
capable of expansion. 
New Zealand did not. In 1928 the New Zealand permanent 
air force consisted of five officers and seventeen other ranks. 
Until April 1931, army uniform was worn, and it was not 
until 1 April 1937 that the Royal New Zealand Air Force was 
formed. Even then it had a strength of only 28 officers and 
160 other ranks. Moreover, it was necessaty to appoint an 
English group captain as the first Chief of the Air Staff.' ^ ^ 
In Canada an air force was formed in 1924. It remained 
under the control of the army until shortly before the out-
break of war. Equipped with civilian aircraft only, its 
functions were entirely civil: spotting forest fires, developing 
mail routes, cartying out air surveys, and making customs 
patrols along the coast.'^* The South African air force in 
1932 consisted of one squadron which was used for police 
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work. As the minister responsible pointed out, this squadron 
was required "in view of the long distances to be traversed 
and the semi-barbarous people which his government had to 
control".'^* Regardless therefore of the discouragements 
which Williams and his service had received between 1923 
and 1934, the Royal Australian Air Force had progressed 
considerably further than that. And Williams must take 
personal credit for the fact that it did. 
In 1928, however. Sir John Salmond had argued that the 
service would be incapable of contributing towards 
Australian defence. The position had not changed when in 
October 1934 Sir Archdale Parkhill became minister for 
defence and Austtalia began to rearm. The main explanation 
of this lies in the fact that Austtalia expected to find its 
security provided for by a British fleet based at Singapore. 
This concept was the most important element in determining 
prewar defence planning and decisions affecting the 
development of the three armed services came from it. To 
understand, then, why the air force was not developed into a 
viable defence force and why its expansion was retarded in 
the thirties, it is necessaty to examine the Singapore concept 
and its effect upon Austtalia's defence policy. 
3 
Singapore and Australian 
Defence 1919-34 
The development of a nation's armed forces should 
be tied, if possible, to a clearly defined strategic concept. 
Between the wars, British naval forces operating from the 
Singapore naval base provided the framework of Australian 
defence planning. The main British fleet based at Singapore 
was expected to deny Japan access to Australia's long eastern 
coastline, to the Indian Ocean, to India itself, and to the lines 
of communication with the United Kingdom through the 
Suez Canal. 
Three essential conditions had to be met before this con-
cept became a viable defensive sttategy. The Singapore base 
had to be built and developed to the point where it was 
capable of accommodating and maintaining the British fleet. 
Secondly, the base had to be defended by means other than 
sea power. Thirdly, a naval force in sufficient sttength had to 
be available to defeat the Japanese fleet. It was held by 
sttategists that the course of any Pacific war which involved 
Japan would entail a decisive fleet action.' It followed that 
the British naval forces based at Singapore not only would be 
required to defend the base by their presence, but their main 
function would be to bring the Japanese fleet to action and 
destroy it. Unless these conditions were met, Austtalia could 
not claim to be secure from Japanese attack. 
The Singapore concept should have simplified Australian 
defence planning. Instead it was made more complicated. The 
Imperial defence connection precluded the making of a quid 
pro quo agreement which might have entailed a guarantee 
that the conditions which made the Singapore base the centre 
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of a viable defence system would be met. If, without a 
guarantee, reliance could be placed in the United Kingdom's 
ability to complete Singapore, defend it, and dispatch a fleet 
there, it was sound policy to develop the Royal Austtalian 
Navy as a contribution to Imperial naval defence. The army 
and the air force could then rightfully fill a secondaty role in 
providing for Austtalian security. Any substantial doubt that 
the United Kingdom might be unable to provide both the 
necessaty facilities at Singapore and a substantial naval force 
held the logical consequence that Austtalian defence planning 
would require reorientation. 
A reallocation of priority among the three Austtalian 
armed services, which placed the development and main-
tenance of the navy behind that of the army or air force, 
would have carried an implication of disloyalty to the Im-
perial defence connection. In a war not involving a direct 
threat to Australian territorial integrity, Austtalian naval 
forces could supplement the Royal Navy in protecting the 
Suez canal, the Mediterranean, and the sea-lanes generally. In 
return, a war with Japan which was uncomplicated by Euro-
pean considerations and which did threaten Australia's terti-
toty with attack, would bring the British fleet to the Pacific. 
Thus in the event of a simple one-front war, the Imperial 
system of defence could be expected to function. 
An element of risk existed, however, if the Empire became 
involved in a two-front war. A European power could not 
directly threaten Austtalia, and Japan did not present a prob-
lem to those concerned with the protection of the United 
Kingdom's territorial integrity. A delicate question, there-
fore, was posed to Australian defence planners: how much 
reliance should be placed on a policy which called for the 
dispatch of large naval force to the Pacific at a time when 
the United Kingdom herself might be facing invasion or subs-
tantial commercial blockade? How far could the Royal Navy 
be expected to command Far Eastern waters and at the same 
time ensure her own survival? Would the Austtalian claim for 
protection be met? 
A basic theme of this chapter, and of chapter 6, will be 
that the Australian government was prepared to accept too 
readily and uncriticdly United Kingdom advice and policy. 
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and that consequently vital interests were left unprotected. 
Rear Admiral Sir Percy Grant, then in command of the Aust-
ralian squadron, warned of this possibility even before the 
United Kingdom government had finally decided to build the 
Singapore base. After the Penang conference, called in March 
1921, he reported his considerable doubts as to the value of 
Singapore to Austtalia's defence. He disagreed with the Ad-
miralty's evaluation that "an invasion of Australia was highly 
improbable" and argued that operations greater than "diver-
sionaty" raids could be expected. In this event, he pointed 
out, Singapore was too far from the lines of communication 
between Japan and Australia to provide security. Grant 
strongly recommended that "the situation be watched closely 
and plans revised as the occasion arises".^ This advice did not 
affect the attitude of the Austtalian delegation at the 1921 
Imperial Conference: when the subject of the Singapore naval 
base was raised and contributions towards its cost solicited, 
"not a voice was raised against the proposal".^ As the Com-
mittee of Imperial Defence advised the invasion of Austtalia 
was "highly improbable"; Grant's views were not debated. 
The Austtalian attitude towards the Singapore sttategy 
during the 1920s may be followed through the discussion 
which arose at the successive Imperial conferences. This dis-
cussion proceeded without a sense of urgency and with a 
complacency in which Australia shared. Bruce, for example, 
might have been more persistent with his questioning in 
1923. With the claims of Sydney taking the place of Singa-
pore in mind, he asked Amety, the First Lord, if he were 
convinced that Singapore was the best location for a main 
fleet base; and if Amety were convinced, then how did the 
United Kingdom intend to defend it? Bruce needed reassu-
rance: Austtalia, he argued, would never have agreed to the 
Washington Treaties if there had been any doubt that the 
base would be completed.* 
In reply, Amery set a note of blandness which was charac-
teristic of British statements on Singapore between the wars. 
He quickly disposed of the first point. He argued, quite 
rightly, that although Sydney would provide for Australian 
security if it were to become a main British base, a fleet 
based there could scarcely screen the Indian Ocean trade 
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routes. Singapore, however, would certainly be developed to 
the point where it could accommodate the main fleet in an 
emergency. Pending this contingency, a Far Eastern fleet 
would be formed. It would consist of "a light cruiser squad-
ron and two or possibly three capital ships", and would be 
stationed at Singapore permanently. The base would be 
defended by this naval force and by its garrison. But the main 
defence of Singapore, it seemed to Amety, rested with its 
geography. It was too far from Japan for the Japanese to 
strike at it with an expeditionaty force. And besides. Hong 
Kong would need be overrun before Singapore could be 
attacked.* 
Amety's conclusions were unsound. In 1923 the existence 
of the "ten-year" ruling made the creation of a Far Eastern 
fleet with battleships most unlikely. To expect Hong Kong to 
stop a Japanese southward advance was unrealistic. Under the 
terms of the Washington agreements. Hong Kong's defences 
could not be improved and were certain to deteriorate.* And 
the geographic argument was superficial. Singapore is 
surrounded by land masses and is washed by narrow seas. 
Disregarding the fact that Japan as early as 1922 was building 
a carrier fleet, it was not likely that Japan would move 
against Singapore without first seizing forward areas either in 
the Philippines, British Borneo, or Indo-China.'' Such a cam-
paign would be essential if only to secure interior lines of 
communication. 
Yet Bruce was impressed with Amety, though on his own 
admission he failed to understand fully Amery's argument. 
As Bruce told the conference, "while I am not quite as clear 
as I should like to be as to how the protection of Singapore is 
to be assured, I am clear on this point, that apparently it can 
be done".* Obviously, Bruce had no wish to embarrass 
Amety with closer questioning. Rather it was Smuts who 
raised the really critical point of whether sufficient naval 
power would be sent to Singapore in the event of a two-front 
war. He did so with pessimism; and concluded, "I am vety 
doubtful whether Australia and New Zealand could safely 
rely on a division of the fleet in a future contingency for 
their protection. [Or] . . . by a movement of the fleet from 
here to those waters. I feel vety doubtful about the whole 
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thing.'" In reply, Amety did nothing to remove this doubt. 
With understatement he remarked "we should be in a posi-
tion of extraordinaty difficulty", then continued blithely to 
hope that in the event of a two-front war America could be 
"induced" to become an ally "before the situation in the Far 
East had entirely and irretrievably altered".'° It is difficult 
to understand how Bruce could have accepted this statement 
and its ominous implications for AusttaUa without comment. 
In 1923 America had given no indication that she was 
prepared to fight for another power's security. On the con-
traty, the American rejection of Article 10 of the Covenant 
of tiie League indicated her unwillingness to do so. Yet as 
early as 1923, Australia was told that her security in a two-
front war might be made dependent upon the workings of 
American foreign policy. Over this policy, of course, Aust-
ralia had not the slightest influence. Indeed, the Singapore 
Defence Conference was meeting as late as October 1940 
under terms of reference which postulated American neut-
rality at the outset of a war with Japan.'' With this said, 
however, Bruce in 1923 was prepared to ask the Austtalian 
parliament to contribute towards the cost of constructing the 
Singapore base. 
Australia would have been a contributor but for the elec-
tion in the United Kingdom of Ramsay MacDonald at the 
head of a Labour minority government in Januaty 1924. The 
Labour party, a hostile critic of the Singapore base, ordered 
work on it to be stopped.' ^ By the time af the United King-
dom election in November 1924 and the return of the Con-
servative party led by Stanley Baldwin, committed to 
building the base, Austtalia had designed a five-year defence 
programme which did not allow for a contribution to be 
made. As Bruce told the 1926 Imperial Conference, his 
government had been "quite prepared sympathetically to 
consider the question of contributing towards the establish-
ment of the Singapore Base". Now, however, a five-year 
defence programme represented the "furthest limit" Aust-
ralia could go in providing for its own defence and contribu-
ting towards the defence of the Empire.' ^ 
The short-term threat offered by Japan in the twenties 
warranted this assessment of Australia's defence programme. 
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In 1923, the Foreign Office, assured the Imperial Conference 
that as far as British-Japanese relations were concerned there 
was "not a cloud in the sky".'* A liberal Japanese Diet 
appeared to be exercising a firm control over the militaty, 
and in 1926 Austen Chamberlain argued that Japan un-
doubtedly "desired peace".' * Perhaps this view was a little 
difficult to square with his further argument that a Japanese 
"steadfast aim" was to control southern and possibly 
northern Manchuria in order to exercise "a preponderating 
influence in at least northern China" but, as this ambition did 
not directly concern British interests, the inconsistency 
received no comment. When Baldwin was asked to define the 
function of the Singapore base, he argued that it was "simply 
to give the fleet mobility throughout the Empire". There was 
no apprehension of a conflict with Japan.' * 
By 1930 the need to prepare for war with Japan appeared 
to have receded further. The Kellogg Pact outlawed war, and 
if an aberration should occur then the means of waging war 
had been further limited by the London Naval Treaty.''' The 
"holiday" imposed by the Five Power Treaty at Washington 
was extended to 1936, and there was a world-wide economic 
depression. A pacifist inclined Labour party government held 
office in the United Kingdom and in Austtalia. Ramsay 
MacDonald had revealed his attitude towards the Singapore 
base in 1923. At this time Matthew Charlton, leading the 
Labor party in Australia, had shown a similiar hostility. J. H. 
Scullin, who became prime minister in October 1929, 
thought that the base was unnecessaty. 
In May 1930, the United Kingdom government decided 
that work on the base should be slowed down and that it 
would consult the Dominions about a "permanent settlement 
of the question of the Singapore Base",'* Scullin, whose 
naval policy was already suspect, was advised by the First 
Naval Member, Admiral Munro Kerr, to oppose any proposal 
which placed completion of the base in doubt. Munro Kerr, 
manipulating Scullin's pacifism and his dire need to exercise 
economy, argued that Japan could become hostile to Aus-
tralia if tariff walls were erected or if the White Austtalia 
policy were maintained. A completed Singapore base would 
not only ensure Austtalia's security but in dampening 
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Japanese ambitions might also help to create lasting con-
ditions of stability. He recommended "that Australia [should 
use] her influence to secure the completion and fortification 
of the base. For in no other way can the security of Austtalia 
be so greatly enhanced for so small an expenditure."" 
Scullin remained uninfluenced by this naval opinion. When 
Philip Snowden, chancellor of the exchequer, argued "all the 
present indications seemed to show that we should have free-
dom from war on an extensive scale for a good many years" 
and that consequently work on the base should be slowed 
down, Scullin made no demur. Certainly, he pointed out, 
there were good domestic political reasons why work on the 
base should not be abandoned, but he had no objections to 
Snowden's proposal. 
New Zealand's prime minister, Forbes, held a quite 
different view. He made the point that the existence of the 
Singapore base was considerably more important to Australia 
and New Zealand than it was to the United Kingdom. Britain 
could exist without Singapore; the Dominions had been told 
that they could not. It was for this reason that New Zealand 
had become a conttibutor to the cost of the base in 1923. 
Scullin had argued that "surely the world might become 
more sane in the near future". Forbes rejected tihis premise, 
and was alarmed at Scullin's admission that he had "never 
been greatly impressed with the suggestion that Japan might 
invade Austtalia". Neither could he agree with Scullin's view 
that any "flare-up" would not occur in the Pacific. The 
whole argument that there was little likelihood of war 
seemed specious, and when Arthur Henderson mentioned the 
Kellogg Pact he was sharply reminded that the Kellogg Pact 
was only "ink and paper". 
In 1930, however, the Committee on the Singapore Base 
resolved that although the base would be "ultimately" 
completed, work should be slowed down and the situation 
reviewed in five
 years.^" Forbes's minority and unpopular 
view could not prevail. Yet he had been closer to the ttuth. 
In June 1932, following the Japanese movement into Man-
churia, the Committee of Imperial Defence, without making 
public announcement, decided that consttuction of the base 
required urgent acceleration.^' 
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The Australian armed forces and the Singapore strategy 1921—34 
It has been argued that the army and the air force were 
regarded as comprising the second line of Australia's defence 
and that emphasis was placed on developing the navy as a 
contribution to Imperial sea power. The development of the 
air force has already been discussed and its state of readiness 
noted. Its role as an auxiliaty to the army and navy has been 
outlined and the point has been made that the service was 
regarded as having a home defence function. The develop-
ment of the air force was thus related to the Singapore 
strategy in only a negative sense and the positive value of the 
Royal Australian Air Force in contributing to the viability of 
this Sttategy remained unexplored. 
At the same time, the army was developed with ambiguity. 
Before the Singapore project had been seriously raised, the 
development of the army had been considered by the Senior 
Army Officers' Conference of 1920. This conference 
designed an army of seven militia divisions of 180,000 men 
and gave to it the role of deterring or resisting invasion.^ ^  
The Hughes government approved of the proposal, and the 
organization of this force was planned. The decision to build 
the Singapore base did not lead to a re-evaluation of the 
required sttength of the army. A distinct lack of clearness 
was evident in government policy: either the Singapore 
strategy was, or was not, expected to function. Either 
invasion was, or was not, possible. 
If it were possible, then seven divisions would be required 
to repel an invasion.^ ^  If it were not possible, then the army 
required a small, mechanized and well-equipped, highly 
mobile force which would be available to repel, raiding 
parties.^* Neither the Hughes nor the Bruce government 
provided either. There was never an intention to maintain 
seven divisions at effective sttength or in a condition from 
which they could be quickly mobilized. In 1927, for 
example, the considered effective sttength of the militia was 
42,887.^ * The service chiefs saw this strength as being "well 
below the minimum requirements for national safety".^* 
The government could have well pointed out to them that 
some forty thousand troops designed to function as an 
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adjunct to the Singapore strategy were quite sufficient to 
meet the expected scale of attack. Even when the Scullin 
government suspended compulsoty militaty training and the 
strength of of the militia declined to 28,285, it could still be 
argued that this force if cortectly organized would have been 
sufficient to repel a landing party. A government committed 
to the Singapore strategy could have overridden the self-
interested militaty opinion. 
To have insisted that the army should be designed to 
function as an efficient second line of defence, however, 
would have meant reequipping a smaller formation. Neither 
government was prepared to do that. The equipment of the 
army came largely from five-divisional sets sent to Australia 
from the United Kingdom after the war. Obviously it was felt 
that all this equipment had to be used; consequently "much 
time and money from vety limited allocations were expended 
on the training of horsed cavalty divisions. Such outmoded 
tystems of organisation and training were translated into 
evety other aspect of [the] pre-war Army."^'' In 1934 the 
army was still operating with "mid-war" type equipment, and 
critically for a basically infantty force, it lacked such funda-
mental items as modern infantty weapons.^* As Colonel 
Harrison, a United Australia party member of the House had 
said, it would have been "nothing less than murder" to send 
such a force into the field against properly trained and 
equipped troops.^' 
Clearly the existence or otherwise of the Singapore naval 
base was not a significant factor governing the organization 
and development of the army. The sttategic framework of 
Austtalian defence was largely ignored except when it was 
used to justify the expenditure of the larger proportion of 
the defence vote on the navy as Australia's contribution to 
Imperial defence. The navy, as Australia's first line of 
defence, should have developed considerably more potential 
if not immediately applicable power. But it did not. The 
development of the Royal Austtalian Navy in the 1920s was 
an expensive bungle. The basis of the postwar navy was laid 
by measures introduced in the Defence Equipment Bill 
presented to the House in June 1924. This bill provided for 
the acquisition of two 10,000 8-inch cruisers, two large 
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submarines, and the seaplane carrier. Albatross. These ships 
were to form part of what was expected to become a four-
cruiser force and a flotilla of six submarines.^" 
The Admiralty had been consulted before this programme 
was adopted. In 1921 and again in 1923, Australia had been 
advised to acquire neither destroyers, because of their limited 
range, nor aircraft carriers, because they were unproven. 
Austtalia was told to acquire four cruisers, six submarines, 
and a seaplane carrier.^' As a result of partially following 
this advice, however, Rear Admiral Munro Kerr, when he 
took up his appointment as First Naval Member in 1929, 
could only refer to the navy as a "heterogeneous collection 
of vessels"^ ^  which were neither "fish, flesh, fowl, nor good 
red herring".^ ^  In no way could the navy be regarded as an 
armed service capable of making an effective contribution to 
Empire naval defence. The rationale of Austtalia's defence 
policy had ceased to exist. 
The initial error lay in the Austtalian acceptance of 
Admiralty advice to acquire cruisers and submarines in the 
expectation that they would operate together. By 1930 the 
Admiralty itself was forced to admit that such advice had 
been "hardly sound".^* By this time it had come to the 
conclusion that it was "hardly safe" for 8-inch cruisers to 
operate in narrow waters without a destroyer screen,^ * and 
although the United Kingdom had given Australia six "S" 
class desttoyers in 1920, they were not expected, some nine 
years later, to perform "regular destroyer duties" in the event 
of war.^* It followed from this assessment that the navy 
would be unable to steam its cruisers in northern Austtalian 
waters, or in the waters around Singapore. 
Instead of destroyers, the navy possessed two submarines, 
Otway and Oxley. Both were ordered late in 1924 and were 
laid down in March 1925 at an estimated cost of $904,000 
each. They sailed from the United Kingdom to Austtalia in 
Februaty 1928, and, after a long delay at Malta while a 
defect was repaired, they arrived in Sydney in Februaty 
1929. These ships saw six months restricted service in Aus-
tralian coastal waters, and then in April 1931 they were 
transferred to the Royal Navy.^'' Clearly Australia had 
acquired a vety specialized arm of naval warfare which 
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needed constant maintenance for no purpose. Yet through 
the adoption of the submarine policy the operational effect-
iveness of the cruisers had been neutralized. In fact, the navy 
had been so poorly developed in the 1920s that when Sir 
George Pearce became minister for defence in 1932 he was 
prepared to ask the United Kingdom to provide cruisers and 
destroyers on permanent loan and consequently to reduce 
the status of the navy.''* Pearce's suggestion was not 
adopted, the Royal Austtalian Navy continued to own its 
ships, but the critical lack of destroyers was only overcome in 
1933 by securing four of them on temporaty loan from the 
Royal Navy. ^ ' 
Australia was defenceless when the Lyons government took 
office in Januaty 1932. Work on the Singapore naval base 
had been slowed down and the Australian armed services 
were incapable of worthwhile operations. Naturally the-
United Australia party blamed Scullin for the state of the 
armed services but such blame was misplaced:*" the Bruce-
Page government failed to provide for a contingency which 
called for the application of power. When the Lyons govern-
ment took office it was obvious that only considerable future 
expenditure on defence which was closely related to a careful 
development plan could rescue the armed forces from their 
ineffectual state. The influence of the Singapore strategy on 
the development of the armed services required careful re-
thinking. 
In Januaty 1932 the Lyons Cabinet considered defence 
and the principles which should govern the organization of 
the armed services. The conceptual framework postulated 
and adhered to by the Bruce-Page Cabinet was reaffirmed. As 
the cabinet recorded 
The provision of sea-power for the defence of sea-borne trade 
simultaneously furnishes a deterrent against invasion by sea-borne, 
land or air-forces, and a general defence against raids. An adequate 
naval strength is of fundamental importance to Empire and Aus-
traUan defence and the Australian Navy should be maintained at a 
strength which is an effective and fair contribution to Empire Naval 
Defence.*' 
Clearly, British sea power based upon Singapore was 
considered both necessaty and sufficient to ensure Australian 
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security. The army and the air force were expected to 
counter raids, while the army was also required to possess the 
capability to form an expeditionaty force inside three 
months. The air force would be required to supply an aircraft 
component for this force. Apart from this commitment, the 
Sttength of the air force was determined by the resolution 
that "the aircraft provided for Naval co-operation will be the 
strength required by the Navy for fleet co-operation, the air-
craft provided for defence against raids will be the sttength 
necessaty for co-operation with the Army and defence of 
vital localities against raids". In August 1932 these principles 
were approved by the British Chiefs of Staff,* ^  while in 
August 1933 Bruce in London again sought direction.*^ 
On this occasion, Bruce had gone further. It has already 
been noted how he raised the question of priority in develop-
ment among the three services, but now he also showed 
concern that the Singapore strategy might not function. Even 
with the Singapore base completed, he argued, there might 
well be doubts that a sufficiently strong naval force would be 
sent there in an emergency.** The subject was quickly 
changed, but in October 1934, Sir Maurice Hankey came to 
Australia to advise on defence and particularly to offer re-
assurance on Bruce's point. Hankey's visit led to the first 
comprehensive debate among the services and the govern-
ment on the efficacy of the Singapore sttategy. It led also to 
a sharp questioning of the government's sea power orienta-
tion, and the wisdom of seeking security inside the Imperial 
defence framework. 
Sir Maurice Hankey and the Australian armed services 1934—35 
October and November 1934 was not an ideal time for 
Hankey to visit Austtalia. The government was reshuffled, 
and as he complained, ministers had been engaged in "almost 
incessant" cabinet meetings. With portfolios to acquire and 
domestic business to discuss, so Hankey had to advise 
Malcolm MacDonald, under-secretaty in the Dominions 
Office, ministers had little time to consider longer ranging 
defence questions. Moreover he was hampered, he felt, by the 
fact that the government insisted that his investigations be 
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kept secret. Although publicly it was given out that his visit 
was connected with the Melbourne centenaty celebrations, 
few were deceived and most suspected clandestine activity.* * 
Despite difficulties, Hankey proved to be an energetic in-
vestigator. His first discussions were with Sir George Pearce in 
Perth, but by the time he had reached Melbourne sixteen 
days later, Parkhill had become minister for defence and dis-
cussions were continued with him. While in Melbourne, he 
had spent two days with the Defence Committee, then he 
ttavelled to Canberra, Sydney, and Brisbane. In Canberra he 
had a long talk with Lyons, and then, at Lyons's instigation, 
spoke to Scullin and Earle Page.* * He returned to Melbourne 
and again met the Defence Committee, then visited the 
government munitions factories and air force units at Point 
Cook and Laverton.*'' His report, when handed to Parkhill 
on 14 November 1934, contained a comprehensive survey of 
Australian defence problems. It ranged from a consideration 
of naval defence, through to the implementation of air raid 
precautions, down to the correct way to keep Committee of 
Imperial Defence documents in safe custody. But above all, 
Hankey's report was aimed at reinforcing the government's 
policy of maintaining sea power as the first line of defence 
and of trusting in the efficacy of the Singapore strategy.^ * 
Before he left England, Hankey had realized that the Aus-
ttalian government would expect a restatement of Imperial 
defence principles for the Far East. As he told Baldwin, then 
Lord President in MacDonald's National government, all 
previous evaluations of Australian defence problems had been 
made on the assumption "that there will be a naval base at 
Singapore sufficiently strongly defended to hold out until the 
artival of the Main Fleet of capital ships which thereafter 
provides the shield to cover the whole of our interests".*' He 
was certain thus to be asked if in "all circumstances" Aus-
ttaUa could rely on the artival of the fleet in an emergency. 
Indeed, Hankey stated that he was quite prepared to cancel 
his Australian visit unless he could receive assurance from 
Baldwin, in writing, that the Singapore base would be 
completed and that sufficient naval strength would be made 
available for dispatch there in an emergency.*" Hankey's 
doubts had been raised by a conversation with Neville 
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Chamberlain who, as chancellor of the exchequer, apparently 
let it be known that he was opposed to spending any more 
money on the project. As well as this Hankey could have 
remembered Winston Churchill who, also as chancellor of the 
exchequer, frequently entered into tirades against the 
expense of Singapore when he attended meetings of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence.*' 
The assurance which Hankey got from Baldwin fell far 
short of a guarantee. It was a promise that Singapore would 
be developed with the object of enabling a fleet to be sent 
there in any "major emergency". As soon as it was financially 
possible, the deficiencies in British naval sttength would be 
made up as the results of the Naval Conference to be held in 
1935 warranted.*^ On the basis of Stanley Baldwin's assur-
ance, Hankey was prepared to continue to advise the Aus-
tralian government to base its defence programme on the 
Singapore sttategy. In fact, Hankey implied that there was no 
choice. As he minuted Baldwin, "Personally I cannot con-
ceive any alternative system of defence of our Imperial 
interests in the Far East, including those of the Dominions, 
that is not based on our centuries-old assumption of Sea 
Power."* ^ With this conclusion, Hankey's report was an 
honest attempt to infuse consttuctive thought into Austtalian 
defence planning. 
For example, although he had full confidence in the 
functioning of the Singapore sttategy, he had little tympathy 
with those proponents of what he called the "mere raid" 
theoty. In his view, national safety simply could not be 
calculated on so nartow a margin. To meet the threat on 
Australian territorial integrity, he argued that the army had 
to be reorganized to cany out two separate tasks. It had to 
be strong enough to defeat any attack which fell short of 
full-scale invasion, and it had to be capable of expansion into 
an expeditionaty force which could then be dovetailed into 
Imperial units. The size of the army had to be reduced, and 
its efficiency increased. Thus an army of 35,000 organized 
into two infantty divisions, three cavalty brigades, and four 
mixed brigades should be ideal. If this force possessed 
mobility, then it would be more than ample to deal with the 
anticipated scale of Japanese attack. 
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Other and not so obvious advantages would be entailed in 
such a reorganization. The army, Hankey argued, was a clearly 
visible manifestation of armed force. The government could 
not afford to cut expenditure because, if in the event of war 
such a manifestation were absent, public opinion might 
demand the retention of Austtalian naval forces in local 
waters. Consequently the execution of Imperial plans could 
be hampered. Hankey saw the suggested militaty organization 
and establishment as a compromise between the view that the 
army was unnecessaty since Singapore provided Austtalia's 
security, and the view that the army had to be organized to 
repel invasion because Singapore provided at best a most un-
certain security. 
On the viability of the Singapore strategy, however, 
Hankey was at his most reassuring. He admitted that the 
provision for Imperial defence in the Far East was vety weak 
but he was confident that by the end of 1936 the British 
rearmament programme would ensure that a sttong deterrent 
would be presented to any Japanese southwards aggression. 
Certainly, he agreed, there was no definite commitment to 
send a fleet to Singapore, but he had no doubt whatsoever 
that the United Kingdom would do so in an emergency. It 
was not only sentimental attachment to Austtalia which 
would prompt this action: rather it was the "immense stake" 
which the United Kingdom herself had in Far Eastern ttade 
and in the region's economy. In the "vety extreme case of 
simultaneous trouble in Europe and the Far East without our 
having allies in either theatre", Hankey argued that Australia 
could still rely on Britain even though the situation would 
impose a severe strain on Imperial
 resources.* ^  
The reaction to Hankey's prognosis among the Australian 
armed services was mixed. Pearce had told Hankey in Perth 
that differences of opinion among the services had become 
"acute". The army, Pearce said, wanted to prepare against 
full-scale invasion, the air force wanted to repel such an 
invasion with air power, while the navy argued that there was 
no need to prepare against invasion at all.** While Hankey 
was in Australia, the Chiefs of Staff did not debate their 
differences. Indeed, Hankey claimed to Baldwin that between 
the time he had landed in Perth and his arrival in Melbourne, 
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"the Australian chiefs of staff had come together."** But 
not for long: as soon as Hankey left, their important differ-
ences were again revealed. The navy accepted the wisdom and 
authority of Hankey's report with Uttle question; the army 
rejected Hankey as an adviser on Australian defence planning 
almost entirely. As Major General J. H. Bruche, Chief of the 
General Staff, commented: "Sir Maurice Hankey's opinion 
by reason of his great experience in Imperial affairs must be 
viewed with respect. Nevertheless the direct responsibility for 
militaty advice upon the problem of the defence of Austtalia 
rests upon the naval, miUtaty and air advisers of the Aus-
tralian government."*'' The Chief of the General Staff 
designate. Colonel J. D. Lavarack, was blunter. As he argued 
"there is vety little better reason for following British advice 
on local defence than there would be for following AusttaUan 
advice on the defence of London against air attack".** Only 
WilUams, among the service chiefs, presented a balanced view. 
Indeed it could be interpreted as an attempt to give substance 
to the 1923 Imperial defence resolutions. Austtalia's 
interests, he argued, did not lie in detachment from the 
Committee of Imperial Defence, but "rather in closer liaison 
and more intimate cooperation with them in the preparation 
and development of all plans".*' 
The army's nationalism was probably directed at contain-
ing the naval ambitions of the Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice 
Admiral Hyde.*" Hyde was a committed proponent of the 
"mere raid" theoty: he wished to reduce even further the 
importance of the army and the air force in providing for 
Austtalia's defence. Not only he argued, was there immunity 
from Japanese invasion but also no likelihood of a raid in 
force. The heaviest scale of attack which might be expected 
would be minor coastal raids and perhaps attacks on the 
sea-borne coastal ttade: "the popular Austtalian idea of a 
Japan of seventy million pairs of eyes all directed at Aus-
ttalia's open spaces [was] vety wide of the mark". And 
besides, if Japan did attack Austtalia it would not be with an 
army but by naval blockade which would cause a withering 
away of economic life and a collapse of morale.*' 
It followed that sea power afforded the only effective 
method of defence: "Empire sea power", Hyde argued. 
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"affords, at one and the same time, defence against invasion 
of Australian territoty and adequate protection of her sea-
borne trade." Hyde accepted without question that the 
Singapore base would be completed and that a powerful 
British fleet would be sent there in an emergency. He thus 
concluded: "It foUows that anything that Austtalia can do to 
increase the Naval strength of the Empire wiU be the most 
effective conttibution she can make towards not only Empire 
but her own defence. Therefore her primary and main 
defence commitment must be the provision of a naval 
force."^"^ Hyde was a convinced disciple of Admiralty 
poUcy.* ^  
It is difficult to know precisely what WilUams thought: 
there is a certain timidity in his appreciations. In 1930 he had 
argued that the existence of Singapore was "essential to the 
security of sea and air communications with Australia"*^ 
and in 1932 there was no recorded objection from him to the 
principles of defence laid down by the Lyons Cabinet. In 
1935 he was still arguing that Australia's first line of defence 
lay at Singapore, but now he noted that there would always 
be doubt as to whether, and in what sttength, British naval 
forces would be moved there. He was aware that it had 
always seemed a remote and slightly fantastic possibility to 
the Committee of Imperial Defence that Australia might have 
to use her army and air force to drive back an invasion,* * but 
he did have himself a clear grasp of what the air force 
required to give it this capability. The air force would need at 
least to be as strong as any carrier-borne force the Japanese 
could employ. This, he calculated, would be 367 aircraft in 
1935 rising to 570 by 1938. 
It was not beyond the capacity of the government, 
Williams argued, to equip the air force with the means to 
withstand such a scale of attack. But obviously he was more 
concerned with reinforcing his gains over the previous two 
years and in emphasizing the need to complete the already 
agreed air force programme** than with proposing an 
expansion to meet invasion. Thus WiUiams concluded "our 
immediate policy and one which will keep us occupied for 
some few years must be to provide for defence against raids". 
Of course this was realistic: the air force had to be able to 
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deal with raids before it could hope to stop an invasion. 
Nevertheless, the doubts he held regarding the Singapore 
strategy might have led him to at least prepare a plan for 
accelerated air force expansion. 
Of course, Williams may have felt that there was little 
point in preparing plans which stood so little chance of 
becoming part of government policy. It was thus left to the 
army to make the only rigorous examination of Hankey's 
report. To the Chief of the General Staff, the Australian 
government was being asked to accept as the first premise of 
all its defence planning that the main British fleet would be 
sent to Singapore in an emergency. The army argued that a 
more reasonable assumption would be that British naval 
forces would be retained in home waters in direct defence of 
United Kingdom interests. The Royal Navy, the argument 
ran, was simply not strong enough to fight a two-front war, 
and only a firm guarantee that a British fleet would be 
dispatched to Singapore inside a specified time would 
warrant Australian acceptance of the Singapore strategy. 
Lavarack carefully made the point: Australia's defence policy 
could not be made "contingent on the presence of the British 
Main Fleet at Singapore unless there [was] a vety firm 
guarantee from the government in the United Kingdom as 
regards the strength of the naval force to be sent and the time 
of its arrival at Singapore".*' Otherwise, as Bruche pointed 
out, the Australian government was expected "to place 
reliance upon a contingency over which it [had] no sort of 
control".^ ^ Sir Maurice Hankey had not given a guarantee, 
and it seemed very doubtful if the United Kingdom ever 
could or would. 
A guarantee was the minimum requirement, bat even if it 
were given, Lavarack argued, the Singapore strategy remained 
suspect. The base itself might not be completed: the 
vacillation which had already surrounded its construction left 
room for doubt. If completed, then it might not be properly 
defended and thus left open to capture. On these vital points 
Australia had no control over the United Kingdom policy. 
And there was a further consideration. Assuming that all the 
requirements which allowed the Singapore strategy to 
function were met, the result would be a fleet action between 
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the Japanese and British fleets. As there was no reason to 
suppose that Japanese seamen were inferior in efficiency and 
determination to British seamen, then it followed that the 
British fleet might be defeated. Bruche could quote Churchill 
to the effect that "JeUicoe was the only man on either side 
who could lose the war in an afternoon", and make it 
pertinent. One conclusion which the army reached therefore 
was that the Singapore strategy was based on the flimsiest of 
supports; Australia had no choice but to abandon it. 
The policy which had to replace it was one of self-reliance. 
The United Kingdom would be an ally in war, but it could 
not be a protector. It would be land and air forces which 
would provide security backed by development of a 
munitions supply industty. The navy, the army argued, 
should be maintained at its 1935 level as a contribution 
towards Imperial defence, but if it were to remain the largest 
consumer of defence funds the land forces would gradually 
be throttled and the cortect development of the air force 
prevented. Hankey's report had simply been inspired by 
Whitehall interests to which Australian defence was "but an 
incident in a world-wide problem". The government was 
clearly warned: if the army's advice were disregarded at the 
request of these "detached" WhitehaU authorities, then the 
government had to be prepared "to assume a responsibility of 
the vety gravest kind". And in this event, the army could see 
only disaster. 
Parkhill quickly became tired of being so reminded. At a 
Council of Defence Meeting in August 1936, Lavarack was 
told to mind his own business. As ParkhiU argued "the special 
observations of the Chief of the General Staff involve im-
plications of a highly political nature and the subject is one 
solely for the United Kingdom and Commonwealth govern-
ments". The services, ParkhiU said, should confine their 
remarks to the purely technical aspects of the Singapore 
strategy.*' Yet Lavarack's attitude continued to pervade the 
army's view of Imperial defence. On 8 September 1939, the 
Dominions Office suggested the raising of an Australian 
expeditionaty force and postulated safety in Japan's 
neutrality. Although Major General Squires, a British officer, 
was acting C.G.S. during Lavarack's absence in England, the 
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army was quick to make the point that it had been arguing 
virtually throughout the interwar period. One hypothesis had 
been disregarded by the Dominions Office, namely a hostUe 
Japan. At once the question of a likely scale of attack was 
raised and the point was put that "while Japan's attitude was 
doubtful, it would be unwise to send overseas an expedition-
ary force of any great size".''" Clearly the army remained 
suspicious of Whitehall, and could still foresee disaster. 
4 
The Air Force and the 
Imperial Connection 
1934-39 
The air force and the Salmond report 
To fit the air force to meet the ultimate test of 
war, the Australian government drew upon the experience 
and authority of the Air Ministty and the United Kingdom 
Air Staff. The relationship was not always amicable. 
Occasionally the Air Board showed its independence, and so 
did Archdale Parkhill and H. L. Shepherd, secretaty to the 
Department of Defence. As Shepherd dtyly remarked on one 
occasion when faced with an objection from the British 
Empire Union in Australia objecting to his policy "one 
countty did not always have to be right merely because of its 
geographical location".' Neither was the Imperial relation-
ship always valuable to Australia: more often it may be 
shown that the United Kingdom placed its varied interests 
weU before the development of Australia's defence potential. 
By September 1939, however, the Royal Australian Air 
Force had been investigated by two ex-Chiefs of the Air Staff 
of the Royal Air Force. Their reports were to have an import-
ant and continuing effect upon the development and 
command of the air force.^ It has been noted that in 1928 
Sir John Salmond had argued that the air force was unfitted 
for war. He did, however, confirm the leadership of the 
service by WiUiams. In 1938, Sir Edward ElUngton approved 
in general terms of the development of the air force, but felt 
that WilUams had to be replaced as Chief of the Air Staff. A 
result of this report was that in 1940 Air Chief Marshal Sir 
Charles Burnett of the Royal Air Force took up the appoint-
ment. 
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Forms of cooperation between the Australian and British 
air forces were laid down before Salmond cartied out his 
investigations. It is difficult to argue that Australia gained 
much benefit from this cooperation which might have 
fostered the development of its air power. For example, there 
was the interchange of personnel between the two services. In 
1921, the United Kingdom Air Staff had suggested that 
aviation lent Itself "in a high degree to Imperial organisation 
on a world-wide basis" and that consequently Dominion air 
forces should use Royal Air Force facilities and adopt stand-
ard ttaining manuals.^ At the 1923 Imperial Conference, the 
United Kingdom proposed offering short-service commissions 
to Royal Australian Air Force officers in the Royal Air 
Force. Australia agreed to accept this offer in principle, and 
at a meeting held at the Air Ministty in Januaty 1924 it was 
argued in detail.* 
The scheme had two basic ideas. Trenchard, perhaps in-
fluenced by Douhet,* held that the application of air power 
exercised by a strategic bombing force would prove decisive 
in future war. Casualties were expected to be high among his 
air crew however, in the early stages of the war. If Dominion 
primaty and advanced training facilities could be used, then 
operational training could be given by the Royal Air Force to 
holders of short-service commissions. A reserve of trained air 
crew could thus be buUt up which would be used to reinforce 
R.A.F. squadrons in an emergency. In the meantime, these 
reinforcements would be no strain on the air estimates. In 
return, the Dominions would benefit: air crew would return 
to the Dominions with four years' operational training 
acquired at United Kingdom expense. 
The transfer of Australian pilots to the Royal Air Force on 
short-service commissions began in Januaty 1927, and by 
March 1931 forty-one members of the Royal Australian Air 
Force had been gazetted under the scheme.* Of the forty-
three pilots expected to graduate from Point Cook in 1937, 
twenty-five had already been selected to go to England.'' 
After the 1937 Imperial Conference, the Australian govern-
ment agreed to increase the intake at Point Cook, and then to 
send a further fifty graduates to the United Kingdom.* In 
1938, Sir Edward ElUngton viewed the practice with alarm: 
66 Air Force and Imperial Connection 
his point was that the Royal Australian Air Force might find 
itself short of air crew to man its own developing squadrons 
if it continued.' Although the Air Board protested that 
Ellington was unduly concerned,'" the scheme was 
suspended in Australia in July 1938. ' ' 
The value of the scheme to Australia was limited. The 
operational experience gained in England had little direct 
application to solving the problem of Australia's defence. 
Geographical isolation ruled out the need to foster a bomber 
force with a city-strike and counter-strike capacity, and the 
techniques of employing fighter aircraft were different, and 
had to be given the nature of the threat to each countty. 
Indeed, the United Kingdom Air Staff held the view that 
fighters were the least suitable type to provide for Australia's 
air defence.' ^ The Royal Australian Air Force was regarded 
as an auxiliary to the army and the navy: the problems and 
tactics of close ground support were little taught in England 
between the wars,' ^ while navigation, an essential skill if a 
pilot were to operate over water, was approached up to the 
late thirties in a light-hearted fashion by the Royal Air 
Force.' * 
Those officers attached to the Royal Air Force to attend 
courses in photography and armament may have benefited 
from an acquaintance with varied equipment, but even this 
may be doubtful. Gunnety training, for example, was out of 
date: even as late as 1937 the Royal Air Force had no central 
gunnery school.' * It is true that Andover and Camberley 
offered courses in staff work and strategy, but again it had a 
doubtful application to AustraUan defence. When Sir John 
Northcott attended the Imperial Defence College in 1935 a 
major part of the course consisted of a tour of the battle-
fields of France.' * Camberley, according to Slessor who was 
in a position to know, was certainly concerned with re-
fighting the trench war of 1914—18 and consequently "living 
in a fool's paradise".''' The system of sending senior Royal 
Australian Air Force officers to England, however, did allow 
the Royal Air Force, which was suffering from the effects of 
the "ten-year" rule, to find employment for some of its 
middle-rank officers in Australia. Between 1927 and 1929, 
the posts of Director of Supply and Research, Director of 
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Training, and Director of Organization and Staff Duties were 
held by Royal Air Force squadron leaders.' * 
It was also suggested at the 1923 Imperial Conference that 
the Dominions might benefit from receiving a quarterly air 
Uaison letter which would be dispatched over the signature of 
the United Kingdom Chief of the Air Staff." Until the late 
thirties, these letters were of small value. They did not 
contain information which was considered "in the interests 
of secrecy or policy undesirable to communicate".^" Thus, 
although the document was marked secret, it generally 
contained little which was not already published in the 
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, the R.A.F. 
Quarterly and the Aeroplane. Otherwise they were filled with 
detailed and intensely dull accounts of air operations directed 
against the intransigent tribesmen of the North West 
Frontier, the Transjordan, and Aden. By 1936, the character 
of the quarterly Air Liaison Letter changed and it became 
concerned largely with aviation technical developments. 
Although this was regarded as a sign of "deterioration" in 
London,^' the letters were considerably more use to Aus-
tralia after 1934 when it began to rearm and to order aircraft 
from the United Kingdom. 
The rearmament programme of the Royal Austtalian Air 
Force when it did begin was based upon the scheme sub-
mitted by Salmond in 1928. Until then, disarmament pro-
posals and the depression had caused it to be shelved. As with 
only slight modification the air force was developed accord-
ing to Salmond's recommendations until just before the out-
break of war, it is necessaty to examine his concept of the 
employment of AustraUan air power in some detaU. 
In January 1928, Bruce cabled the Dominions Office with 
a request that a senior Royal Air Force officer be made avail-
able to visit Australia to report on the organization, training, 
and equipment of the Royal Australian Air Force, and upon 
AustraUan air defence generally.^ ^  WilUams in no way re-
garded this as a slight. In fact he argues now that the idea was 
originally his and that he hoped to get a larger share of the 
defence vote as a result of the visit.^ ^ Williams had his own 
ideas, however, on how the air force should be expanded. In 
April 1925, for example, he attacked in a carefully argued 
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memorandum, the five-year defence programme which had 
resulted in the costly submarine and cruiser poUcy. With con-
siderable vigour he argued that it was his "duty" to draw the 
government's attention to "the inadequacy of the provision 
for and the lack of proportion in the size of the Air Force 
contemplated as compared to the other services".^* The air 
force provided in the defence programme consisted of four 
squadrons and one flight. Williams had a plan which called 
for an air force estabUshment in all states by 1934. 
WiUiams saw an air force consisting of ten and one-third 
fighter squadrons, seven and two-thirds bomber squadrons, 
six army cooperation flights and six flights of amphibians. To 
1934, WilUams calculated the capital and maintenance costs 
to run at $5,000,000 each year. Maintenance costs after 1934 
for this force would total $3,600,000 each year. These 
proposals may only be interpreted as an attempt by Williams 
to bring the need for what he considered adequate air 
defence requirements before the government. He must have 
known that this plan was so much at variance with the views 
of the government that there was no chance that it would be 
implemented or even seriously considered. 
Williams must have been disappointed if he expected 
Salmond to advocate a simUar scheme of expansion. 
Salmond, however, held the view that Australia's main 
defence lay at Singapore, and although he could argue that 
air power should be regarded a s " a primary consideration in 
framing aU future schemes of defence",^ * he felt that the air 
force had only to concern itself with defence against raids. As 
invasion was not Ukely, it followed that a large air force was 
not required. The force he suggested, therefore, was designed 
simply to offer "a considerable measure of defence against 
hostile sea-borne attack".^ * Moreover, it increased the force 
already provided for by the government to only five 
squadrons and four flights. If an Army Cooperation 
Squadron, two Bomber-Reconnaissance Squadrons, and two 
flights of flying-boats were added to the two Composite 
Squadrons and the Fleet Cooperation flights already in exis-
tence,^ '' then this force, concentrated in Victoria and New 
South Wales, could protect the eastern seaboard and use the 
developing air routes to reinforce Albany, Darwin, and Bris-
bane. 
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Salmond reaUzed that this force, and its deployment, 
denied the air force the capabiUty to meet simultaneous 
attacks on the eastern coast and strUces to the northwest, the 
north, or the northeast. Albany, Darwin, and Brisbane would 
be left undefended because the concentration of population 
and the wealth of attractive targets on the east would 
demand air protection. Certainly, such a scale of attack was 
most unUkely, Salmond argued, but it remained true that 
Albany and Darwin were vital centres. Obviously with the 
dispatch of an Australian expeditionaty force to the United 
Kingdom or the Middle East in mind, Salmond felt that 
Albany would be the principal convoy assembly port in war-
time; Darwin was essential as a subsidiaty operational base 
and refuelUng point for the British fleet steaming from Singa-
pore. In the secret part of his report, Salmond attempted to 
solve these problems. 
The solution was not ambitious. Darwin, he argued, could 
be defended as well as Albany by adding two-thirds of a 
fighter squadron to Sydney, a flight of torpedo-bombers at 
Port Macquarie, two flying boat flights at Albany, and the 
formation of a Citizen Air Force bomber squadron in the 
Perth—Albany area.^ * To implement part one of his scheme, 
Salmond calculated would cost $2,381,000 in capital charges 
and $1,217,600 each year in maintenance costs, while part 
two would cost an additional $2,431,600 in capital costs and 
$688,880 in maintenance. Development for both parts of the 
scheme should be spread over nine years, but if part two of 
the scheme were completed it would approach the "ideal" 
plan for Australian air defence.^ ' 
Such a claim may be questioned. To defend Darwin from a 
landing in force by attempting to sink transports with only 
three torpedo bombers stationed some 3000 km away seems 
optimistic. If these ttansports were protected by only one 
light carrier, the nine fighter aircraft which could be dep-
loyed could easily be overwhelmed.^" But at least part of 
Salmond's scheme was realistic enough to gain government 
approval. When defence poUcy was announced in August 
1934, the promise was made to complete part one of the 
scheme inside three years. Attainment of the "ideal" was not 
contemplated, but if Salmond had tackled more seriously the 
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question of coast defence by aircraft instead of guns it is 
possible that a resulting higher air force budget would have 
aUowed it being approached. In effect he shirked the issue. 
At the time of Salmond's visit, the United Kingdom Air 
Staff were concerned with the possibility of substituting air-
craft for fixed-gun defences.^' Indeed, before he left for 
Australia Salmond was given a note which set out the current 
Air Staff thinking.^ ^  It acknowledged that "air forces could 
not form a general substitute for all forms of fixed armament 
at all ports" but at the same time argued that "aircraft 
provide in themselves an offensive weapon par excellence 
against all forms of sea-borne attack". To provide both guns 
and aircraft for the defence of Australian ports was con-
sidered to constitute an expensive overinsurance. Surely this 
was a clear direction for Salmond to press the advantages of 
air power over guns. And it was a pertinent point to argue. In 
1925 the Committee of Imperial Defence had recommended 
the installation of sixteen 9.2-inch and twenty 6-inch guns to 
replace the thirty-six 6-inch and three 9.2-inch guns already 
in position.^ ^ The cost of installing a battery of two 9.2-inch 
guns was $600,000. It foUowed that the cost of instaUing the 
recommended number of 9.2-inch guns totalled some 
$4,800,000. 
Salmond Umited his comments to making the point that 
"the interests of economy demanded that serious considera-
tion should be given to modifying any previously designed 
programme of fixed-gun defences".^* Perhaps with the Air 
Staff's warning against providing "over-insurance" in mind, 
or perhaps, to leave the way quite clear for further dis-
cussion, Salmond failed to provide any aircraft to cooperate 
with the fixed defences in his air defence plan. One wonders 
at this caution: a reasonable compromise might have been to 
allow the army to retain the smaller caUbre guns while recom-
mending the substitution of aircraft for the larger.^* A 
further explanation of Salmond's reticence may well have 
been that it was intended to echo Williams' concern that the 
air force tty to stay on the best possible terms with the army. 
Even as Salmond's report stood, the army was suspicious 
of it. The proposal to establish an army cooperation squad-
ron at Canberra was welcomed, but why only one squadron? 
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It may have seemed to the Militaty Board that Salmond had 
quite overlooked the fact that the main role of the air force 
was to cooperate with the army.^* In March 1932 WUUams, 
obviously feeUng that he had nothing to lose, did suggest that 
aircraft could replace long-range guns in coast defence.^' The 
army reacted predictably: any suggestion that aircraft could 
act alone in the defence of ports would meet with its "great 
reserve".^* Moreover it fought a quick preventive war: at the 
expense of reequipping its field formations it made the res-
toration of the fixed-gun defences its primaty task. Obviously 
the army could not be deprived of a defence vote invested in 
guns set in concrete and the army convinced the government 
that this was wise expenditure.^' 
These guns were still not in position at the time of Munich 
and by then the army had pressured the air force into provi-
ding five general purpose squadrons to operate with them.*" 
Indeed, WilUams had resorted to subterfuge in order to have 
the army and naval element on the Council of Defence accept 
the air force development programme. As he advised the 
Australian Air Liaison Officer in London 
a number of squadrons are to be trained in duties other than that 
which the title indicates. The reason for this is that the Army and 
the Navy would not admit of any Air Force role in Australia except 
as auxiliaries to themselves, and in order to obtain their support for 
our programme the titles shown were given and in the Defence Com-
mittee discussions the squadrons were regarded as being all for naval 
and military purposes.^ ^  
This clearly was the only way open for the Chief of the Air 
Staff to avoid his service being used simply as a reinsurance. 
In May 1937 Williams produced a detailed paper on the 
state of the Royal Australian Air Force for the Australian 
delegates to use at the Imperial Conference.*^ His goal was 
to achieve, in a sUghtly modified form, part one of the 
Salmond plan. He could point to the development of a 
moderate air force organized on a regional basis and manned 
by both permanent and Citizen Air Force personnel. Victoria 
was the centte of the air force with two operational squad-
rons: No. 2 Bomber Squadron and No. 21 City of Melbourne 
Squadron formed on a cadre basis.* ^  No. 1 Flying Training 
School and a recruit-training squadron provided aircrew, and 
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these units were backed with No. 1 Aircraft Depot at Laver-
ton and Royal Australian Air Force headquarters at Mel-
bourne. In New South Wales four squadron^ existed: No. 3 
Army Cooperation, No. 4 General Reconnaissance, No. 5 
equipped with Seagulls for naval cooperation (the Salmond 
Report had provided for only one flight), and No. 22 City of 
Sydney Squadron, again formed on a cadre basis. Western 
AustraUa was defended by No. 23 City of Perth Squadron 
formed on a cadre basis and intended for general purpose 
work. 
To complete part one of the programme it remained 
necessary to form, equip, and man a further nine squadrons. 
The order of priority given to the formation of these squad-
rons might have reflected concern at the state of the northern 
defences. The formation of No. 6 General Purpose Squadron 
to be stationed at Darwin was given first priority followed by 
No. 24 City of Brisbane General Purpose Squadron. After 
this it was intended to strengthen the ait defence of New 
South Wales by three squadrons: No. 7 Fighter-Bomber, No. 
8 Bomber and No. 9 Fighter. The formation of No. 10 
General Reconnaissance Squadron to be based at Pearce was 
to foUow. The formation of No. 11 General Reconnaissance 
Squadron, to be based in North AustraUa, and of No. 12 and 
No. 13 Army Cooperation Squadrons for Canberra, com-
pleted the development as far as the squadrons were con-
cerned. Group headquarters had to be established in Mel-
bourne and Sydney while a station headquarters had to be 
formed at Pearce, Darwin, Canberra, and Lake Macquarie. An 
additional flying school had to be estabUshed and the existing 
one expanded, while No. 1 and No. 2 Aircraft Depots had to 
be enlarged. 
It wiU be obvious that behind this flat statement of 
achievement and expectation lay some controversy. Inter-
service rivalry remained keen; the Chief of the Naval Staff 
was still arguing that the air force was diverting funds from 
the navy which required developing regardless of its effect on 
the other services.** But by 1935 WilUams was facing 
another threat to the efficiency of his service which came 
from Parkhill himself. It revolved around the place the 
Citizen Air Force should occupy in Australian air defence. 
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The concept of a Citizen Air Force held an attractive sim-
plicity. Moreover the idea was older than the air force itself. 
In 1918, the Chief of the General Staff, Major General J. G. 
Legge, had argued that "the Militaty Air Force of Australia 
should be mainly composed of Citizen Forces, with a propor-
tion of Permanent troops, the latter to provide for the ins-
ttuction of the Force, and maintenance and testing of 
machines".** In 1921, this idea received the approval of the 
United Kingdom Air Staff. They advised: "Australia is parti-
cularly happily situated in that it would have ample warning 
of serious attack and can raise the greater portion of its air 
force on a citizen army basis."** The air force itself in 1924 
stressed the need for its second aircraft depot to be placed 
close to a capital city in order to attract C.A.F. personnel.*'' 
In June 1925, the Citizen Air Force was given statutoty 
authority and the Air Ministty was advised that the training 
offered was "similiar to that for the Permanent Air Force 
Officers, but on a modified scale".** Pilots, already quali-
fied, were asked to undergo twenty-five days' training each 
year.*' When the then minister for defence, Sir Neville 
Howse, reported that an air force trained on C.A.F. lines was 
a "thoroughly sound and practical proposal",*" evetyone 
appeared satisfied and there seemed to be no reason why the 
practice should not continue. By 1929 it was expected to 
raise a Citizen Air Force of 98 officers (only 12 fewer than 
the permanent Royal Australian Air Force establishment) 
and 456 airmen.*' 
Salmond was clearly horrified with what he found: the 
two composite squadrons presented in his opinion, a travesty 
of operational effectiveness and this was mainly the result of 
two-thirds of their personnel coming from the Citizen Air 
Force. To expect to train air crew in fighter and army 
cooperation duties in twenty-five days each year was not 
reasonable, and the prospects of teaching them to fly straight 
and level on a bombing run were Uttle better. It was prefer-
able, Salmond argued, to concentrate on attaining a high 
degree of efficiency in the regular service. Otherwise the 
immediate economic gain might well result in a future mili-
taty disaster.*^ 
WilUams accepted this warning, Parkhill did not. As part of 
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the 1934-37 defence programme, the Air Board had decided 
to form four of the five squadrons which it intended to 
operate in conjunction with the fixed-gun defences on a 
cadre basis, but the estimates for 1935—36 provided for the 
establishment of three general-purpose squadrons manned 
wholly by regular personnel.*^ ParkhiU at once took objec-
tion, and minuted WilUams: 
The underlying policy of our land defence forces is a Citizens' Force 
organisation based on a Permanent Force instructional nucleus and 
operational units are maintained with permanent personnel only 
when the work involved cannot be carried out satisfactorily by the 
Citizens' Forces. Unless there are sound reasons against it, I would 
prefer to see this policy followed by the Air Board in the organis-
ation of new landplane units. ^ * 
Certainly, Parkhill argued, he was aware of Salmond's recom-
mendations, but surely it was possible that the Royal Aust-
ralian Air Force could function with a lower standard of 
efficiency than that enjoyed by the Royal Air Force. This 
attitude proved that Parkhill had yet to learn how to deal 
with his chiefs of staff. WilUams was clearly astounded at the 
naivety of the approach and alarmed at the dangerous implic-
ations of the suggestion. Obviously if a lower standard could 
be accepted in personnel efficiency, then it seemed to follow 
that the service could be fobbed off with sub-standard equip-
ment and faciUties. 
Naturally, WilUams countered strongly: in his view a part-
time air force was virtually no air force at all. A citizen force 
he argued, could not be expected to reach the standard of 
permanent units, and it was dangerous to think that the Aust-
ralian service could accept a lower standard of efficiency than 
its United Kingdom counterpart. In war, the Royal Aust-
raUan Air Force would possibly be pitted against the pick of 
a highly trained regular air force, and there would be no 
room then for any difference in fighting efficiency — the 
level of training could well decide the battle.* * The fate of 
the service should not, he argued, be determined by false 
economy. This point was well made. How a squadron was 
manned did not affect the capital cost: this remained at 
$106,000 for works and $320,000 for equipment. Any 
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saving, therefore, would have to come from the difference 
between the $106,000 a year maintenance cost of a C.A.F. 
squadron and the $144,000 cost of maintaining a permanent 
one. Certainly, WiUiams pointed out, this did leave a margin 
of $36,980 each year, but such saving could quite easily be 
written off by the loss of three aircraft due to inadequate 
training. This point, however, underlined his more serious 
reflection when he asked Parkhill to consider "what would be 
more pitiable than a countty which having saved perhaps 10% 
on its yearly defence expenditure by substituting Citizen for 
Permanent Forces finds out that, when required, its Air 
Force fails to reach even its objectives." WilUams and the Air 
Board thus "most sttongly" recommended against the estab-
lishment of further units on a Citizen Air Force basis.* * 
Parkhill was not easily convinced. Still seeking economy he 
raised the question at the Council of Defence who appointed 
an examining sub-committee, and then he approached the Air 
Ministty. In the CouncU of Defence Williams presented the 
Salmond scheme as the "backbone" of AustraUan air defence 
and pointed out that Salmond had warned against weakening 
it with C.A.F. formations. With some poUtical skill he 
allowed that any programme which exceeded Salmond's 
requirements could vety well draw upon a citizen force.*'' 
Thus he appeared to concede a point whereas in fact he 
conceded nothing. It was fortunate also that WilUams found 
himself supported by the army element in the council. 
Always quick to seize upon an idea which might prove 
acknowledgment that the army was a viable home defence 
force, the generals showed concern that C.A.F. squadrons 
might not be able to cooperate effectively with the guns.* * 
The Air Ministty promptly returned the question to ParkhiU: 
the type of force which should be employed in Australia had 
to rest "largely on local considerations".^' Parkhill thus was 
forced to accept the views of his own Chief of the Air Staff, 
and Williams won a most important point. The only further 
concession made to the idea of a part-time air force was the 
establishment of a new squadron on this basis at Townsville 
in 1938. 
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Defence and the Empire air maU scheme 
That Parkhill should raise the question of a Citizen Air 
Force is not surprising; it is the duty of a poUtical head to 
weigh costs and benefits. What was odd in the episode was 
the neutral attitude of the United Kingdom Air Staff. The 
Japanese move into Manchuria had awakened their interest in 
reinforcing Singapore with AustraUan squadrons. In July 
1934, Plans Division foresaw a shortage of aircraft in the Far 
East which in fact had developed when Japan attacked in 
December 1941, and began to plan on the assumption that 
AusttaUa would make at least some of her squadrons avail-
able in an emergency.*" ElUngton, when Chief of the Air 
Staff in May 1936 wrote to ParkhiU: "I would draw attention 
to the vital importance to the Commonwealth of AustraUa of 
the successful defence of Singapore and the desirability, 
should other conditions allow, of developing AustraUan rein-
forcements to assist in that task."*' When Sir Cyril Newall 
took over from ElUngton, he wrote to Williams suggesting an 
interchange of squadrons, and if possible the appointment of 
an AustraUan staff officer to headquarters Far East.*^ 
Ellington was asked to raise the possibiUty of AustraUan rein-
forcements going to Singapore with Lyons during his visit in 
1938,*^ and when as a result of this visit WilUams was re-
placed by Goble, Newall immediately reopened the quction 
of an Austtalian officer being seconded to Far Eastern head-
quarters.** 
The point being made is that throughout the thirties the 
United Kingdom was anxious that Australia make some com-
mitment regarding the air defence of Singapore. Yet an 
examination of the United Kingdom proposals to inaugurate 
an Empire air mail scheme and the negotiations which 
followed shows a certain disregard in Whitehall for Australian 
local defence interests and its forward defence at Singapore. 
That part of the Empire air mail scheme which concerned 
AustraUa may be briefly summarized. In October 1934, the 
Dominions were asked to join the United Kingdom in a 
scheme which would result in all maU between them and the 
United Kingdom being sent by air. Australia was asked to 
enter into a fifteen-year contract with Imperial Airways. By 
its terms. Imperial Airways would carty mail to and from the 
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United Kingdom and Australia would pay an annual subsidy 
of $244,000. It was proposed that technical and operational 
control of the entire service would remain in the hands of 
Imperial Airways in London who would operate the service 
with Short Empire flying-boats. The planned route to Aust-
ralia would be via Singapore — AustraUan landfaU would be 
at Darwin and the route would then continue southeast 
across land to Port Roper, across to Normanton, then over 
the Cape York Peninsula to Townsville, and then down the 
coast to Sydney. Australia was required to provide the 
necessaty ground organization: slipways, moorings, wireless 
communications, and buildings. The most important 
provision as far as Austtalia was concerned, however, lay in 
the fact that the land-plane route which Qantas had been 
planning and operating between Sydney and Singapore since 
1932 would have to be abandoned.^^ 
In 1933 Sir George Pearce had announced to the Senate 
that Australia had a special interest in controlling and 
manning the Sydney-Singapore section of the Austtalia-
United Kingdom service because it contained an important 
defence potential.** This point had, in fact, been so strongly 
made that it impressed the secretaty of state for Dominion 
affairs, J. H. Thomas. When the British cabinet was conside-
ring the air mail proposals in July 1934 he advised that Aust-
ralia was not likely to be satisfied with any scheme which 
vested entire control in a United Kingdom agency.*'' And 
Thomas was right: ParkhiU and WilUams came to oppose the 
project because it appeared to prejudice AustraUan defence 
interests. 
One AustraUan point was that if the Sydney—Singapore 
section of the route traverse ' i region considered vital to 
Australian security, then it would be wise if the service 
between these two centres were operated by Australian 
crews. One day, it was argued, AustraUan air crew might be 
fighting over it. A second point was raised by Williams and 
centred on the use of flying-boats in the scheme. As he 
minuted ParkhiU: 
From a defence point of view the greatest value is to be obtained 
from a landplane service operating over the existing routes (which 
are strategic ones and would be further developed by the service) 
entirely controlled in Australia by persons responsible to the 
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Commonwealth Government and no other, having in their organis-
ation experienced personnel and crew and facilities for overhaul, 
repair and maintenance.^^ 
Williams had always been opposed to the use of flying-boats 
and he had disagreed with Salmond in 1928 when Salmond 
had wanted to introduce this type as the main coastal recon-
naissance aircraft.*' In 1935, it seemed to WilUams that if 
the Empire air mail scheme were operated with flying-boats, 
then the internal air routes which had been designed to fulfil 
a strategic function would decUne. The proposed route for 
the flying-boats he considered strategically useless — if used 
AustraUa's ability to reinforce Singapore would suffer, and so 
would AustraUa's local air defence potential.''" 
These views were shared by Parkhill, Pearce, Shepherd, and 
the Australian Director of Civil Aviation, Captain E. C. 
Johnston.''' They made little impression on London: despite 
many speeches made at successive Imperial conferences on 
the need for cooperation in Imperial defence, the AustraUans 
were confronted with negotiators who were either unin-
terested in the subject or who actively worked against 
achieving it. It has been suggested that Australia adopted a 
"head in the sand ostrich poUcy",''^ in refusing to agree at 
once to the United Kingdom proposals: if anything, however, 
this poUcy was adopted by WhitehaU. Thus, when the initial 
proposals were rejected by AustraUa, E. T. Crutchley, the 
United Kingdom repreoerjtative in Canberra, advised the 
Dominions Office that it would be neccsaty to stress the 
defence aspects of the scheme if AustraUa were ever to accept 
it.'' ^ Yet when F. L. G. Bertram, the deputy Director of Civil 
Aviation, was flown out from England to discuss the matter 
with the AustraUan cabinet he was told that "the proposals 
were not in any way influenced by considerations of 
defence",''* and thus was not briefed on this aspect. When 
ParkhUl raised the question, Bertram had to reply that it was 
"outside [his] ambit" and consequently he could not discuss 
it.''* 
In London, Sir Eric Geddes, chairman of Imperial Airways, 
was reported as saying that it was not important for Aust-
raUan pilots to become famiUar with flying conditions in the 
Singapore region.'' * Yet, when the Interdepartmental Com-
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mittee on Imperial Air Communications considered ways to 
persuade Australia to accept the scheme. Sir Warren Fisher, 
the permanent secretaty to the Treasuty, argued that if Aust-
ralia would not agree to "the right of Imperial Airways to run 
a service through from Singapore to Sydney then Australia 
would have to be told firmly that it would be equaUy im-
possible for Australian machines to make use of Singapore, 
landing rights being a matter of reciprocity".'''' This sugges-
tion — the vety negation of the idea of Imperial cooperation 
— was odd when it is considered that at the same time the 
United Kingdom air staff were anxious to have Royal Aust-
ralian Air Force aircraft not only land but be stationed there. 
A possible explanation for this hard attitude by the United 
Kingdom might rest with the fact that despite Thomas's 
warning to the contraty, it was fully expected that Australia 
would accept the initial proposals. The flying-boats had been 
ordered before the Dominions had been approached,^* and 
possibly the United Kingdom was reluctant to cancel.'" 
What gives credibiUty to this explanation is that while Aust-
ralia finally got its way and acquired the right to operate its 
own service with its own crews, the route remained and so 
did the flying-boats. Moreover, the United Kingdom Air Staff 
had not been asked for an opinion before the flying-boats 
were ordered, and when they were asked they agreed with 
WilUams. As A. T. Harris, then a group captain and deputy 
Director of Plans minuted: 
The flying-boat scheme for Imperial Airways was entered into with-
out the Air Staff being consulted otherwise on zfait accompli. Sub-
sequently repeated attempts have been made to get the Air Staff to 
postulate the strategic importance of the scheme. Not only is it 
strategically a gaffe — but technically also, as Imperial Airways have 
yet to learn. ^ " 
Ellington, the Chief of the Air Staff, agreed with Harris.*' 
Viscount Swinton, secretary of state for air, most certainly 
did not. In a sharp minute to ElUngton he pointed out that 
the Air Staff's argument was quite "unfair", and while 
denying that he had any intention of influencing the Air 
Staff's strategic appreciation, this is exactly what he tried to 
do. In effect, the Air Staff were asked to change their 
mind.^^ Ellington reaUzed that WilUams had the reinforce-
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ment of Singapore in mind and he had no doubt as to the 
importance of the matter being debated. As he told Swinton, 
it was "comparatively easy to show that a civU flying-boat 
service operating along the coast of Australia is of use in war, 
but that does not answer the view put forward that a land-
plane service would be more useful".*^ ElUngton proved, 
however, to be not firm enough. He succumbed to Swinton's 
pressure and by ignoring the real issue at stake prepared a 
memorandum for Parkhill which simply said that a flying-
boat service would be valuable. 
It had been improper of Swinton to use his poUtical 
authority to influence a miUtaty judgment, and equally so for 
Ellington to aUow it to occur. As a result, Parkhill was mis-
led.8* When he returned to AustraUa after discussing the 
Empire air mail scheme at the 1937 Imperial Conference, he 
referred to the Imperial air routes as "arteries" through 
which "the reinforcements and support necessaty for the 
defence of any part of the Empire [could] flow".^^ So they 
could, but Parkhill did not know that the means of transpor-
tation remained unrecommended by any air defence expert. 
Rearmament 1937—39: The air force and the Ellington report 
It will be shown that Archdale Parkhill expressed concern 
at the 1937 Imperial Conference that Imperial defence 
arrangements were unsatisfactoty and needed strengthen-
ing.** According to WilUams, however, ParkhiU went to 
the Imperial Conference more impressed with the need to 
improve local AustraUan defence rather than to contribute 
further to the Imperial system. As Williams wrote to ElUng-
ton: "I feel that our Minister is incUned to the idea that we 
should maintain our Navy at its present strength and devote 
first attention to completing the Air Force of seventeen 
squadrons, and I think that he would be glad of anything that 
would back him up on this."*'' The air force was still seen as 
a local defence force. ParkhiU's concern that the Empire air 
mail scheme should be made to realize its full defence 
potential certainly indicated that he had grasped the 
importance of reinforcing Singapore by air, but he had stiU 
not accepted the fact that AustraUa's squadrons could defend 
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Australia from this forward position. 
This muddled thinking was a result of the uncertain 
functioning of the Singapore sttategy. When Ellington had 
raised directly the question of earmarking AustraUan 
squadrons for Singapore's defence in May 1936, the Air 
Board argued that the service's development programme was 
based on providing for home defence and thus "it would 
appear that Air Force units would not be dispatched from 
Australia to Singapore in war unless they were not required 
for operations in AustraUa itself".** When at the 1937 
Imperial Conference the United Kingdom Air Staff tried to 
secure a slight change in the proposed Royal AustraUan Air 
Force development programme which would give a higher 
priority to those squadrons deemed suitable to reinforce the 
fortress, ParkhiU would not hear of it. He echoed the Air 
Board: only if squadrons were not required for Australian 
operations would they be sent to Singapore.*' This attitude 
lacked strategic logic: unless Singapore had fallen, or in some 
way was not fulfilling its function, Australian squadrons 
based in the Singapore region could have provided more 
effectively for Australia's defence than those based on the 
mainland. And if Singapore did fall, then according to the 
theoty all was lost. 
This ambiguity is evident in the 1937—38 defence 
estimates: $23 milUon was distributed between the three 
services, the air force vote rose from $3.2 milUon to $5.4 
million, and there was no mention of increasing the effective 
strength of the navy. The October campaign for the 1937 
federal election stressed, however, the overriding importance 
to Australia of sea power and the Imperial defence con-
nection. Lyons told the electorate in his final speech of the 
campaign that: "A vote for the government means a vote for 
Empire co-operation in naval defence for the safeguarding of 
our shores from foreign aggression."'" 
As a result of the election Parkhill lost his seat, ' ' and any 
prospect of quietly changing the emphasis of AustraUa's 
defence planning disappeared. In May 1938, a new three-year 
defence programme was introduced which allotted $86 
miUion among the three services. The decision made the 
previous August not to increase the strength of the navy was 
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reversed and plans were announced to acquire two 6-inch 
cruisers. At the same time, however, and for the first time, 
the total air force vote exceeded the naval, while Lyons told 
his broadcast Usteners in March 1938: 
The completion of the Permanent Air Force and the necessary 
ground organisation, the local aircraft industry, the expanding 
resources of civU aviation and the continued development of air 
routes, would render possible in an emergency a rapid expansion of 
that strength which would enable us by our own efforts to repel an 
aggressor.92 
The objective of AustraUa's defence poUcy had obviously 
become confused: it is difficult to imagine what effect the 
presence of the cruisers would have had upon the aggressor 
whom the air force was being developed to repel. Without the 
British fleet, the AustraUan naval forces had little value. 
After Munich the ambiguous defence preparations 
continued. The $86 million voted for defence in May was 
increased to $126 milUon, and stress again was laid upon the 
importance of seapower and Singapore.'•^ Again the navy 
was to be expanded: twelve torpedo boats which could be 
expected to possess only a local defence capabiUty, were to 
be acquired, and two destroyers were to be bought to operate 
with the cruisers. The government, it seems, intended to 
bolster one doubtful investment with another, while at the 
same time Lyons was telling the United Kingdom high com-
missioner that the increased defence programme already 
represented "more than the utmost the countty could 
afford".'* 
This comment raises the question: had the government 
tied itself so firmly to the Imperial defence concept that in 
trying to meet the demands of it and local defence 
neither was being provided for satisfactorily? For example, 
although the navy was expanded after Munich it was the 
army which was allotted the largest share of the increased 
defence vote: some $16 milUon above the $39.4 milUon 
voted in March. By this time the army was being instructed 
to prepare to meet invasion: the militia was doubled to 
70,000, arms and ammunition were to be stockpiled, and 
anti-aircraft guns were installed.' * But according to the Chief 
of the General Staff, Lavarack, these measures were far from 
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being anything like sufficient. In his view, the Japanese 
militaty forces were well equipped and trained and were 
based in secret locations among the CaroUne Islands only 
2,414 Km from AustraUa. Such a development meant for him 
that the government should be planning to spend some $60 
milUon in the hope of stopping an invasion launched from 
those islands.'* Perhaps the increase in the air force vote 
from $25 milUon to $44 million, and the raising of its 
planned strength from the Salmond-recommended seventeen 
squadrons to eighteen equipped with 212 first-Une aircraft 
was partly an attempt to meet the appreciation.'"' The 
establishment by June was planned to consist of 540 officers, 
5,200 other ranks, and 100 air cadets.'* But obviously 
neither the army nor the air force together would be strong 
enough to resist an invasion inside three years and by that 
time there was little hope that increased British naval power 
could provide security. 
It seems that Parkhill had gone some way towards re-
cognizing the dilemma. He had not been a brilliant minister 
although certainly the best among those who held the 
defence portfoUo in the interwar years. At times he had tried 
hard to separate Austtalian from United Kingdom 
interests;" he could be tenacious, and he did have the 
advantage of three years' experience with the portfolio which 
might have led to more continuity in defence planning during 
the last two years before the war. He was succeeded by the 
deputy leader of the Countty party, H. C. V. Thorby, who 
was to hold the defence portfoUo from 29 November 1937 to 
27 November 1938. Earle Page, then leader of the Countty 
party, argues that Thorby quickly became "deeply and 
capably involved" in the rearmament programme.'"" 
Hasluck agrees: Thorby, he argues, "applied himself 
assiduously to the job" in spite of the "limited oppor-
tunities" it offered at the t ime. ' " ' The natural bias of Earle 
Page is obvious, but one wonders what Hasluck means by his 
comment: there was certainly more money available after 
Thorby took over than ever before in peacetime. Perhaps 
Hasluck has in mind the contradiction between Imperial and 
local defence needs — after ParkhiU went there was even a 
suggestion that the navy acquire a battleship.'"^ From 
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Thorby's own recollections it is clear that he did take his 
portfoUo vety seriously but felt that he had been defeated by 
the previous twenty years of complacency and the idea that 
"Singapore would protect us".'"^ The ttuth is that the 
government was now taking two-sided measures which were 
not likely to be effective either way. After Prague the 
possibiUty of war with Germany increased, and if a European 
war did occur then Japan was expected to take advantage of 
it. 
Thorby was foUowed as minister for defence by Brigadier 
G. A. Street, a man with no previous ministerial experience. 
When he was given this most important portfoUo, two 
months after Munich, he was still not considered to be 
sufficiently senior to become a member of the inner cabinet 
which Lyons formed at the end of 1938.'"* Perhaps Lyons 
had made himself responsible for defence inside this body. 
But Lyons was tired and iU, and, as the United Kingdom high 
commissioner reported, worried by what Lyons called the 
"treachety" of Menzies and GuUett and at the actions of 
Hughes whom he regarded as a nuisance both inside and out-
side cabinet.' ^ * 
It was, however, in the middle of this confused period of 
rearmament that Sir Edward ElUngton visited Australia to 
inspect and report on the air force: he arrived in June 1938 
in response to an invitation issued by the government with-
out the knowledge of the Air Board.'"* ElUngton's in-
spection right from the beginning therefore was conducted in 
a manner quite different from the cordial relationship which 
Salmond had with WilUams and the Air Board ten years 
previously. Air Marshal Sir George Jones suspects that Elling-
ton was invited to AusttaUa in order to inspect Williams 
rather than the air force and to recommend his removal from 
the post of Chief of the Air Staff if necessaty.'"'' There is 
circumstantial evidence which suggests that there might be 
truth in this suspicion: WilUams had been Chief of the Air 
Staff for seventeen years and there was no precedent for 
removing a C.A.S. from office. Moreover, the case which was 
eventually presented by Ellington to justify Williams's 
removal was countered by the Air Board, while difficulties 
were experienced when an attempt was made to examine 
it.'"* 
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In December 1938, Street noted in a cabinet submission 
that ElUngton had been invited to Australia as a result of 
parUamentaty and press agitation for an inquity into the in-
cidence of fatal aircraft accidents involving air force 
machines.'"' Between 1932 and 1936 there were ten such 
fatal accidents; in 1937 there were seven."" In April 1938 
an officer was kUled flying too low at a Richmond air dis-
play; in June a sergeant pilot flew into the ground while 
cartying out low-level aerial combat exercises, and a court 
martial discipUned an officer for his part in the accident.''' 
In the same month. Street himself was fortunate to avoid 
death or serious injuty when the Avro Anson in which he was 
a passenger made a forced landing in northern New South 
Wales. As cabinet was considfering ElUngton's findings, a 
further accident occurred in which the pilot was killed 
through "low flying in cloud and professional negU-
gence".'' ^ It appeared to some that this record was swiftly 
proving that the air force wjis unable to operate efficiently in 
peacetime and that its prospects of successfuUy meeting the 
test of war were slight.'' ^ 
There were doubts, therefore, in 1938 about the efficiency 
of the service. Its whole organization seemed open to 
question: did the cause of the accidents stem from the type 
of training air crew received? Was the Air Board, or WilUams 
himself, to blame? Or did the fault lie in the equipment used? 
— the Hawker Demon and its Rolls Royce Kestrel engine 
were suspect. As J. V. Fairbairn, a United Austtalia party 
member of the House, pointed out, the air force was surroun-
ded with "mystety" and no one seemed to know if the 
service were adequate or not. ' ' * Ellington's report provided 
some answers, and the result was sharp conflict between the 
Air Board and WilUams on one side and the government on 
the other. 
As intimated, EUington and WUUams did not get along weU 
together. EUington arrived with preconceived ideas that 
AustraUa's security rested upon British power and that 
provision for AustraUa's local defence was a quite secondaty 
requirement.'' * WUUams resented his arrogant manner and 
his consistent refusal to Usten to local advice and opinion. ' ' * 
ElUngton's criticisms feU into two parts: one concerned the 
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role of the air force in defence, the other revolved around an 
explanation for the spate of flying accidents. 
When ElUngton arrived WiUiams handed him a memoran-
dum setting out the aim and role of the air force.' ' ' ' As 
WUUams explained, "the aim of the Royal Australian Air 
Force is to defend Australia and its territories against raids 
either on territoty or on trade, acting in close co-operation 
with the Navy and Army". In furtherance of this aim, the air 
force would provide for local air defence, coastal recon-
naissance, cooperation with the fixed defences, direct co-
operation with the navy and the army; and in certain cases 
for independent offensive action. In addition to these 
functions the air force was to be prepared to meet the air 
requirements of an expeditionaty force of one division. 
EUington reported that the proposed composition and distri-
bution of the Royal Austtalian Air Force was suitable to 
meet these requirements."* This was predictable: he had 
approved the programme himself at the 1937 Imperial Con-
ference. What he did attack was the conception held of air 
power in AustraUan defence. 
Ellington returned to the theme that it was necessaty for 
AustraUan squadrons to reinforce Singapore. Thus the 
defined role of the air force as "defence against raids in co-
operation with the Navy and Army" was too nartow. Aust-
ralian territoty could only be attacked, he argued, after an 
enemy had made an approach from Malaya through the 
Melanesian islands. To cover this contingency, he suggested 
that the role of the air force should be redefined as "the 
defeat in cooperation with the navy and army of any power 
which is threatening the independence of the countty". ' ' ' 
Obviously Ellington was angUng for a definite commitment 
to reinforce Singapore,'^" and such a blanket definition 
would aUow for it. With some surprise, he noted that no 
plans existed for the air force to reinforce the Royal Air 
Force squadrons stationed at Singapore. 
Now it certainly was the job of the Chief of the Air Staff 
to consider and prepare plans for the employment of the air 
force, and of course ElUngton's strategic thinking was right 
provided that the Singapore strategy was stUl thought to be 
viable. WiUiams himself had considered the need to reinforce 
Singapore, as witness his stand over the Empire air mail 
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scheme. On the other hand, the government had consistently 
seen the prime function of the air force as providing for 
home defence. As a result of ElUngton's criticism, however, 
WUUams was reprimanded. Tartly WiUiams requested direc-
tion from the government "if there is to be any change in the 
aim of the service".' ^ ' In reply, the government implied that 
planning for the air reinforcement of Singapore could be 
regarded as a contingency covered in a public statement made 
by Lyons on 24 August 1937 that 
Supplementary to Empire sea power as the first line of Australia's 
defence against invasion, and since sea power cannot provide a com-
plete defence against raids, the Air Force organisation, which is 
being developed in accordance with the revised Salmond scheme, 
should provide for air forces adequate for close co-operation with 
the other services and as a striking force in whatever role it may be 
required to perform. 
Such a channel of communication could not be considered 
adequate as a device through which to advise the head of a 
fighting service of a possible major change in poUcy.' ^^ 
The faUure of Williams to prepare plans to reinforce Singa-
pore, however, appeared a minor censure when compared to 
Ellington's comments on the cause of the flying accidents. 
There was nothing wrong with the aircraft, and Ellington 
thought that their maintenance reached a vety high standard. 
Ellington, however, censured the level and scope of the 
training which air crew received in the operational squadrons, 
and accused both senior and junior officers of either faUing 
to promulgate orders properly or to enforce them seriously 
when they did. In the combination of these factors, ElUngton 
found the explanation for the series of accidents. As he 
argued, "unless all officers from those of the Air Board 
downwards are prepared drastically to enforce the regulations 
and never overlook minor infringements of them, avoidable 
accidents wUl continue, and the reputation of the R.A.A.F. 
wiU suffer in consequence".'^^ Even such a fundamental 
procedure as the proper authorization of flights, ElUngton 
argued, was begun only after he had started his inspection, 
and it was not surprising that the accident rate in the Royal 
Australian Air Force was higher than in his own service. 
Moreover, the only training that the squadrons had under-
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gone in 1938 had been concerned with preparing for an air 
display at Richmond. The conclusion was that the Air Board 
was grossly at fault, and more particularly the Chief of the 
Air Staff. Obviously it appeared that even the service's most 
senior officers were prepared to accept insufficiently trained 
operational crews; and then they either faUed to issue orders 
or if they did, they overlooked or condoned infringements of 
them. 
Clearly the Air Board had to fight to protect its corporate 
reputation, and its service members to protect their own 
careers. The Air Board made much of the shortness of ElUng-
ton's inspection: ten days had been spent at Royal Australian 
Air Force headquarters, and only four and a half days at the 
operational squadrons. ElUngton had remained aloof, and as 
the Air Board argued, there was no opportunity to discuss 
with him any of the points which he had raised. If there had 
been any discussion, the Air Board felt that ElUngton would 
have adopted a more modified approach.' ^ * 
There was truth in this statement. EUington had 
not discussed with WUUams the memorandum which WUUams 
had prepared on the role of air power in AustraUa's defence. 
If a joint analysis had taken place, then ElUngton's criticisms 
in this regard would have been less severe. If Ellington had 
been aware of the difficulties which the air force faced in 
arguing for itself a raison d'etre, then it was not clear from 
his report. To the Air Board it obviously appeared necessaty 
for even a highly experienced officer such as ElUngton to 
understand local pressures and considerations before making 
judgments. 
In reply to ElUngton's comment that service training could 
be improved, for example, the Air Board agreed, but then 
went on to argue that the equipment — bomb-sights, bomb-
racks, instruments for blind flying — was on order from the 
United Kingdom and that without it the air force, hampered 
by a previous lack of funds, faced difficulties and in some 
instances had to improvise.'^* Even so, when the Air Board 
surveyed the previous year's main training activities — 
3,797,143 km flown, 5,393 practice bombs dropped, 
202,500 practice rounds fired, and 20,202 km^ of countty 
photographed, and exercises carried out with the navy and 
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army — the Air Board was "amazed" at ElUngton's state-
ments.' ^  * Certainly it was difficult to understand the remark 
that little had been done except prepare for the Richmond 
air display. 
ElUngton's observation that the Air Board had faUed to 
create a proper fUght procedure was regarded by the Air 
Board as further evidence of superficiality. Moreover, it was a 
most "misleading statement" which was "definitely not 
correct". The implication that for seventeen years the air 
force had been operating without a system of flight control 
was patently absurd. As the Air Board pointed out "even if 
the most cursoty enquity had been made into the matter" 
such a conclusion would never have been reached. Street, as 
minister for defence, had to agree.' ^ '' 
On the more important but connected question of the 
cause of flying accidents the Air Board objected to ElUng-
ton's methodology and particularly his use of doubtful 
statistics. When the Air Board examined EUington's com-
parison between the accident rate in the Royal Air Force and 
the Royal AustraUan Air Force it was found that ElUngton 
had used a set of figures published in an Air Ministty docu-
ment. Report on Flying Accidents. These figures, however, 
carried a specific warning that they did not afford "any close 
and reliable indication of the trend of the accident rate". To 
demonstrate that EUington was wrong to use such figures as a 
basis for comparison, the Air Board promptly employed 
them to reverse ElUngton's findings. Both results were in the 
Air Board's opinion quite absurd.'^* And the Air Board 
flatly denied that the infringement of orders was condoned. 
How did Ellington know, it asked, what fatal accidents had 
been caused by infringements — surely the nature of the 
accident precluded conclusive enquity into the pUot's 
actions? Ellington, it seemed to the Air Board, had simply 
reached this answer on little or no evidence.' ^ ' 
Ellington's report, the Air Board argued, was "unjust".' ^" 
Gillison, however, in the official histoty suggests that the Air 
Board overreacted to Ellington's criticism: and that it over-
defended itself.' ^' On the other hand, the Air Board did feel 
that ElUngton's comments were levelled at "practically the 
foundations of the efficiency of the service in the air".'^^ 
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The essence of the criticism was not lost on the press. As the 
Argus argued, "the officers responsible for the vety grave 
dereliction of duty should certainly be called to 
account".'^^ The Age was more pointed: "the broad 
question raised", its editorial ran, "is that of directive power 
which includes an abiUty to transmit from top to bottom the 
vital influence of a forceful personaUty".' ^* And the Sydney 
Morning Herald came to much the same conclusion when it 
argued that the report "reflected upon the authority which is 
finally responsible for the discipline of the force".' ^ * This 
could only mean the Air Board, or Williams as its senior 
officer. 
In 1938, the Air Board consisted of three service members 
and a civilian finance member.'^* Of the service members 
only the air member for supply could feel that lie had 
emerged from ElUngton's inspection unsulUed. If any blame 
were to attach then it had to be either WUUams or to Goble, 
the air member for personnel. From Januaty 1936 to Januaty 
1938, however, Goble had been seconded to the Royal Air 
Force as deputy Director of Air Operations, and the position 
of air member for personnel had been fiUed by Air Commo-
dore Russell on exchange with the Royal Air Force. More-
over, as it has been noted, WUUams had made himself respon-
sible for operational training in October 1934. It was at this 
point that the personal and perhaps professional differences 
between Williams and his second in command, Goble, were to 
prove desttuctive. Animosity between the two had been 
present since 1922 when the navy was backing Goble's claim 
to be Chief of the Air Staff and we have noted how Goble 
agreed to the navy's fleet air arm plan while Williams was in 
England. WilUams apparently did not find out about the 
agreement until he returned to take over his command. It was 
common knowledge in the air force that Goble and WilUams 
simply could not work together;'^'' after the Ellington 
report it was felt that they never would agam.' ^* In Septem-
ber 1938 Goble moved swiftly to protect his interests: he 
went direct to Street and told him that although WilUams had 
agreed to put the information that WilUams was in charge of 
operational training in the Air Board's reply, he had faUed to 
do so. '^ ' 
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The Air Board was thus not only divided but had shown 
itself to be, and this aUowed Street to draw the conclusion 
that "the Air Board has not been functioning in a fully satis-
factoty and co-operative manner". It followed, therefore, 
that Stteet could argue that "a better standard of higher 
direction would reflect itself in the Air Force generally". The 
blame was firmly attached to Williams, for "in view of this 
transfer of duties and the fact that the present Air Member 
for Personnel was abroad for two years duty ending Januaty 
1938, it would appear that the main responsibiUty should be 
placed upon the Chief of the Air Staff".'*" After seventeen 
years of resisting attacks by the army and the navy, of coping 
with inert, economy-minded governments, and generaUy 
handling the unspectacular job of building an air force in 
peacetime, WUUams was to go. And this at the vety time 
when it appeared that the service would soon be tested in 
war. 
On 16 Januaty 1939, Lyons announced that WilUams 
would be sent to the United Kingdom for two years and that 
Air Commodore Goble would be promoted to the acting rank 
of air vice marshal and given the job as acting Chief of the Air 
Staff.'*' Who would be the next Chief of the Air Staff was 
not mentioned and the position remained unfilled until 
Januaty 1940 when Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett of 
the Royal Air Force was brought out from England. Was the 
government justified in removing WilUams? Firstly, yes: 
seventeen years is too long for any one man to hold such an 
office. The government, however, should have reaUzed this 
and acted independently of ElUngton. WUUams had ferried 
the service through the crucial early years, but his thinking 
had been conditioned by his experience with admirals and 
generals bent upon destroying the service. Certainly he had 
shown political skill in deaUng with them. He possessed a 
clear vision of the errors in the fleet air arm proposals, in 
ParkhiU's wish to operate the service on a part-time basis, and 
in the arrangements to run the Empire air mail scheme. One 
looks in vain, however, for any original contribution towards 
providing a solution to the problems of AustraUan defence, 
and this timidity was particularly acute whenever he had to 
give offence to the army or navy.'*^ Secondly, however, the 
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government was not justified in removing Williams on the 
basis of the evidence contained in the EUington report. The 
replies of the Air Board were largely disregarded. It seems 
that the government was prepared to accept the weight of 
Ellington's prestige as an Imperial representative as evidence 
in itself: as it argued "great weight must be attached to his 
conclusions".'*^ 
It has been mentioned that one point ElUngton had not 
considered but which the Air Board quickly noted itself was 
the difficulty which the air force faced due to the slow 
delivety of equipment ordered from the United Kingdom. 
The problems this raised partly stemmed from the refusal of 
the Austtalian government to foster untU 1936 a local air-
craft industty. As regards the supply of operational aircraft 
from the United Kingdom, the situation was worse. Indeed, 
by 1938, the promises of the United Kingdom to deliver 
aircraft ordered from their factories to AustraUa had acquired 
an even lower status than the promise to dispatch a fleet to 
Singapore. Australia was forced to rely on her own efforts, or 
this time turn to the United States for assistance. 
5 
The United Kingdom and the 
Formation of the Australian 
Aircraft Industry 1918-39 
Opinion and policy 1918—35 
The defence value of a local aircraft industty was 
reaUzed in Australia before the end of the 1914—18 war. On 
29 AprU 1918 the Chief of the General Staff, Major General 
J. G. Legge, suggested that the commonwealth should buUd 
200 aircraft,' and on the following day the cabinet decided 
"that steps should be taken to artange for the consttuction of 
engines . . . and any measures to encourage local manufacture 
should at once be taken".^ On 9 May, Wing Commander H. 
Maguire of the Royal Naval Air Service submitted a memor-
andum which strongly expressed the opinion that "Austtalia 
should be self-supporting in regard to engines and machines". 
As he argued, "due to its geographical position and long dis-
tances from possible sources of supply, the conditions of 
importing machines in sufficient quantities to be of use, 
would be of enormous difficulty".^ In June 1918, an 
approach was made to the secretaty of state for the colonies 
asking for assistance from the Royal Air Force and the 
Department of Aircraft Supply, and by November 1918 the 
DH9a fitted with a Liberty engine had been selected for 
manufacture.* 
No further action was taken: the question of local manu-
facture appears to have been submerged in the attempt of the 
army and navy to control the air force. The defence value of 
a local aircraft industty continued, however, to be argued 
both in London and AusttaUa. In London, the Air Ministty, 
anxious that Dominion air forces should be created, stressed 
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that "there would obviously be many advantages in the 
Dominions producing their own aircraft",* while in July 
1921 the point was elaborated with the argument 
These air forces, like all the other defence forces would have to be 
expanded when war threatens, and in view of the distance of Aust-
ralia from Great Britain, it is of the first importance to encourage 
the development of a strong industry capable of manufacturing air-
craft and engines and utilising where possible local materials.* 
Most informed opinion in Australia shared a simUar view. 
Both E. C. Brinsmead and the Air Board argued for the 
merits of forming a local industty. In 1922, Brinsmead told 
the AusttaUan Aero Club in Sydney that he was "greatly in 
favour of an 'All AusttaUan' theoty in aviation".'' This 
meant, optimistically, that evetything used in Austtalian 
aviation should be locally produced. In June 1923, when 
called to give evidence before the Joint Committee of Public 
Accounts, he repeated the essence of this statement.* The 
Air Board, more practical, was as enthusiastic. In 1922, it 
gave its support to a suggestion coming from the Munitions 
Supply Board that a government factoty should be formed 
for the manufacture of airframes,' while in 1924 the air 
force argument was strongly stated before the ParUamentaty 
Standing Committee on PubUc Works. As Squadron Leader 
P. A. McBain, Director of Equipment, pointed out: 
If Australia cannot manufacture its own machines it will be in a 
serious plight in time of war. The sooner that this is realised the 
better. It is the unanimous opinion of every officer of the Royal 
Australian Air Force, and I think the Defence Department and the 
Civil Aviation authorities, that Australia should at the earliest 
moment produce its ovm aircraft.'" 
Eighteen years later, McBain's prophecy of a "serious plight" 
was fulfUled. 
Apart from the airframe factoty proposed by the 
Munitions Supply Board, a further suggestion was made by 
the Joint Committee of PubUc Accounts. In their 1923 
report they recognized the difficulties connected with local 
manufacture, but went on to argue that Austtalia's air 
defences would be of "small value" whUe it remained essen-
tial "to import fresh suppUes of aeroplanes, engines, and 
parts from other countties". The government was urged, 
Australian Aircraft Industry 95 
therefore, to estabUsh an experimental section and to couple 
it with a "shadow factoty" which would stock raw materials 
and organize the countty's engineering resources to meet war-
time needs. The alternative, the committee argued, was to 
grant a really attractive subsidy to private enterprise.'' The 
Bruce-Page government did neither. 
UntU 1935 when it at last began to take action, the govern-
ment in fact was never short of advice. The Melbourne Herald 
found Austtalia's position "painful to contemplate " if it 
continued to rely on imported aircraft.' ^ Major H. T. Shaw, 
managing director of Shaw Aviation, argued that only 
capacity for local manufacture could save the air force being 
"largely a joke".' ^ In the House, Mr. Mart, the Nationalist 
member for Parkes, pointed by implication to the budding 
aeronautical industty in Japan as constituting a danger to 
Australia and urged the government to provide a local 
counter to it.'* A simUar theme ran through the editorial 
colums of Aircraft.^ * In 1931, Squadron Leader G. Jones (to 
become Chief of the Air Staff in 1942) told the Melbourne 
branch of the United Service Institution that the Royal Aust-
ralian Air Force could be suitably equipped with aircraft in 
wartime only if a "Commonwealth Aircraft industty capable 
of rapid expansion" was created.' * This stock of opinion 
Archdale ParkhUl inherited when on 12 October 1934 he 
became minister for defence. 
In May 1935, WUUams reinforced it with a memorandum 
which was to form the basis for much of ParkhUl's comment 
on the need to form a local aircraft industty. Such an in-
dustty, WilUams argued, presented "the only sound solution 
to the needs of Air Defence". There were two main reasons 
for this conclusion: in wartime considerable reserves of air-
craft would be required; at the same time the capacity of the 
United Kingdom's aircraft industty would be "severely 
taxed". Williams went on to argue that as there was already a 
munitions industty in Australia then "local production of 
aircraft and engines should not present great difficulties".''' 
Parkhill, therefore, was making neither a new nor novel state-
ment when he announced in December 1935 that 
Considerable reserves of aircraft and engines are necessary for war, 
and the provision of them during peace in adequate numbers is a 
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costly undertaking. The establishment of the aircraft industry locally 
would offer a solution of this problem and greatly improve the 
present position of rehance on overseas supply which might not be 
available in war.'^ 
Any novelty lay only in the fact that ParkhUl was the first 
Australian minister for defence who was prepared to back 
such a statement with action. 
Why such support had previously been withheld requires 
explanation. The government's refusal to support a local air-
craft manufacturing industty in the 1920s did have justific-
ation even though from a defence viewpoint it was short-
sighted. No enemy appeared as a present danger; the Com-
mittee of Imperial Defence ruled out the possibiUty of a 
major war, and Singapore was expected to guard the sea 
routes. The small air force determined the size of the poten-
tial market and this force had already been equipped with 
128 aircraft donated by the United Kingdom." There was 
an economic argument also against sinking part of the already 
small defence vote into a factoty which for some time to 
come might produce little of miUtaty value. Nor did the com-
mercial and civU market show much sign of growing quickly 
enough to affect the situation. In 1924 there were forty-eight 
registered aircraft and stUl only ninety in 1928.^" As A. S, 
Butler, a director of de HavUland, remarked in 1925 after a 
visit during which he considered opening an AustraUan 
branch of his company, both the civU and miUtaty pro-
grammes were too small to justify it.^' 
It must have been evident to the Bruce-Page government 
that air power did not consist simply in the number of air-
craft available at a given time. The difficulty involved in 
recognizing this and yet rejecting the idea of an aircraft 
factoty resulted in an ambiguous poUcy. The government 
placed an order with the most promising embtyo company, 
and then refused to place another. The government declined 
to set up a government factoty, and yet sanctioned the 
formation of an Royal Australian Air Force experimental 
section. Moreover it tried to stimulate interest in aeronautical 
engineering by distributing the work of reconditioning 
aircraft as widely as possible. 
At one time in 1921 it did seem that an Australian aircraft 
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industty would be established through the Australian 
Aviation and Engineering Co. formed in Sydney by Nigel 
Love. While in England, Love acquired the Australian agency 
for A. V. Roe and the services of H. E. Broadsmith, that 
company's chief designer and engineer. In April 1921, Love 
approached the defence department with a proposal to build, 
mostly from local materials, the Avro 504K for the air force. 
Seeking an order for twenty-four machines, the company 
promised delivety over eighteen months and undertook to 
find the necessaty capital and equipment. While Love's 
immediate concern was to manufacture airframes, he did in 
time intend to turn out aero engines. 
In July 1921, the defence department placed an order for 
six aircraft.^ ^ At the same time, the Air CouncU passed a 
recommendation that the government should maintain 
"steadfastly" any policy once approved for supporting local 
manufacture.^^ This the government faUed to do, and 
although Love told Massy Greene, minister for defence, in 
March 1922 that the economic position at the factory would 
be "critical" unless further orders were placed^* and pleaded 
with him in September to provide a useful subsidy,^* the 
government refused to be vety concerned about the fate of 
the Australian Aviation and Engineering Co. By October 
1923, the company was in liquidation, and although it could 
be pointed out that "national defence should be placed above 
business considerations",^* the government, true to its 
political-economic principles, refused to run the factoty as a 
state corporation. As E. K. Bowden, minister for defence 
from 9 Februaty 1923, pointed out, his government had no 
intention of being involved in "what might be a costly 
provision for the manufacture of local aeroplanes".^'' 
Bowden might have realized that it was not practical to 
expect a tangible profit to be returned from defence 
expenditure. 
The closing of the Australian Aviation and Engineering Co. 
must have retarded the development of the aeronautical 
industty. Apart from the obvious fact that the only factoty 
m Australia was closed, the government's poUcy must have 
been a factor which drove talented engineers and designers 
out of the countty. H. E. Broadsmith went back to A. V. Roe 
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in the United Kingdom. In 1921 Frank Barnwell, the designer 
of the most successful aircraft of the 1914—18 war, the 
Bristol Fighter, joined the technical branch of the Royal 
AustraUan Air Force but little use was made of his talents. 
According to Air Vice Marshal E. C. Wackett, he was asked to 
spend his time designing propellers^ * and in 1923 he resigned 
his commission in disgust and returned to England.^' For 
Bristol, he designed and saw put into production the 
Blenheim which in 1935 was thought by some to be the best 
bomber in the world.^° 
In 1923 the Aero Club of New South Wales sponsored a 
light plane design competition. It was won by Edgar Percival. 
But there appeared to be no future in Australia for 
such a designer and in the year following the closure of the 
Australian Aviation and Engineering Co. Percival went to 
England where he designed and produced the highly success-
ful Gull light aeroplane.'^' In 1924 the government announ-
ced that it would grant $1,000 from the civil aviation vote as 
additional prize money in simUar competitions in an effort to 
encourage local designers,^ ^  but it was obvious that without 
the capacity for local production any serious designer would 
have to take both his design and his talents out of the coun-
tty. 
The major attempt to keep talent in the countty and to 
provide some manufacturing capacity was the formation in 
1924 of the Royal AustraUan Air Force Experimental 
Section at Randwick. The suggestion that such a unit should 
be formed came from the United Kingdom Air Staff who, in 
1921, felt that the testing of materials such as glue or fabric 
could provide useful results if undertaken in the Australian 
climate.^ ^  When the section was opened and placed under 
the direction of Squadron Leader L. J. Wackett, it was 
thought to mark a "new epoch in the histoty of aviation in 
AustraUa". '^* In the five years of its existence, however, the 
Experimental Section had a vety mixed record. When the 
section was closed in 1929, it had produced three complete 
aircraft which, though skilfully engineered,^ * were not really 
successful. 
Naturally enough. Sir Lawrence Wackett now holds the 
opinion that it was the experience gained in the Experimental 
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Section which aUowed the Commonwealth Aircraft Corpora-
tion some ten years later to produce aircraft at all. It aUowed 
Wackett himself to gain design and construction experience 
and it made possible the training of a nucleus of technicians 
which the construction of the Wirtaway later required.^* Yet 
by 1929, the Royal Australian Air Force 'Experimental 
Section had been attacked by two quite separate authorities: 
the federal auditor-general and Sir John Salmond. 
In 1928 Salmond's report cartied the comment: "if the 
object of buUdmg these machines is to prove that it is 
possible to buUd aircraft from materials produced in Aust-
raUa, then that object has been attained."^'' He recommen-
ded that the section be closed, and this was the one part of 
his report which was immediately implemented. Sir Lawrence 
Wackett's explanation of Salmond's attitude needs examin-
ation. According to Sir Lawrence, Sir John Salmond artived 
in Australia briefed by the Board of Trade which in turn had 
been mstructed by the Society of British Aircraft Construc-
tors. Thus, according to Wackett, one of the purposes of 
Salmond's visit was to stop any incipient move to form an 
Australian aircraft industty. The Australian market had to be 
protected for the United Kingdom manufacturer.^ * 
There is little evidence to support the Wackett thesis. Cer-
tainly the Department of Overseas Trade in London kept 
itself informed. For example, it reported to the United King-
dom Air Ministty the Australian Defence Department's 
action in ordering the six Avro aircraft from the Australian 
Aviation and Engineering Co. in 1921.^' Bruce at the 1926 
Imperial Conference may have made it appear that a move to 
start serious production was imminent when he said "our 
Experimental Section has undertaken the manufacture of air-
craft", and intimated that local firms would soon gain 
sufficient experience to start manufacture themselves.^" It 
will also be shown that the Board of Trade was initially 
opposed to the formation of the Commonwealth Aircraft 
Corporation while the Air Ministty showed itself most 
anxious to shut out American influence in Australian 
aviation. 
But there is no indication that Salmond's visit had stirred 
the Society of British Aircraft Constructors into action. And 
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besides, it is not likely that the Air Staff would, in deference 
to such an interest group, instruct its own ex-Chief of the Air 
Staff to reverse the already stated view that a local manufac-
turing capacity was required and to close up what, after all, 
was only a minor R.A.A.F. estabUshment. As the American 
MiUtaty Attachd in London — an unbiased observer perhaps 
— noted, "there is no reason to impugn Sir John's motives in 
this matter".*' The point is, however, that in 1929 Wackett 
did, and the matter rankled. In Wackett's view it was the 
Society of British Aircraft Constructors who "damned [his] 
chances" and destroyed his "early efforts to found an indus-
tty".*^ Without doubt this attitude had some influence on 
his recommendation in 1937 that an American, instead of a 
British, service aircraft should be manufactured. 
It is more likely, however, that the Experimental Section 
was closed not because of the machinations of any United 
Kingdom government department or interest group, but 
because it seemed extravagant and because Wackett operated 
the section with Uttle liaison with either the Air Board or 
with the Department of Defence.*^ For example, the 
amphibian Widgeon I was estimated to cost $5,000. Its final 
cost was $14,360 and when built no one had any use for it. 
Its successor Widgeon II "was not designed for any specific 
purpose and it [did] not appear to meet any useful mUitary 
requirement". It was unsuitable for naval cooperation duties 
and the Air Board advised that it could not be used in the 
Royal Australian Air Force "either as a flying boat or 
amphibian". Moreover, the Controller of CivU Aviation 
advised that the machine was of no use to his department. Its 
estimated cost had been $8,000; its final cost $18,478. A 
prototype training aircraft, Warrigal I, received an adverse 
report from No. 1 Flying Training School and it cost $7,450 
above the estimate to produce, while the auditor-general was 
clearly pessimistic about the final cost of Wartigal II.*'* 
Wackett in his account of the closure of the Experimental 
Section mentions nothing of this. 
Although Salmond reported that the work carried out in 
the section had been of "high order and ably directed"* * it is 
possible, in view of the auditor-general's two reports, that 
Salmond had been a little kind. There was clearly justific-
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ation for closing the section when it tended to reproduce the 
work which was being cartied out in the more sophisticated 
workshops in England, and particularly so when the Air 
Liaison Letters advised the Air Board of technical develop-
ments. But the experience of the Experimental Section with 
the aircraft it did produce proved an important point: the 
difficulty which would arise if AustraUa suddenly found itself 
required to manufacture its own aircraft. When the section 
ceased operating on 2 AprU 1930 there obviously remained 
much more to be learnt. 
One way of attempting to give engineering firms some 
aeronautical experience was to spread the work of recondi-
tioning the 128 United Kingdom gift aircraft as widely as 
possible. When reconditioning began in 1925 conttacts worth 
$35,000 were let but no single contract was worth more than 
$5,450. As Squadron Leader McBain pointed out, "our 
object in getting these firms to recondition machines is to tty 
and maintain them in business so that eventually they will 
undertake manufacture".** This work also brought the 
Munitions Supply Board to the fringes of the aeronautical 
industty. Within it the Aircraft Inspection Section was 
formed and the post of inspector of aircraft construction 
created. The Munitions Supply Board also undertook the res-
ponsibUity of manufacturing various aircraft components 
ordered by the Air Board.*'' 
Allowing for the fact that the depression precluded the 
ScuUin government from forming an aircraft manufacturing 
policy, it may be argued that before 1935 successive Aust-
ralian ministries had done little to foster the growth of an 
aeronautical industty. Both the Hughes government and the 
later Bruce-Page government relied on the efforts of private 
enterprise and limited their financial assistance to a subsidy 
of $3.36 per kUogram per aircraft. Yet surprisingly, the late 
twenties saw a smaU flourish of activity in the design and 
construction of civil aircraft. The Larkin Aircraft Company 
designed and produced the all-metal-framed, single-engined 
Lascoter which the Australian Aerial Services placed on its 
Melbourne—Hay run. In 1930, the same company produced 
the tri-motored Lasconder. Both Qantas and Western Aust-
ralian Airways assembled the DH50 and the DH61 from im-
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ported parts, while in 1929 the General Aircraft Company 
produced the successful Genairco. Lawrence Wackett, who 
had resigned from the air force with the closure of the Exper-
imental Section to form his own smaU company, made the 
Codock and the Gannet.** This endeavour, however, was a 
fragile foundation on which to buUd an aircraft industty 
capable of fulfUling the countty's needs in wartime. In 1935, 
AustraUa was relying on the United Kingdom to supply 
operational aircraft. 
The problem of supply 1935-39 
It has been shown that in 1934 the Lyons government 
announced that as part of a general three-year plan to 
develop defences it intended to "practically complete" part 
one of the Salmond scheme. Naturally this meant that new 
aircraft had to be ordered, and by March 1936 indents worth 
$3,400,000 had been placed through the Air Ministty. It was 
one thing, however, to place orders, but quite another to 
obtain reasonably quick delivery. Early in 1935, AustraUa 
had ordered twenty-four Supermarine Seagulls Mark V for 
fleet cooperation work, thirty-three Avro Ansons for coastal 
reconnaissance, fifty-four Hawker Demons as fighter-
bombers, five Avro Anson trainers, and one de HavUland 
Rapide. By March 1936 five Seagulls, seventeen Demons, the 
Anson trainers, and the Rapide had been delivered.*' In 
October 1936 a further ten Demons were ordered; the 
earUest delivety date which could be promised was December 
1937.*° 
The attempt to equip the Royal AustraUan Air Force with 
a fast, twin-engined bomber-reconnaissance aircraft capable 
of cartying out strikes agamst shipping or of attacking land 
targets, provides a good illustration of the supply difficulties 
the air force faced. In November 1938, Lyons told the House 
"there have been on order through the Air Ministty for some 
time a large number of fast, powerful, modern twin-engined 
general reconnaissance-type land planes".*' This order was 
originally for the Blenheim*^ but in March 1937 the order 
had been changed to cover the supply of the Bristol 149, 
later known as the BoUngbroke, and delivety promised for 
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June/July 1938.*^ By May 1937, however, the prototype 
had not flown, and the air member for supply and organiz-
ation at the Air Ministty had to admit that "no definite 
forecast for Australian deUvety" could be made.* * The order 
for the BoUngbroke was cancelled and then transferred to 
cover the supply of the Beaufort. After Lyons had personally 
intervened, fifty were promised for delivety in July 1939 and 
the remainder by the following March.* * These aircraft were 
never delivered, and finally the manufacture of the Beaufort 
was undertaken in Australia in the hope that squadrons might 
be equipped with them in 1940. They were not: when Japan 
struck in December 1941, only ten Beauforts had been 
produced by the Government Aircraft Factory formed for 
this vety purpose.* * 
There were good reasons why Austtalian orders could not 
be quickly fUled. In 1934 Baldwin announced plans to reach 
air parity with Germany. Originally the attainment of this 
objective entailed the delivety ex-United Kingdom factories 
of 3,000 aircraft each year, but in Februaty 1936 that figure 
was increased to 8,000. By AprU 1938 it was again amended, 
and this time delivety of 12,000 aircraft inside two years was 
called for.*^ Until the "shadow factoty" tystem began to 
operate effectively, it is not surprising that the British aircraft 
industty which had struggled along in the twenties found it 
impossible to meet these demands.* * 
The production and supply problem was made more diffi-
cult by the fact that the expansion programme coincided 
with far-reaching changes in aviation technology.*' Fabric 
was being replaced with the stressed-skin method of tteating 
air surfaces; the fixed-wheeled biplane was being superseded 
by the monoplane with the retractable undercarriage; the 
variable-pitch propeller was being developed, engines were 
being supercharged, and cockpits enclosed — all from the 
middle of 1935 onwards. The future of none of these inipor-
tant technical points had been settled. In 1936, one of the 
best thinkers that the Royal Air Force has produced. Sir 
John Slessor, could still argue the merits of the two-seater 
biplane fighter-bomber-type over the single-seater fighter.*" 
Given this combination of circumstances, the British air-
craft industty had delivered only 4,500 of the machines 
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ordered for the Royal Air Force by AprU 1938. Dominion 
orders naturally suffered: the defence of the United Kingdom 
held strategic priority, and it would have been absurd for the 
Air Ministty to have given it any other status. The fact 
remained, however, that AusttaUa was denied the means to 
provide for aerial defence. The attempt to overcome the 
problem held far-reaching consequences: it may be argued 
that one strand of the Australian—American alUance may be 
traced back to the connections made from 1935 between the 
Australian and American aviation concerns. Again arose the 
problem of resolving the conflict between Australian interests 
and United Kingdom policy and wishes. This time it meant 
that the 1923 Imperial Conference defence resolutions 
covering the standardization of equipment were to be tested. 
At the 1923 Imperial Conference, Bruce had been respon-
sible for drafting the defence resolutions, but had clashed 
with Mackenzie King. The result was that aircraft standardi-
zation was expressly omitted.*' This development did not 
particularly concern the Air Ministty. At the time they were 
interested in seeing local manufacturing capacity in the 
Dominions, and at a conference held the following year their 
spokesman made it plain that this should be encouraged to 
the extent that "the time was not opportune for serious con-
sideration of the question of standardisation".*^ At the 1926 
Imperial Conference, however, Bruce committed AustraUa to 
the idea that standardization in all forms was an admirable 
goal. As he told the conference, "the guiding principle on 
which all our defence preparations are based, whether for the 
Sea, the Land, or the Air Force, is uniformity in evety 
respect".*^ A more definite statement is difficult to imagine. 
It foUowed that in the 1920s, the idea of a successful 
American invasion of the AustraUan aviation market was 
remote. The air force was not blind to American develop-
ments.*'* When WilUams was returning to Australia in 1926 
from attending staff college in England, he returned via the 
United States and visited United States Army Air Corps 
stations.* 5 In 1929, Squadron Leader E. C. Harrison spent 
ten weeks in the United States inspecting both east and west 
coast aircraft factories.** But it seemed out of the question 
to incorporate American aircraft into the Royal Australian 
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Air Force. The supply of militaty aircraft was obviously a 
British prerogative. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
first American success came in the civil field. 
Until November 1935, the importation of American civU 
aircraft into Australia was conttoUed by a technicality. Under 
customs regulations, only aircraft which possessed a certifi-
cate of airworthiness issued or validated by a countty which 
had been a party to the 1919 International Convention of 
Aerial Navigation could be flown in AustraUa.*'' Neither 
Germany nor America had been a party, so unless a certifi-
cate was granted by a state which had been a signatoty, 
German and American aircraft were for all practical purposes 
shut out. WhUe Germany could always use the good offices 
of Sweden, the distance obstacle facing American would-be 
suppliers is obvious. The airworthiness bartier was so effec-
tive that although the Ottawa tariff favoured British aircraft 
with a 15 per cent preference, the AustraUan government 
gave only 10 per cent. It was, after aU, a formality. 
In July 1935 the position was about to change. The United 
Kingdom's senior trade commissioner in Australia, R. W. 
Dalton, advised London that the AusttaUan government was 
considering the use of either German or American aircraft on 
the Trans-Tasman route and on some internal air services. It 
was suggested that an application at once be made for the 
imposition of the full 15 per cent preference.** The Board of 
Trade was alarmed. According to J. R. Adams a United King-
dom trade commissioner in Sydney, Kingsford-Smith, a 
popular national hero, had been pushing the claims of his 
Lockheed Altair and seemed bent upon creating an atmos-
phere hostile to British aircraft.*' This had to be countered. 
As A, E. Overton, the second secretaty to the Board of 
Trade, pointed out to the Dominions Office, "if foreign types 
secure a foothold it might be difficult for the British 
products to replace them".''" Overton was right. 
The first counter-attack was launched on Menzies who as 
Attorney General was in London at the time the initial advice 
was received. Menzies was given a stiff lecture and an aide 
memoire. It was stressed that for defence reasons only British 
civU aircraft should be employed. A second reason given was 
the obvious one that it was beneficial to United Kingdom 
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trade that only such aircraft should be imported. The Board 
of Trade pointed out that if AustraUa, in spite of these a,rgu-
ments, did change its poUcy, then they would insist on the 
imposition of the fuU 15 per cent tariff margin. Menzies's 
attitude was of polite disbelief that American aircraft would 
be used, and he agreed fully with the views of the Board of 
Trade.''' In AusttaUa, E. T. Crutchley approached Earle Page 
and Archdale ParkhiU and was quickly reassured: there was 
no intention to allow easier importation of American aircraft. 
Earle Page told Crutchley that evety attempt had been made 
to block Kingsford-Smith's efforts to bring American com-
mercial aircraft into the countty simply on the grounds that 
the government "did not want American aircraft". Parkhill 
echoed this; he told Crutchley that he was definitely against 
the idea of German and American imports and that "he 
would have nothing to do with them".''^ It must have come 
as something as a surprise therefore to Sir Hany Batterbee in 
the Dominions Office to receive Crutchley's cable on 28 
November 1935 which read, "Cabinet decided yesterday to 
grant licence for the importation of foreign aircraft for com-
mercial airlines."'' ^ 
There were good reasons for this change of policy: British 
commercial aircraft were, quite simply, inferior to the 
American and a point was finally reached when the Aust-
ralian government with the best will in the world could no 
longer support the British manufacturer. The Americans, par-
ticularly the Douglas and Lockheed companies, were far in 
advance in commercial design. This fact was weU demon-
strated by the result of the London—Melbourne MacRobert-
son air race held in October 1934, and the remarkable perfor-
mance of a Douglas DC2 entered by K.L.M. as a normal 
passenger service.'' * The only type the United Kingdom had 
to offer in competition was the fabric-covered four-engined 
biplane, the DH86, which had a disastrous accident record in 
AusttaUa. Six of this type crashed, and between October 
1934 and October 1935 two aircraft belonging to the newly 
formed Holyman Airways were lost. It was the October 1935 
accident which brought about the lifting of the American 
importation embargo. As Parkhill apologetically explained, 
the number of passengers cartied by Holyman decUned and 
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"the fact that they were compelled to use this type involved 
the services being run at a considerable loss".'' ^  So there was 
much pressure to allow the importation of American aircraft. 
The reaction of the British aircraft industty to this 
development was apathetic. Not only did they lack competi-
tive types of aircraft, they lacked any enthusiasm to compete 
at aU. American Douglas interests, on the other hand, buUt 
upon their success of October 1934, while Lockheed ener-
getically promoted the sales of their Electra and Model 12. 
And above aU, both companies could promise quick delivety. 
Hankinson, in the high commissioner's office in Canberta, 
made this point vety well when writing to Sir Harty Batter-
bee of the Dominion office in Februaty 1936: 
I heard the other day from a private source that some time ago New 
England Airways ordered two machines from the United Kingdom 
last October. As they hadn't been delivered by the end of last year 
and the advice was that they might with luck get here next August, 
Air Lines (who have now taken over New England Airways) have 
now ordered two U.S. machines instead. ''^ 
And the Americans backed the promise of prompt delivety 
with a good public relations technique. When the first DC2 
ordered by Holyman arrived in May 1936, Douglas sent out 
Major Bertandias, their export manager, to support Harold 
Gatty the Australasian manager. As Liesching wtyly noted, 
"even Canberra was visited and regaled with free flights for 
the local populace from the Governor-General axid his staff 
downwards". In Melbourne Bertandias gave a large party to 
celebrate the arrival of Douglas in Austtalia and it was 
"attended by the Chief of the Air Staff, the Controller-
General of Civil Aviation, and other senior officers of the Air 
Board".'''' 
The combination of superiority in type, excellent sales-
manship, and personal contact made the American threat 
difficult to counter. The Society of British Aircraft Construc-
tors made no real attempt to do so. It abandoned the Aust-
ralian market for commercial aircraft with little interest. The 
Air Ministty, much more alive to the impUcations, discussed 
the American invasion with the society whose suggestions, in 
fact, amounted to an admission of defeat. AustraUa, the 
society argued, should be induced to impose the full 15 per 
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cent preference; the new DH91, which could not be delivered 
before June 1937 "at the earUest", should be promoted. But 
the society were straightforward: they could see "little hope 
of inducing firms other than De HavUland to make any 
special efforts to regain lost export markets whilst they are 
saturated with orders from the Defence services".'' * This was 
not a business dynamic with which to match the Americans, 
and as Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, United Kingdom high com-
missioner, wrote to Batterbee, "if we think that we can avoid 
taking simUar measures to the Americans and can rely on 
sentiment to sell our aircraft, we are making a vety fooUsh 
mistake".'" In July 1936 defeat was formally admitted and 
the Australian change in poUcy vindicated when Swinton 
refused to sanction the request for the 15 per cent tariff on 
the grounds that it was "a dog in the manger" attitude.*" 
Indeed, in 1937, British Airways itself was forced to import 
the Lockheed Electta because no British counterpart was 
avaUable.*' 
In 1936, however, it could seem that despite the slowness 
of deUvety the AustraUan market for mUitaty aircraft was 
StiU secure in British hands. In November 1935 the Air 
Ministty suggested that delivety should be improved if Aust-
ralia planned its requirements on a three- or five-year basis 
and avoided placing orders for aircraft which were not in 
standard use with the Royal Air Force. It was also suggested 
that firm orders should be placed by March each year.*^ 
Australia agreed to this procedure, and yet at the same time 
there was some indication from the Department of Defence 
that the implication that AustraUan equipment would be 
selected by the Air Ministty was not altogether suitable. 
Shepherd, secretaty of the department, noted that "while [he 
was] alive to the advantages of uniformity, AusttaUa must 
retain for itself the responsibility for exammation of types of 
aircraft and decisions as to the best to suit local require-
ments".* ^ Moreover, there was no indication that AustraUan 
deliveries would be speeded up in this process. 
Oddly enough the Air Ministty's defence against charges of 
slow delivety was that "in general the specifications for air-
craft ordered by the Australian government have differed 
considerably from our own". When this consideration was 
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taken into account, the Air Ministty concluded that the 
deUvety dates were not unreasonable and compared favour-
ably with those offered to the Royal Air Force.** Archdale 
Parkhill was not convinced. The strategic principle of the 
defence of the United Kingdom could be given by British 
planners a wide interpretation. By 1937, Parkhill reaUzed 
that it was wide enough for the United Kingdom to give 
priority to orders placed by Turkey and Finland. As he put 
the point at the 1937 Imperial Conference, "long delays 
occur in meeting Commonwealth orders for Air Force air-
craft from British manufacturers, but it is understood that 
some part of the delay is due to the fact that these factories 
are also accepting orders in an ordinaty commercial way from 
foreign countries". Consequently he submitted a definite 
proposal that "the Commonwealth Government desires that 
the principle should be affirmed that the requirements of 
Dominion Air Forces should be given priority over those of 
foreign countries".** The Air Ministty never gave this 
assurance. 
By 1938 two complete squadrons of the Turkish Air Force 
had been suppUed with the Blenheim.* * As the Air Ministty 
noted the poUtics of supply "it was of particular importance 
that evetything possible should be done to keep countries 
Uke Turkey within our sphere of influence by providing them 
with aircraft".*'' The same comment could have been made 
of Finland: by 1938 it also had been suppUed with the Blen-
heim.* * The principle of strategic supply of aircraft could be 
extended. For example, by June 1939 the Air Ministty had 
promised 126 of its precious Hurricanes to Roumania for 
deUvety between June 1940 and May 1941, 24 Spitfires had 
been allocated for delivety to Greece between December 
1939 and June 1940, while Turkey had been promised a 
further 60 Blenheims and 60 Spitfires.* ' 
British reasoning was sound enough. If Turkey were an ally 
of Britain then it would strengthen the British position in the 
Mediterranean: if not, then the pressure upon Italy to join 
Germany might be increased. Indeed, the political and 
strategic importance of Finland, Greece, Turkey, and 
Roumania all tended to make their requests for aircraft more 
urgent in British eyes than AusttaUa's.'" It followed that all 
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ParkhiU could gain from the 1937 Imperial Conference was 
the secret assurance that "the United Kingdom should con-
sider intensive [sic] possible peace orders to the government 
munitions estabUshments in Austtalia and India and should, 
as far as possible, give priority to Dominion and Indian orders 
for war material placed in this countty"." In reality, this 
assurance was no assurance at all. 
For these reasons, the Royal Australian Air Force stUl 
lacked a sttiking force. In September 1937, ParkhiU was stiU 
hoping that the Blenheim might be avaUable,'^ but this air-
CTaft went elsewhere. The AustraUan attacking force consis-
ted of Ansons and Demons, and forty of the Ansons were 
under charter from the United Kingdom.'^ It was boasted 
that these aircraft would be equal to "any kind of sea-borne 
aircraft that they may have to meet in this countty".'* This 
statement was either an absurd naivety or a calculated 
ambiguity. Sir CyrU NewaU, Chief of the Air Staff in the 
United Kingdom, had a more realistic view of Australia's air 
defence capabUity when he pointed out that "in the Royal 
Air Force, the Anson is regarded as merely a stop-gap and the 
Demon is obsolescent",'^ gut the point had been made: 
further reUance on the United Kingdom to improve the 
position would be misplaced. 
By November 1938, Lyons appeared to have recognized 
this fact: he announced in the House that "as a necessaty 
measure of re-insurance against the non-delivety of the twin-
engined aircraft commencing next year" it intended to order 
50 Lockheed Hudsons from America.'* In 1939 an order for 
a further 50 was placed. Even though Britain had ordered 
200 of this type from Lockheed, the Air Ministty was still 
opposed to Austtalia departing from the principle of 
equipping its force with a standard British type. In fact, 
Newall went so far as to suggest that the Royal Air Force 
should absorb "the entire output of the Lockheed factoty" 
in an attempt to "head them off buying Hudsons even 
though it may mean giving up some of the earUer deliveries of 
the Beaufort".''' Such a move, however, was too late; by this 
time AustraUa was not only buying American civU and mUi-
taty aircraft, but it was also manufacturing under licence an 
American machine. 
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The formation of the Australian aircraft industry 
In July 1935, J. R. Adams, a United Kingdom ttade com-
missioner, advised the Department of Overseas Trade that 
Parkhill, speaking at the annual dinner of the Sydney 
Chamber of Commerce, had emphasized "his firm intention 
to do evetything in his power to establish and foster the 
manufacture of aeroplanes in AusttaUa". Adams was anxious: 
American interests, he argued, "would be on the alert to 
identify themselves with this", and he suggested that "sound 
guidance" should at once be made avaUable to Parkhill from 
the United Kingdom industty.' * 
Adams had cause for concern: unUke his predecessors, 
ParkhiU had a serious intent. Moreover, despite opposition 
from London and mside the AustraUan cabinet, American 
interests were connected with the project. In fact, when the 
Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation was formed in October 
1936, the British aircraft industty was shut out. The manner 
in which the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation was 
formed may be interpreted as a far-reaching defeat for British 
aviation interests in Australia. Once again, the defeat was 
largely deserved, and to some extent self-mflicted. The 
United Kingdom industty showed no interest in being 
involved in the manufacture of aircraft in AusttaUa until it 
was too late, and although then its effort was strongly backed 
by the Air Ministty, it faUed to dislodge the American 
interests, General Motors-Holden's and North American 
Aviation. 
The genesis of the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation is 
obscure. What is clear is that shortly after taking office as 
minister for defence, ParkhiU became convinced that Aust-
raUa needed an aircraft factoty. In 1934, the same idea 
occurred to Essington Lewis, managing director of Broken 
Hill Pty. Co. L td . , " and W. S. Robinson, joint managing 
director of Broken Hill Associated Smelters. According to 
Mellor's account in the official histoty, Essington Lewis 
presented Parkhill with a "ready made plan" (of which no 
details are given) and ParkhiU simply adopted i t . ' "" Thus to 
Mellor, Essington Lewis was both architect and prime mover 
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of the aircraft industty. 
A different version is given by W. S. Robinson. Robinson 
argues that it was he who activated Essington Lewis, and 
although Parkhill is seen as "honest, earnest", and "hard-
working", his contribution was slight. It was not until Robin-
son got into direct contact with Lyons that any real progress 
could be made.'"' L. J. Hartnett, the managing director of 
General Motors-Holden's, presents still another account and 
claims for himself the dual role of instigator and organizer. 
According to Hartnett, ParkhiU came to him and said, "well I 
know we shoidd be making aircraft in Austtalia, but I am 
way out of my depth. If you were in my position, how would 
you go about getting started?'""^ Hartnett says that it was he 
who told Parkhill to approach the industrialists, and in fact 
claims that he drafted the letter which Parkhill sent to them. 
In spite of these conflicting claims, there is some evidence 
which shows that Parkhill was not simply being directed by 
Essington Lewis, W. S. Robinson, or L. J. Hartnett. Indeed, 
Sir Lawrence Wackett is firmly of the opinion that Parkhill 
alone was responsible for initiating the proposals to form the 
aircraft mdustty and that without his energy and drive the 
project would not have started in 1935—36.'" ^  Certainly in 
1935, ParkhiU's mind was working along different lines from 
those of the industrialists. On 5 November 1935 he had a 
long discussion with E. T. Crutchley, and after pointing to 
the slow delivety of aircraft ordered from the United King-
dom, asked if there was a British aircraft company which 
would be prepared to set up a factory in AustraUa.'"'* The 
point is, however, that no notice was taken in London of the 
warning Adams had offered in July, nor had the United King-
dom industty responded to ParkhiU's overture by Februaty 
1936. As W. C. Hankinson, m Canberra, regretfully wrote to 
Sir Harty Batterbee, "so far I have had no reply to that 
enquity and now I hear that artangements are practically 
complete for a company to be formed and floated for the 
manufacture of aircraft".'"* A prompt response might have 
given the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation a different 
complexion, but as Hankinson noted "they apparently did 
not think it worth while to come in". 
Although negotiations had been going on between the 
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government and the companies involved from at least 
October 1935, it was not untU 11 Februaty 1936 that the 
Dominions Office were officially advised of the project, let 
alone that any progress towards its realization had been 
made.'" * This tardiness was unusual for the Lyons govern-
ment: generally it was most anxious for advice and rarely 
acted without it. On this occasion, the government may have 
reaUzed that the inclusion of General Motors-Holden's might 
cause difficulties.'"'' Certainly it appears from the advice 
sent to the Dommions Office that the Australian cabinet felt 
they had to explain General Motors-Holden's' holding of 25 
per cent in the company. They granted that it would be 
preferable for "any such undertaking to be financed and con-
trolled by wholly Austtalian and British capital", but also felt 
that "such a favourable opportunity may not again present 
itself". Consequently it was asked if the Air Ministty would 
give an assurance that their assistance in technical matters 
would be continued.'" * 
The Dominions Office were advised that the members of 
the syndicate were Broken HUl Pty. Co. Ltd., Broken HUl 
Associated Smelters, and General Motors-Holden's but before 
the Dominions Office repUed to the first telegrams, they were 
advised that Imperial Chemical Industries had joined the 
group and had taken half the interest held by General 
Motors-Holden's. Once again the AusttaUan cabinet stressed 
the favourable terms offered by this syndicate: no guarantee 
or financial backing was required by it from the government, 
and all these companies wanted was an official letter which 
they could show their shareholders saying that the govern-
ment required the estabUshment of an aircraft industty. After 
aU, it was pointed out, the shareholders could not expect 
profits for some considerable time.'"' 
The first point which might be made when examining the 
British reaction to these proposals is that W. S. Robinson's 
simpUfication that they were "out and out" opposed to the 
idea of manufacturing aircraft in AusttaUa as they considered 
it unnecessaty,"" requires modification. The British res-
ponse was, in fact, mixed. There was one point of agreement: 
General Motors-Holden's had to be ousted. On 20 Februaty 
1936, Sir Harty Batterbee chaired a meeting attended by 
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representatives from the Board of Trade, the Air Ministty, 
the Dominions Office, and the Department of Overseas 
Trade. The Air Ministty, although refusing to admit that 
Australian aircraft orders were being delayed, repeated the 
arguments of 1921 and added to them the point that an 
AustraUan capacity might be a source of supply to the Royal 
Air Force in wartime. Provided therefore that a British type 
was manufactured, the Air Ministty had but one objection: 
American participation would preclude Austtalian access to 
secret technical information. The CivU Aviation view was 
simUar: an AusttaUan factoty was approved of in principle, 
but there was no wish to see "Australian civil aviation 
become 'Americanised' " . I t followed that General Motors-
Holden's would have to leave the syndicate. 
It was the Board of Trade which had objections to the 
Australian proposal which transcended the Air Ministty's 
reservations. Given Article Nine of the Ottawa tariff agree-
ment the products of an aircraft manufacturing industty 
could not be protected, and the Board of Trade argued that it 
was necessaty to discourage "the setting up of such expensive 
secondaty industries in the Dominions". Aircraft could be 
imported more cheaply from the United Kingdom. It 
followed that the creation of an aircraft-manufacturing 
capacity in Austtalia would have to be "strongly opposed" 
from a commercial point of view. '" This argument, 
however, was short-lived. Four weeks later it was admitted 
that no objection would be raised under Article Nine if the 
project were considered vital to defence.'' ^ By this time, the 
real and lasting objection was to the inclusion of General 
Motors-Holden's. 
The quaUfied approval which the Dominions Office fmally 
gave to the AusttaUan proposal, therefore, was dependent 
upon the removal of American influence. Although consider-
ations of AusttaUan defence and the poUcy of adopting 
common types of service aircraft were appreciated, a 
continuation of the Air Ministty's cooperation and assistance 
could only be assured if the concern were entirely British. 
After aU it was argued, the Air Ministry "could not, of 
course, divulge defence secrets to any undertaking which con-
tamed a foreign element.'" ' ^ In reaUty, the objection to the 
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inclusion of American interests in general, and to General 
Motors-Holden's in particular, had nothing to do with 
defence. 
It was reasonable for the members of the tyndicate to 
want General Motors-Holden's associated with them. It was 
the only company in Austtalia with considerable experience 
in body-buUdmg engmeering. But from the United Kingdom 
viewpoint it was just this experience in the motor car 
industty which posed a danger to British interests. Thus the 
argument that cooperation would be withheld because it 
would mean American access to British defence secrets was 
simply a "screen" to guard against "the more serious danger 
of the exploitation of the AustraUan motor engine 
market".'' "* Compared to this American threat, provision 
for AusttaUa's defence took second place, and it is not sur-
prising, therefore, that by the end of May 1936 AustraUan-
United Kingdom relations had become sttained. 
There is no need to labour the point that any participation 
in the Australian manufacture of aircraft by General Motors-
Holden's was unacceptable to the United Kingdom, and that 
as long as General Motors-Holden's did have an interest, the 
Dominions Office were quite prepared to acknowledge the 
view of the Board of Trade that "the estabUshment of an 
aircraft factoty must be opposed as leading inevitably to the 
extinction of the United Kingdom motor trade in Aust-
ralia".' ' * This consideration prolonged the tedious negotia-
tions: the Dominions Office could not officially state the real 
reason for wishing to oust General Motors-Holden's, but as 
the Air Ministty had argued that an Austtalian aircraft 
factoty did possess a definite defence value, neither could 
they oppose the project entirely. The problem was to shut 
out American interests, but as this could not be admitted, the 
negotiations lacked reality. W. S. Robinson has stated that 
the aircraft industty was started in AusttaUa only after one of 
the "most strenuous" fights he had ever had."* But more 
than this, it was devious. 
It is difficult, for example, to know just what function 
Bruce, now Australian high commissioner, performed. He 
knew the real reason for the United Kingdom objection to 
General Motors-Holden's,'''' but there is no evidence which 
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suggests that he passed it on to his government. In fact he 
seemed to identify himself with United Kingdom interests: 
when he could tell Sir Harty Batterbee "not to put any ob-
stacles in the way provided the Commonwealth Government 
co-operates with us in making it a British concern",'' * the 
pronoun might be reveaUng. When L. J. Wackett met Bruce in 
London, he found him extremely hostile and "cynical to the 
point that he could hardly beUeve that it was proposed to 
attempt to buUd aircraft in Australia".'' ' 
An odd note was also struck by Casey and GuUett during 
the negotiations. Both these senior Australian ministers were 
in touch with Sir Geoffrey Whiskard throughout the cabinet 
discussions, and were quite prepared to discuss cabinet 
business with him.'^" In fact Whiskard's dispatches reveal 
that Casey was partly responsible for planning the strategy of 
the Dominions Office.'^i Casey and GuUett firmly held the 
view that American capital should be replaced by British, and 
their insistence on this point appears to have caused them 
both to clash with Parkhill, and to a lesser extent with Lyons. 
One method of bringing British capital into the project 
was, of course, to include a United Kingdom aircraft firm in 
the syndicate. By 17 March, the Dominions Office had been 
advised that General Motors-Holden's had reduced their 
interest to 10 per cent. If a British aircraft company could be 
found who would be wilUng to take up this shareholding, 
then the fear for the fate of the Australian market for motor 
cars and engines would be partly removed. The attempt of 
the Hawker-Siddeley group to take the place of General 
Motors-Holden's, however, failed completely. When the offer 
came in Februaty 1936 it was too late and its terms were far 
too binding on the AustraUan syndicate. Moreover, their 
effort to replace General Motors-Holden's was never more 
than halfhearted. 
Indicative of the nonchalant attitude Hawker-Siddeley 
took towards being associated with the project is the fact 
that their negotiator in Australia, Brian Lewis, was neither a 
member of the company nor was he receiving any payment 
for his services. Indeed, in June 1936 he stiU did not possess 
any documentaty evidence to show that he really was acting 
for Hawker-Siddeley.'^^ It seems a safe conclusion to draw 
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that Brian Lewis was not a leading businessman, and that if 
Hawker-Siddeley had been serious in their intent they would 
have sent at least a member of the board to AusttaUa to put 
their proposals before ministers and industriaUsts. As it was, 
Brian Lewis relied almost solely on the advice of Liesching, 
an upper-middle-echelon civU servant in the United Kingdom 
high commissioner's office. 
It was not untU January 1936 that Brian Lewis saw Essing-
ton Lewis, and was invited to submit a proposal. In Februaty 
Brian Lewis suggested that Hawker-Siddeley should take up 
capital, and that as a quid pro quo the syndicate should agree 
to manufacture only Hawker-Siddeley aircraft.'^^ But by 
this time, L. J. Wackett had been asked to lead a mission 
overseas with the task of selecting an aircraft for manufac-
ture. It was unUkely, therefore, that Essington Lewis would 
commit himself to Hawker-Siddeley until the findings of this 
mission had been examined. Although it was reported that 
Essington Lewis had been "genuinely glad to receive the 
proposals"'^* he in no way intimated that their acceptance 
would mean the automatic removal of General Motors-
Holden's. Indeed, Brian Lewis was told that the inclusion of 
General Motors-Holden's was certainly required because the 
syndicate needed the services of L. J. Hartnett.' ^ * 
This was the situation when Menzies arrived in London 
with Earle Page.' ^ * At the same time so did Wackett and the 
other two members of the mission: Squadron Leader A. W. 
Murphy and Squadron Leader E. C. Harrison.' ^'' On 26 
March, Page and Menzies had a discussion with Viscount 
Swinton, Malcolm MacDonald, Sir Harty Batterbee, and rep-
resentatives from the Board of Trade.'^s The same ground 
was covered and no progress was made. One novel note was 
introduced when Swinton suggested that only a "shadow 
factoty" was necessaty. This could be set up, and then closed 
untU the outbreak of war. The subject was quickly changed 
when it was pointed out that the only conceivable factoty 
avaUable would be that belonging to General Motors-
Holden's. Baulked, Swinton then attacked the raison d'etre 
for including Hartnett and with a clear threat retreated to his 
former position. If, he said, "there was any foreign capital in 
the enterprise in the sense of involving any element of foreign 
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management and control, then it would be impossible for the 
Air Ministty to give their co-operation".'^^ Menzies and 
Page had made no impression. 
On 14 AprU a worried Lyons cabled Baldwin direct 
pointing out that he was "at a loss to understand the opposi-
tion". Baldwin was asked to "smooth out" the difficulties 
which could only exist in the minds of those at the 
Dommions Office and the Air Ministty. Again an assurance 
was given that it was intended to manufacture a British type 
and that all technical secrets would be quite safe.' ^" Baldwin 
had no intention of being any help: he simply passed the 
telegram over to Batterbee who had Whiskard's advice (ex-
-Casey) that if the secrecy aspect was stressed long enough 
then Parkhill would be overruled. To clinch the defeat of 
ParkhUl, Whiskard had advised, it was only needed to give "a 
precise assurance that British technical assistance and finance 
would be avaUable to fUl the place of General Motors-
Holden's 10 per cent and Hartnett".'^' This combination 
would ensure the success of British poUcy. 
Before the Dominions Office drafted Baldwin's reply to 
Lyons, Swinton saw a representative from Hawker-Siddeley 
who assured him that the group could supply any technical 
assistance. Thus fortified, Swinton advised the Dominions 
Office that the Air Ministty was firm in its refusal to co-
operate with any company which contained even a modicum 
of foreign capital or management and that Hawker-Siddeley 
could fUl the gap left by General Motors-Holden's.'^^ The 
reply Baldwin sent, therefore, simply said that no coopera-
tion was possible whUe General Motors-Holden's 
remained.' ^ ^  
From this point, relations between the two governments 
rapidly deteriorated. In London, Menzies asked a difficult 
question: which formula did the Air Ministty use when 
deciding to withhold secret information? Blandly Menzies 
was told that it was "a case of our knowing an All-British 
firm when we saw it". After arguing that Hartnett was a 
Vauxhall-trained Englishman, and that for aU practical pur-
poses General Motors-Holden's was an AustraUan company, 
Menzies shortiy retorted that although the Air Ministty might 
"know a British dog when they saw one" it did not 
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necessarily follow "that they would know an AusttaUan 
dog".'^* Lyons, in Canberra, seems to have wondered 
whether by this British intuition they were able to "know" 
any kind of dog at all: he told Whiskard that although he 
understood that Imperial Chemical Industries possessed a 
foreign element, access to defence secrets was apparently not 
denied to it.' ^* The matter of secrets was also nicely, if not 
tactfully, covered by WilUams when he irritably wrote to 
EUington, "the only secret information I know coming from 
you comes to these headquarters", to which he added the 
point "are we not learning a good deal in aeronautical 
engineering from the U.S.A. these days?'" ^  * 
In AusttaUa it was becommg obvious that this question of 
secret information was, to quote H. L. Shepherd, "an obstacle 
invented by the United Kingdom government for tactical 
reasons in an endeavour to get their own way".'^'' The 
United Kingdom, in fact, was occupying an untenable 
position, and much of the credit for breaking the deadlock 
must go to Keith Officer, then the Political Liaison Officer in 
London. By-passing Menzies, he saw Batterbee on 27 AprU 
and told him that as the two governments were "getting at 
loggerheads", he was becommg "worried". Menzies, he said, 
usually "most sympathetic", felt that in this instance the 
Dominions Office was being "unduly sticky". Would the 
Dominions Office accept the formula of dropping the objec-
tions to General Motors-Holden's provided that the manage-
ment of the proposed company was entirely British, an 
assurance was given that technical secrets would not be 
revealed to the board, and that there was a real intention 
expressed to manufacture British and not American types of 
aircraft?'^* Officer suggested that Batterbee put this to 
Menzies as a Dominions Office modus vivendi — it might then 
be accepted. 
And indeed it was. On 1 May, Harding advised Whiskard 
that Menzies felt that these suggestions should be passed on 
to Lyons.'^' The exchange of cables between Lyons and 
Baldwin which finally closed the agreement added 
nothing,' *° but aU the United Kingdom had gained by three 
months of negotiation was the exclusion of L. J. Hartnett as 
managing director — a position which it had not been certain 
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he was going to get anyway.'*' Certainly there was no 
provision made for the inclusion of Hawker-Siddeley in any 
capacity. 
Why this group was excluded deserves explanation. In part, 
it was symptomatic of the general lack of interest which the 
British industty showed in the possibUities of development in 
Australia. To the leaders of that industty, the Austtalian 
market seemed assured and thus to them no real awareness 
that a dangerous threat to the primacy of British aviation in 
Australia existed. The Society of British Aircraft Construc-
tors was not the MachiavelUan-inspired pressure group en-
visaged by Wackett in 1929. Rather it showed itself to be 
Ul-informed, irtesolute, overconfident, and mistakenly 
artogant in its deaUngs during 1936 with the Australian 
market. These faUings became obvious once this market was 
opened to American suppliers. The exclusion of Hawker-
Siddeley was a further demonstration: Adams had suggested 
"sound guidance" in July 1935, but it was not until March 
1936 that the society considered the question of an Aust-
ralian aircraft factoty. Its members then assumed that there 
was already in existence an agreement whereby the Dominion 
governments had undertaken to arm their air forces only with 
British-made aircraft.'^^ If this had been true, then there 
would have been little cause for alarm, but it was far from 
true, and the Society of British Aircraft Constructors should 
have known it. 
In 1936, when British aviation was lagging behind 
American, it seems that only artogance could account for the 
attitude revealed by the Society of British Aircraft Construc-
tors in stating that "if the AustraUan company or government 
bound itself to manufacture only British types of mUitaty 
aircraft, then our members would be ready to grant licences 
for their manufacture in AustraUa"."*^ The granting of 
Ucences should not have been thought of as a favour, but 
rather as the securing of good business. Hawker-Siddeley's 
proposals put to Essington Lewis reflected patronizing 
thinking. The British group required from the AustraUan 
syndicate an exclusive option in procuring rights for aircraft 
and aero-engines.'** Naturally, such an option would have 
given Hawker-Siddeley complete control of the entire manu-
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facturing programme. The Australian principals would have 
had no room for manoeuvre on the open market and all they 
would have got from Hawker-Siddeley in return would have 
been a 10 per cent investment and technical assistance. 
The decision to manufacture the Wirraway 
By August 1936, Sir Harty Batterbee had asked Liesching 
if any information could be "gleaned" as to the nature of the 
report which Wackett's mission had handed to the Air Board. 
Liesching contacted A. E. Leighton, ControUer-General of 
Munitions Supply, and what he heard could have been dis-
quieting. Leighton, it seems, had seen part of a draft and had 
gathered the impression that "it was full of nothing but the 
excellence of American machines".'** But the possibility 
that the now-formed Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation 
might manufacture an American mUitaty aircraft did not 
appear to have occurred to Liesching. He only felt that the 
report could be weighted heavUy in favour of manufacturing 
American civU aircraft. 
This was a reasonable assumption: there was clearly an 
Austtalian market for American-designed commercial air-
craft, and as far as miUtaty aircraft were concerned, the Air 
Ministty had been repeatedly assured that only a standard 
type in use with the Royal Air Force would be produced. 
When the Dominions Office was advised on 24 September 
1936 that the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation intended 
to manufacture, on order from the Commonwealth govern-
ment, forty North American-type NA16 aircraft,i*^ the 
announcement came as a shock. As Whiskard wrote to Earle 
Page, 
in view of the explicit assurances given by the Commonwealth 
Government at every stage of the recent discussions that only British 
types of service aircraft would be manufactured, its [the NA16] 
adoption would be received by my government with surprise and 
dismay, and would necessarily involve the reconsideration by them 
of the whole question. ^*'' 
Wackett, had, in fact recommended to the Air Board that a 
licence be secured from North American Aviation Inc. for the 
manufacture of the airframe and that a. further licence be 
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bought from Pratt and Whitney to make the Wasp engine a
the power unit. 
The scope of this dec
As the Air CouncU noted, "once the new factoty adopts an 
American service type of aircraft and engine, it will be prac-
tically impossible for them to break away from the American 
aircraft industty in spite of the assurances given by the 
Commonwealth Government of their intention to do so".' ** 
Moreover, although the point was never raised with the 
Commonwealth government, it must have seemed to the Air 
Ministty that their apprehension regarding the inclusion of 
General Motors-Holden's in the company had been well 
founded. What must have made the decision to manufacture 
under licence a machine produced by North American Inc. 
appear sinister was the fact that General Motors owned 51 
er cent of the stock in that concern. Even L. J. Hartnett 
shuddered" when he heard the news.' * ' And the interest of 
eneral Motors in North American did not go unremarked in 
he AusttaUan press: Smith's Weekly archly asked, "is it only 
 coincidence that the planes in question are buUt in the 
.S.A. by a General Motors subsidiary?"' *" 
There is no evidence \which suggests that it was anything 
ther than a "coincidence". Although long before Wackett 
rrived in America, Dalton, senior United Kingdom trade 
ommissioner, told Whiskard that Wackett was "in the pay of 
eneral Motors-Holden's",' *' he almost certainly was not in 
he sense that he received any monetaty consideration from 
hem. From the records it is obvious that Wackett did not 
now that the NA16 was suitable until he visited the North 
merican factoty. 
The question must arise, however: why was an American 
and not a British aircraft selected for manufacture? Mellor, 
although he does not disclose the terms of the agreement, 
argues that "no means least of the advantages of the 
American machine were the vety reasonable terms for the 
Ucence to manufacture it in AusttaUa".' *2 But this was not 
SO: the sale of the Ucence to AustraUa was good business for 
North American. They were paid $US 100,000 in Ucence fees 
and royalties made up of $US30,000 for the specifications 
and manufacturing data, $US 1,000 royalty on each of the 
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first twenty-five aircraft, and $US600 on the remainder, until 
a hundred aircraft were produced when royalty payments 
were to stop.^^^ These terms may be compared with the 
Ucence bought in 1935 for the manufacture of the Avro 
Cadet trainer from A. V. Roe. The blue-prints and manufac-
turing data cost £UK1,125 plus 5 per cent royalty on each 
airframe produced.* ^^ In June 1936, Lockheed Aircraft Cor-
poration offered the licence of their SGIO bomber to Aust-
ralia for $US65,000 with a royalty of 5 per cent on each 
aircraft sold outside Australia,* ^^ vvhile in 1937 the Vaught 
Aircraft Corporation offered L. J. Wackett the licence for 
their "Attack" aircraft for $70,000 complete.* ^ ^ 
The terms offered by North American, therefore, had Httle 
to do with the decision to build their aircraft. An American 
aircraft was chosen simply because a suitable type to meet 
Australian requirements did not exist in the United Kingdom. 
Moreover, the types which were recommended to Australia 
reveal either little appreciation in London of Australia's 
needs or a willingness to urge the manufacture of unsuitable 
aircraft simply to retain some hold on the market. Wackett 
had left Australia looking for a training aircraft of modern 
design which would meet the Air Board's specification. 
Apparently, the first aircraft offered by the Air Ministry was 
the Fairey Battle,^ ^'' a single-engined, all-metal light bomber 
powered by a Rolls-Royce Merlin engine. The manufacture of 
such a sophisticated engine would have proved difficult, but 
apart from this it had been made plain that a trainer was 
required. The Air Ministry's suggestion was firmly, and, as it 
turned out, wisely rejected. Although the Battle was intro-
duced into the Royal Air Force in 1936, Sir Cyril Newall 
could note in 1939 that "the Battle will shortly be worthless 
to us if peace continues". Moreover, his opinion of the air-
craft was such that he recommended that 100 of them worth 
£ UK 1,15 0,000 should be given to Turkey without 
charge.^ ^^ 
The strongest recommendation which the Air Ministry 
made, however, was that the Westland Lysander should be 
manufactured in place of the North American aircraft. As 
Whiskard wrote to Earle Page on 1 October 1936, 
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Regarding the matter solely from the point of view of the require-
ments of the AustraUan Air Force, the United Kingdom Government 
would strongly recommend the selection, for construction by the 
new factory, of a standard single-engined British service type suitable 
for equipping squadrons and its use for advanced training as a sub-
sidiary duty . . . such a type exists in the Westland A39/34.'*' 
Whiskard went on to point out that the Royal Air Force had 
just placed a production order, that the construction was 
simUiar to the NA16, and that it was powered by the Bristol 
Mercuty engine which was vastly superior to the Pratt and 
Whitney Wasp.'*" 
Again the Air Board was not impressed: far from meeting 
the AustraUan requirements, the Lysander was seen as quite 
unsatisfactoty. Firstly the Lysander had been designed as an 
army cooperation aircraft, secondly its high-wing construc-
tion made it quite different from usual types, and thirdly its 
non-retractable undercarriage was fitted with a most com-
plicated arrangement for firing fixed machine guns. Accor-
ding to the Air Board, the Lysander showed little improve-
ment in consttuction over the Wapiti introduced in 1929. 
And the Mercuty engine was not considered superior to the 
Wasp. It had forged cyUnder heads which the Air Board 
argued would make manufacturing costs prohibitive, and 
more importantly it represented a type of aero engine already 
being phased out of service in the Royal Air Force. As the 
Air Board sourly noted, "we are being recommended to take 
up production of an engine type being continued in the 
R.A.F. only because the sleeve valve type is not yet ready to 
take its place".' *' The Air Board was thus quite categorical 
in rejecting the Air Ministty's recommendations. 
Lyons, of course, was placed in an awkward position: he 
had assured Baldwin that only British types would be manu-
factured and now he was being forced to go back on his 
word. At first, the recommendation to manufacture the 
NA16 was entirely rejected by cabinet.'*^ Considerable 
pressure was appUed to Lyons and ParkhiU to convince them 
of the need to manufacture a British type. Whiskard told 
Lyons that defence cooperation between the United King-
dom and AustraUa was being destroyed and he elaborated 
upon the dangers attendant if this happened.'*^ Liesching 
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attacked ParkhiU on another flank. He told Batterbee that "I 
shook him more than a little by picturing his conferring in 
London on defence next year having been responsible for 
departure from a principle which South Africa and Canada 
had faithfully and for good reasons observed".'** Clearly 
Parkhill had not been shaken enough: on 25 November the 
Dominions Office was advised that "in view of the world 
situation the government proposes to proceed with manufac-
ture as outlined".'** There was, as Lyons added in an 
apologetic personal telegram to Baldwin, no alternative.' ** 
In London, this final decision and justification was not 
greeted with sympathy. Baldwin replied shortly, "so long as 
American types are manufactured it would be impossible for 
us to regard the AustraUan factoty as an effective addition to 
Imperial resources".' * ' As the undersecretaty of state for air 
told the House of Commons "the decision of the Common-
wealth Government has been received with vety great re-
gret.'"** And yet Lyons had been right; a British aircraft 
would have been selected if a suitable type had been avail-
able. The AustraUan government was faced with a situation 
where the United Kingdom could not deliver the aircraft 
ordered nor be of practical assistance in the creation of a 
local source of supply. 
There remains a further point to make regarding the Aust-
ralian decision to manufacture the aircraft which later was 
named the Wirraway. When in March 1939 it was flown for 
the first time, the flight was haUed as being "probably the 
most significant event in AustraUa's aviation histoty".' *' On 
20 Januaty 1942 they were committed against Japanese air-
craft over Rabaul when, to quote the official historian, the 
Wirraway was "completely outclassed in speed, manoeuvr-
abUity and fire-power".'''" It has been noted how in 1936 
the Air Board had rejected the Battle and the Lysander partly 
on the grounds that it failed to meet the AustraUan specifica-
tion for a traming aircraft. The NA16, it was argued, met this 
condition precisely. The question must arise, therefore, why 
a training aircraft was committed to fighter operations. 
An obvious explanation is presented by -Sir Lawrence 
Wackett. He argues, "they were sent to New Guinea to be 
shot down by Zeros because they were the best and only 
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aeroplanes that we had. '" '" Wackett implies that tactical 
necessity forced the decision on the air force. The Wirraway, 
this argument seems to run, was thrown into battle in a des-
perate attempt to stop the Japanese advance, even though the 
limitations of the aircraft were reaUzed. Thus L. J. Hartnett, 
in defending the Wirraway, asks us to remember that it "was 
never intended for such combat work".'"'^ Certainly they 
were never again used as fighters, even though it was not until 
19 March that Kittyhawks were made avaUable to defend 
Port Moresby. 
The argument of tactical necessity is, however, only partly 
true. To it has to be added the fact that only a long-standing 
and, at times, deliberately fostered ambiguity could have led 
to the commitment of the Wirraway as a front line fighter. As 
Air Vice Marshal E. C. Wackett commented, many claims 
were made for the Wirraway simply because it was necessaty 
to convince the government and the Air Board of its 
value.'''^ The ambiguity originated in activities of J. H. 
Kindleberger, president of North American Aviation, who in 
1936 fitted a retractable undercarriage, gun and bomb racks, 
a Pratt and Whitney Wasp engine, and a three-bladed con-
troUable-pitch propellor to North American's NA16—lA 
trainer, and sold it to the Army Air Corps as the BC—1 Basic 
Combat aeroplane.''' * The same aircraft was called by North 
American the NA16—2K Two Place General Purpose aircraft 
and basically it was this aircraft which was buUt in AustraUa 
under the North American contract number, NA33. It 
became the Wirtaway.''' * 
Kindleberger's abUity to sell to the Army Air Corps a com-
bat aircraft which was virtuaUy a disguised ttainer is stUl cited 
as evidence of his business acumen at North American."* It 
is difficult to escape the idea that it was also sold to Wackett. 
Certainly Wackett had made it quite plain that he wanted a 
training aircraft,''''' but the concept of a general-purpose 
aircraft evolving out of it must have seemed attractive. More-
over, Wackett had his grudge against the Society of British 
Aircraft Consttuctors, and here was a selUng point which 
might help the cabinet accept an American aircraft. When his 
recommendation was accepted, Wackett was clearly deligh-
ted > some thirty-five years later he could write "at last I was 
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able to even the score with the Society of British Aircraft 
Constructors".'' '* Given this attitude, it was only natural 
that Wackett should accept some of Kindleberger's ideas. 
It followed that because the manufacture of an American 
aircraft received such opposition, the training role of the 
machine received Uttle attention in pubUc comments. Parkhill 
when announcing the decision referred to the machine as 
"the most modern type of service General-Purpose air-
craft".' ' " When he justified the choice before the Warringah 
Electoral Conference, he claimed for it the diverse roles of 
two-seater fighter, army cooperation duties, reconnaissance 
tasks, light bomber, and advanced trainer.'*" The periodical 
Aircraft repeated the same claim, and saw the Wirraway as a 
fighter, light bomber, or advanced trainer.'*' When Curtin, 
leading the Labor party opposition, attacked the decision to 
manufacture the NA16 he did so on the grounds that it 
would be obsolete by the time it was flying.'*^ The main 
point was missed: clearly he shared the view that it was an 
operational machine. 
The fact that the Air Ministty itself regarded a general-
purpose type of aircraft as most suitable for Australia tended 
to reinforce the confidence which was placed in the Wirra-
way. At the 1937 Imperial Conference, the virtues of aircraft
with "ubiquity of purpose" were extolled, and it was en-
couragingly stated as a known fact "that Japan, Austtalia's
most dangerous potential enemy, always tends to be some
years behind other powers in aircraft design".' * ^ It was left
to Ellington in 1938 to point out that the idea of using the 
Wirraway as a fighter-bomber should be discarded. It lacked
the performance to be regarded as anything other than an
advanced trainer. The difficulty was, however, that EUington 
could not suggest any British aircraft which could be manu-
factured in its place.' ^* His advice was ignored — it seemed 
to be vety much a "dog in the manger" attitude. In Maty 
1939, it was still being claimed that the Wirtaway could per-
form "almost any miUtaty task".'** It was this background 
of opinion which lay behind the commitment over Rabaul. 
A move was made at the 1937 Imperial Conference to 
restore some British influence in Australian aviation largely 
because the United Kingdom wished to ease the strain being 
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placed upon their industty's capacity by the Royal Air Force 
expansion schemes. The United Kingdom also feared that the 
Neutrality Acts might continue to close the American 
armament market.' ^ ^ It was not however until Bruce on his 
own initiative approached the Air Ministty' *'' that a tenta-
tive ambitious proposal for Australia to produce 1,000 Beau-
forts was made. In the first instance however it was suggested 
that an initial order for 100—150 of such aircraft should be 
placed.'** Delivety, it was argued, could be expected in 
"little over a year". In Februaty 1939, Sir Hardman Lever 
arrived at the head of a British Air Mission, and by AprU a 
firm agreement had been signed to manufacture 90 Beauforts 
for Australia and 90 for the United Kingdom in a government 
aircraft factOty.^  * ' In fact it was not until August 1941 that 
the first locally made Beaufort was flown. It is sufficient to 
make the point that the British effort came too late to be 
upon the outbreak of war anything other than a promised 
addition to AusttaUan air power. 
It followed that when war broke out with Germany, the 
material power of the air force was stUl vety weak. In 1928 
Salmond had recommended a force of seventeen squadrons: 
in September 1939, eleven squadrons had been formed, while 
Darwin was protected by two flights and Brisbane by one. 
The Royal Austtalian Air Force was operating eighty-two 
Ansons, fifty-four Demons, seven Wirraways, twenty-one Sea-
gulls, and eighty-two training aircraft."" Partly this was the 
result of relying upon the United Kingdom for supply and 
neglecting to form a local industty. It was fortunate, there-
fore, that Japan was unable to attack in September 1939 and 
thus pose immediately the problem of coping with a two-
front war. It has been shown, however, that war with Japan 
was expected to bring strong British naval forces to Singa-
pore. AusttaUa would thus be secure. The reality of such 
expectations should now therefore be examined. 
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PI. 1. The manufacture of aircraft by the Australian Aviation and 
Engineering Company at Mascot in 1922. Photograph courtesy National 
Library of Australia. 
PI..2. The first Australian-built Avro 504K delivered by the AustraUan 
Aviation and Engineering Company to the Royal Australian Air Force 
in 1922. Photograph courtesy National Library of Australia. 
Pi. 3. The Chief of the Air Staff with the Governor-General Lord 
Stonehaven during an inspection of Point Cook in 1926. The aircraft 
lined up are DH 9A bombers given to Australia from war surplus by the 
United Kingdom. Photograph courtesy National Library of Australia. 
Pi. 4. The first Supermarine Seagull being delivered to the Royal 
Australian Air Force in 1926. Photograph courtesy Australian War 
Memorial, Canberra. 
PI. 5. A Supermarine Southampton flying-boat before delivery to the 
Royal Australian Air Force in 1927. These aircraft saw ten years' 
service. Photograph courtesy Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
PI. 6. The Westland Wapiti ordered in 1928 as a new front-line, general-
purpose two-seater aircraft. Photograph courtesy Australian War 
Memorial, Canberra. 
Pi. 7. The Hawker Demon 1 fighter bomber introduced in 1935. 
Photograph courtesy Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
PI. 8. The Avro Anson general reconnaissance aircraft. Photograph 
courtesy Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
Pi. 9. The Lockheed Hudson, one of the aircraft ordered from America 
in 1938. Photograph courtesy Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
PI. 10. wirraways made by the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation 
positioning for attack. Photograph courtesy Australian War Memorial, 
Canberra. 
Pi. 11. A simulated attack by Wirraways on a Hudson. Photograph 
courtesy Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
PI. 12. Menzies and Street inspecting militia in November 1939. Note 
the horse. Photograph courtesy Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
PI. 13. H.M.A.S. Australia 8-inch 
cruiser, laid down in 1925 and 
completed in April 1928. Her 
sister ship Canberra was 
destroyed in a night action with 
the Japanese off Savo Island, 
August 1942. Photograph 
courtesy Australian War 
Memorial, Canberra. 
Pi. 14. H.M.A.S. Perth 6-inch cruiser lost in 
Japanese in Sunda Strait, February 1942. 
Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
night action with the 
Photograph courtesy 
Pi. 15. H.M.A.S. Sydney 6-inch cruiser lost in action against a German 
raider, November 1941. Photograph courtesy Australian War Memorial, 
Canberra. 
Pi. 16. H.M.S. Repulse 15-inch battlecruiser sent to Singapore. She 
was bombed and sunk, 8 December 1941. Photograph courtesy 
Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
PI. 17. Battleship King George V, sister ship to the Prince of Wales. 
Photograph courtesy Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
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Australian Defence and British 
Sea Power 1934-42 
It has been shown that the army had Uttle faith in 
the workings of the Singapore strategy. It will now be argued 
that from at least 1934 the Lyons government possessed 
sufficient evidence to have led it to accept the army's 
appreciation. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the 
government chose not to recognize the danger to Austtalia, 
or to admit publicly its misgivings, because to have done so 
wotdd have brought the United Austtalia party close to the 
stand adopted by the Australian Labor party in its defence 
thinking. Certainly Lyons himself and his minister for 
defence, Archdale Parkhill, occasionally revealed apprehen-
sion. Yet the Singapore sttategy remained the basis of Aust-
ralian defence policy. When Parkhill announced this policy in 
December 1935,' Sir Maurice Hankey in London was deligh-
ted. He circulated ParkhiU's speech around the British cabinet 
and hastened to tell Malcolm MacDonald that it implemented 
"the poUcy which I recommended on the occasion of my 
visit to Australia".^ 
It has been argued, however, that three conditions had to 
be filled before British naval power operating from Singapore 
gave AusttaUa a viable defence strategy. Firstly the army had 
cast doubts on the eventual completion of the base. On this 
point the fear^ were unfounded but the army had been right 
in 1935 to view the development of Singapore's defences 
with pessimism. The final stage of the base was opened in 
1938 but the defences were never adequate. At no time 
between the wars was it sufficiently well defended to offer 
Australia security. In 1932 when the Japanese attacked Shang-
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hai, there were few anti-aircraft guns, no boom defences or 
mines, while the army garrison consisted of only two 
battaUons and local volunteer units.^ In 1934, Sir John 
Latham passed through Singapore on his way back from 
London and was unimpressed with what he saw.* Profes-
sional defence planners were equally concerned, and 
remained so. In February 1934 the Defence Requirements 
Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence 
argued that it was of the "utmost importance" for the United 
Kingdom to revive "its old terms of cordiaUty and mutual 
respect with Japan". The reason was that Singapore was con-
sidered virtually undefended.* 
A simUar conclusion was reached independently but at the 
same time by Admiral Sir Frederick Dreyer, commander in 
chief of the China station. His attention focused on the 
shortage of aircraft. Only twenty-seven machines were based 
at Singapore and the air officer commanding there expected 
that it would take twelve days to reinforce them by thirty-
nine aircraft flown from India and Iraq. The crews, however, 
would be untrained in naval cooperation tasks, and therefore 
would be practically useless.* Lyons and Menzies were aware 
at least by May 1935 of the general situation. As Sir John 
Simon, the foreign secretaty, told a meeting of Dominion 
prime ministers in London, Singapore had become "some-
thing of a UabiUty which had to be converted into an asset".'' 
And at a CouncU of Defence meeting held in June 1935, 
Admiral Hyde repeated these sentiments and made much the 
same point.* Certainly
 full-scale army exercises were held at 
Singapore late in 1938 to practise defence measures against 
an enemy advancing south from Mersing towards the naval 
base' but, after the Singapore Defence Conference met in 
October 1940, the Austtalia delegation reported to the 
government that "the general conclusion reached by the dele-
gation was that, in the absence of a main fleet in the Far 
East, the forces and equipment at present avaUable in this 
area for the defence of Malaya are totally inadequate to meet 
a major attack by Japan".' ° 
Menzies, as prime minister, found such a report "alarming" 
and decided to go to London to discuss the situation with 
Winston Churchill.'' In the meantime, however, he cabled 
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the secretaty of state for Dominion affairs comparing past 
promises with the conference's report. As he pointed out, 
"the Commonwealth Government has considered the report 
of the Singapore Defence Conference and is gravely con-
cerned at the most serious position revealed in regard to the 
defence of Malaya and Singapore".' ^ A brigade group was at 
once offered for Malaya, but in reply the United Kingdom 
again attempted to be reassuring. The secretaty of state for 
Dominion affairs felt that the AustraUan view on the "general 
defence situation was unduly pessimistic": weaknesses there 
certainly were, but "evetything possible" was being done.' ^  
It was too late, however, the shortage of aircraft mentioned 
by Admiral Dreyer was never overcome,'* and when in 
August 1941 V. G. Bowden was appointed the Australian 
representative at Singapore, one of his first reports made the 
point that "the real defensive strength of Malaya fell far short 
of previous publicity.'" * While Singapore itself was later to 
be referred to as an "almost naked island". 
But if the defences of Singapore proved to be largely an 
illusion which was shattered by the Japanese 25th Army, 
then the expectation that the British main fleet would be 
sent there was based on little more than fantaty. This was the 
second point which the army had asked the AusttaUan 
government to accept. The poUcy of sending the main fleet, 
or at least a sizeable offensive naval force, to Singapore was 
considered between the wars with the ambiguity which is 
often reserved for a poUcy which is known to be impractical. 
For example, the dispatch of such a force was the annual 
exercise set at the Royal Naval Staff College, but always the 
assumption was made that the United Kingdom was involved 
in a war with Japan alone.''' Yet elsewhere it was seriously 
appreciated that Japan would only strike if the United King-
dom were involved also in a European conflict. Major General 
Bruche had pointed to this absurdity when, after reviewing 
the work done at the Imperial Defence College and the argu-
ments presented by the Committee of Imperial Defence, he 
concluded that the problem of Australian defence had never 
been seriously considered in "the event of Japan being 
against us concurrently with the happening of a major war on 
the other side of the world".' * 
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In 1930 such a possibihty had been unofficially yet 
authoritatively examined by Admiral Sir Richard Webb, 
former commander of the Royal Naval War College. His con-
clusions were not encouraging: as he told the Royal United 
Service Institution, 
We are not only an Oceanic Power in the widest sense, but also a 
European country with all Europe's complicated troubles and res-
ponsibilities at our door; that being so, to imagine that we are going 
to uncover the heart of the Empire and send our fleet thousands of 
miles into the Pacific with only one base, Singapore, for our supplies 
and damaged ships is to write us down as something less than 
fools. 19 
In October 1934 at a time when Hankey was sounding so 
confident in Australia that an adequate force would be sent 
to Singapore under any circumstances. Sir John Simon 
foreign secretary, and Neville Chamberlain, chancellor of the 
exchequer, circulated a cabinet paper which underlined the 
point made by Webb. In the event of a two-front war, they 
argued, Austraha and India would be placed in "dire peril" 
because naval forces would not be available to protect the 
Indian and Pacific Oceans. ^° 
Bruce, as Australian high commissioner, could well have 
drawn this conclusion from a conversation he had with Eyres-
Monsell, the First Lord, in December 1934. Bruce raised the 
subject of the dispatch of a fleet to Singapore, only to be 
told that, although this operation was regarded as of "first 
importance" in Australia, it could only be done if there were 
sufficient battleships available "to cover our responsibilities 
nearer home". After all, Eyres-Monsell continued, Bruce 
would well be able to imagine "the public outcry if our 
whole naval strength departed to the Far East".^' This view 
was, of course, quite realistic, but there is no evidence to 
show that Bruce reported the conversation to Canberra. 
Nevertheless a good opportunity for the Australian position 
mside the framework of Imperial defence to be explored and 
debated was provided when Lyons and Menzies attended the 
twenty-fifth Jubilee of George V held in London during May 
1935. As a basis for discussion the Chiefs of Staff reviewed 
Imperial defence commitments, and examined the strength 
and disposition of the fighting services in connection with 
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them.^^ The result was that British sea power was shown to 
be hopelessly overcommitted. It was made plain that the 
Committee of Imperial Defence had argued in 1925 that the 
conditions of a "one power" naval standard were satisfied 
if our fleet, wherever situated, is equal to the fleet of any other 
nation, wherever situated, provided that arrangements are made 
from time to time in different parts of the world, according as the 
international situation requires, to enable the local forces to main-
tain the situation against vital and irreparable damage pending the 
arrival of the Main Fleet and to give the Main Fleet on arrival 
sufficient mobility. ^ ^ 
But since the war, the "one power" standard had never 
actually existed. In terms of definition, the fact that Singa-
pore was not completed told against the fleet's mobility 
while the AustraUan armed forces were incapable of main-
taining anything other than the most minor situation. 
These considerations, however, were relatively unimpor-
tant. In 1932, the Committee of Imperial Defence revised the 
1925 desirable standard of naval strength and advised that for 
"practical purposes" it should be based on the formula that 
the United Kingdom 
should be able to send to the Far East a fleet sufficient to provide 
"cover" against the Japanese fleet and sufficient additional forces 
behind this shield for the protection of our territory and mercantile 
marine against Japanese attack: at the same time we should be able 
to prevent the strongest European naval power from obtaining con-
trol of our vital terminal areas while we can make the necessary 
redispositions. ^ * 
This standard had not been agreed to by the United Kingdom 
government, but, since it had been decided upon, Japan had 
declined to be hmited any longer by naval treaties and this 
ominous development had only partially been offset by the 
apparent German wiUingness to Hmit their own naval forces 
to 35 per cent of the British.^ ^ Menzies and Lyons were 
plainly told that the strategy envisaged in 1932 could not be 
exercised until 1940, and then only provided that no British 
battleship was laid up and that British cruiser strength was 
increased.^ ^ Moreover, even if these conditions were filled 
the strategy would be nullified if the French fleet were not 
available for aUied operations in Europeari waters. 
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In 1923, Bruce had been prepared to pass unchaUenged the 
suggestion that in the event of a two-front war AustraUan 
security would be dependent on American participation. In 
1935 Lyons and Menzies were told that it depended on the 
course of French foreign policy and defence planning. And at 
this time the international situation was much more danger-
ous than it had been twelve years previously. As the Foreign 
Office advised the Dominion representatives "there is no 
general moderate party m Japan, and she is likely to grasp at 
as much as she feels capable of reaching at any given 
moment".^ ^  Certainly Chamberlain was soothing: in 1935 he 
considered that the Japanese had too many "irons in the 
fire" for her to take further aggressive action. But if Japan 
ever did feel capable of reaching southwards as a result of 
British preoccupation in Europe, then Lyons and Menzies 
were left in little doubt as to the consequences. As Chamber-
lain clearly made the point, "it is impossible for this countty 
to fight both Germany and Japan".^ » 
Both Lyons and Menzies refused to piece all the evidence 
together in order to draw the obvious and logical conclusion: 
that if a two-front war did occur at any time up to 1939—40 
then a British fleet certainly would not be sent to .Singapore. 
There was no possibUity whatsoever that the British main 
fleet would ever be sent. Perhaps Menzies wished to create a 
good impression in London,^' but all he could mUdly say 
was that the aggressive attitude Japan had shown over ttade 
negotiations, and her general international posture "rendered 
it inevitable that a greater interest than before would be 
taken in the Singapore Base and in British poUcy in the Far 
East".^" Lyons reacted more sttongly: to improve AusttaUa's 
precarious position he suggested appeasement.^' Lyons had 
argued that in Manchukuo the Japanese had produced "order 
out of chaos", and he could see no reason why Japan should 
not "be allowed to expand in its own area". If Japan were 
blocked in the north she could weU turn south. It would be 
well, therefore, to recognize Manchukuo and then to reaffirm 
the status quo by "some sort of pact of security for all 
nations bordering on the Pacific".^^ Lyons obviously was 
looking for a supplement to British naval power: possibly 
even a tenuous American commitment. Yet he refused to 
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push his suggestion very far: in fact he gave unquaUfied 
support to the existing British poUcy. There was no reser-
vation m his final comment that "speaking for Austtalia, aU 
he could say was go forward on the lines you have adopted 
and you can depend on us in AusttaUa. doing all we can to 
help you".^^ Neither the existing state of British sea power 
nor its predicted development warranted such an expression 
of soUdarity. 
Between the 1935 meeting of the Dominion prime 
ministers and the gathering for the 1937 Imperial Con-
ference, the naval situation did not improve. In November 
1935 the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee of the Com-
mittee of Imperial Defence submitted a further report.^* It 
developed further, but more gloomily, the views which had 
been argued before Menzies and Lyons. The navy could not 
be expected to reach the requirements of the 1932 formula 
untU March 1939 at the earUest; for "some years thereafter" 
at the indeterminate latest. By 1942 Germany was expected 
to have buUt five new capital ships; by March 1939 she would 
already have operational three Deutschland class capital ships 
and two 26,000-ton battle-cruisers. Thus no margin for safety 
was left to the United Kingdom if a fleet really did have to be 
sent to Singapore. As the committee pointed out, "unless we 
can provide a sufficient defence for that emergency, Aust-
raUa, New Zealand, India, Burma, the rich colonies East of 
Suez and a vast trade . . . might weU be doomed".^* An ex-
tensive buUding programme clearly had to be undertaken if 
the fleet were to be brought up to the 1932 suggested 
formula. The difficulty was, however, that this formula was 
no longer considered adequate. Now only a two-fleet navy 
would suffice: a defensive force in Eastern waters and a fleet 
in home waters "able to meet the requirements of a war with 
Germany at the same time". The committee recommended 
that seven new capital ships should be laid down between 
1937 and 1939, four aircraft carriers between 1939 and 
1942, and five cruisers each year untU deficiencies in this 
type of ship were overcome.^* 
This buUding programme was given cabinet approval on 25 
Februaty 1936 but it did not provide for a two-fleet navy nor 
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Far Eastern security.^'' British naval power remained over-
committed even on paper. Without the benefit of WhitehaU 
contact, this fact had become obvious to the Australian 
Labor party. It was also recognized by other observers. At 
the height of the Abyssinian crisis, virtually the entire British 
naval force was concentrated in the Mediterranean to counter 
possible moves by the Italian navy.^* The weakness of 
British naval power was thus underUned. As E. L. Piesse 
reminded his wireless Usteners in November 1936, "it was 
clear a year ago that the British fleet, with the comparatively 
unimportant aid that the Dominion's Navy could give, was 
not Sttong enough to protect the more distant parts of the 
Empire".^' This was the basic Labor party attitude: it led 
the party to advocate a policy of self-reliance with more 
intensity than it had done in the previous decade. The Labor 
party defence plank at the 1937 federal election was that 
local defence requirements should receive preference over 
providing for any Imperial contingency.*" Clearly the Labor 
party and the army shared the same fundamental concept. A 
point of difference, perhaps, lay in how they viewed the 
development of the air force. Curtin, now leading the Labor 
party, wished to see a fifty-squadron air force buUt at an 
estimated cost of $30 million.*' The greater point of similar-
ity was self-reliance. Professor A. C. V. Melbourne, professor 
of history at Queensland University and neither an army man 
nor a member of the A.L.P., felt that in placing reliance on 
the United Kingdom, the Lyons government showed itself to 
be a "dangerous" and "hopeless" combination without any 
capacity to "see beneath the surface". As he wrote to the 
AusttaUan ttade commissioner in Tokyo, 
I don't know which I think the most dangerous, the warmongering 
jingoistic type as represented by your friend William Morris Hughes, 
or the dogmatic unimaginative type as represented by Sir Henry 
GuUett. Whichever way you take it, the influence of these people is 
essentially anti-Australian; they cannot see that Australia has any 
interest apart from the interests of the United Kingdom and, as long 
as they are able to strut about in their own stupid vanity, they will 
sacrifice their country to the interests of the British politician and 
the British manufacturer, without asking whether the United King-
dom could be of any real help to Australia in time of trouble.^^ 
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Melbourne had seen, perhaps dimly, the fallacy of the Singa-
pore strategy. 
This other defence opinion appeared to have little effect
on the attitudes held by the AustraUan delegates to the 1937
Imperial Conference. Parkhill advised Casey that Austtalia's 
defence was still firmly anchored to the concept of "an im-
pregnable Singapore and the dispatch of part of the Main 
British Fleet thereto in war".*^ Both the AustraUan and the 
United Kingdom delegation approached the conference, how-
ever, with the same wish to discuss defence. The United King-
dom assumed that "the greater part of the time would be 
concerned with matters of foreign policy and defence".** 
Malcolm MacDonald, secretaty of state for Dominion affairs, 
hoped that the result of this discussion would be "an agreed 
Commonwealth foreign policy". It would not be too diffi-
cult, he thought, to obtain. AU the Dominions were "rather 
frightened" and it was only required to permit them "to 
agree with us in their own way and in their own time".** 
Certainly there was no indication from AustraUa that there 
would be any other result. The Australian delegation left 
carefully briefed to argue their case inside the framework of 
Imperial defence.*^ 
As Malcolm MacDonald implied, however, Australia did 
have cause to be frightened. The possibility that a fleet would 
be dispatched to Singapore had become even more remote. A 
two-front war had become more probable. During the 
previous two years, Japan and Germany had come closer to-
gether and the Anti-Comintern Pact had been signed in 
November 1936. Italy, since the signing of the Rome-BerUn 
Axis agreement, could no longer be considered a power 
friendly to Britain. Certainly she had entered into a gentle-
men's agreement with Britain in Januaty 1937 to maintain 
the status quo in the Mediterranean, but this could scarcely 
be regarded as offsetting the implications inherent in the 
ItaUan rapproachement with Germany. Moreover, and more 
dangerous to AustraUa, the standing antagonism between 
China and Japan threatened British interests in the Far East. 
The threat of a two-front war was viewed with alarm by 
the British Chiefs of Staff. In their review of Imperial 
Defence which was circulated around the conference, they 
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argued: 
The chief danger which Imperial Defence has to face at the moment 
is that we are in a position of having threats at both ends of the 
Empire from strong miUtary powers, i.e. Germany and Japan, while 
in the centre we have lost our traditional security in the Mediterra-
nean owing to the rise of an aggressive spirit in Italy accompanied by 
an increase in military strength . . . *^ 
As the Chiefs of Staff continued, only "very great mUitary 
and financial sttength" could give the Empire security. There 
was no sign that a proportionate effort was about to be 
made: in 1935 the Chiefs of Staff had pointed out the 
requirements in precise terms, a two-fleet navy. Yet in 1937, 
the proposal had not even been seriously considered by the 
United Kingdom government. According to Sir Thomas 
Inskip, the newly appointed minister for the coordination of 
defence, the question of buUding two fleets was quite 
"academic". UntU the "holiday" on the construction of 
battleships agreed to at Washington, and reaffirmed by the 
1930 London Naval Agreement, expired on 31 December 
1936 nothing could be done. And according to Inskip, the 
time was still not "ripe" for a firm government decision. 
Moreover, the United Kingdom's ship-buUding capacity was 
fully occupied in trying to meet the requirements of the 
obsolete 1932 formula.^^ 
The main problem facing Lyons and Parkhill at the 1937 
Imperial Conference was to decide in what circumstances 
Australia could reasonably expect a fleet to be sent to Singa-
pore. At all times, the dispatch was made contingent upon 
there being in existence sufficient British naval sttength not 
only to dispatch part of the fleet but also to retain sufficient 
Sttength to meet a European threat. In the event of a war 
with Japan alone, the Chiefs of Staff were confident that a 
fleet equal to the Japanese could be sent. But a single-front 
war was most unUkely: it was much more probable that the 
United Kingdom would face a combination of German, 
Italian, and Japanese forces. If this were so, the assistance of 
the French fleet to contain Italian forces in the Mediterra-
nean was deemed vital for the implementation of Imperial 
strategy. 
On one point alone could Parkhill or Lyons consider 
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themselves reassured. To the Chiefs of Staff, the dispatch of a 
fleet to Singapore and the "Security of Empire interests in 
the Far East against Japanese aggression" possessed a higher 
priority amongst Imperial defence commitments than the 
"Security of interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East". Thus no anxiety or risk in the Meditertanean could be 
allowed to interfere with the dispatch of the fleet to the Far 
East. As the Chiefs of Staff made the point, 
weakness in the Mediterranean would not be so serious as the 
surrender of our sea power in the Far East. That would enable the 
Japanese to undertake deUberate operations against Singapore which 
in default of any possibiUty of reUef, might fall, leaving the coasts of 
India, Australia and New Zealand and the sea routes to those 
Dominions open to attack. ^ ^ 
ParkhUl saw in this statement the impUcation that all the 
conditions pertaining to the Singapore strategy would be 
met. Australian security would thus be ensured: as he told 
the conference, he had been "very glad" to see this particular 
point made.*" 
Yet neither Parkhill nor Lyons probed as deeply as they 
might have done into the structure and poUtics of Imperial 
defence arrangements. For example, it had been made quite 
clear for the second time in two years that AustraUan 
security, in the event of a two-front war, was dependent 
upon the cooperation of the French fleet. It was to remain 
so. As Sir Samuel Hoare was to note much later, the fact that 
a fleet was not sent to Singapore "was not a faUure on our 
side, but the loss of the French Fleet in 1940".*' In 1937, 
Australia could weU have asked what political and mUitaty 
arrangements the United Kingdom had made, or intended to 
make, with France. Indeed it might have been pertinent for 
Lyons or ParkhUl to have asked what arrangements were 
possible after they heard Sir Thomas Inskip argue "France is 
not in a vety healthy condition. Her rearmament has been 
delayed by internal dissension and industrial troubles. The 
morale of the nation is not too good and her financial 
situation could not be described as sound. "*^ The oppor-
tunity to ask these questions was missed. At the time of the 
1937 Imperial Conference, in fact, France had not even been 
approached by the United Kingdom. 
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The possibUity that fleet dispositions might be arranged 
was first raised by France after the conference,* ^ and it was 
not until September 1938 that Anglo-French staff talks for 
European defence began.** In June 1939, the joint Anglo-
French defence of Hong Kong, Malaya, and Indo-China was 
discussed and arrangements made for the loose coordination 
of defence forces in the Pacific* * Nothing concrete emerged, 
but this is not surprising: France was looking for British 
militaty support in Indo-China at a time when Britain cer-
tainly was unable to give it. France herself could supply only 
an army of 50,000, twenty-five aircraft, and one cruiser for 
the defence not only of Indo-China itself but as a contribu-
tion towards the defence of the entire region.* * 
If the AustraUan delegation to the 1937 Imperial Con-
ference did not question the nature of possible French 
militaty cooperation, Lyons did reveal vague apprehension 
that British naval power would be unable to provide for Aust-
ralia's security: these misgivings found expression in his 
proposal for a Pacific pact. He had first made the suggestion 
in 1935; by 1937 it was obvious that Lyons hoped to obtain 
some definite commitment that the United States would sup-
plement British power in the Pacific. On his way to London 
Lyons had passed through America and had gone so far as to 
raise the question of American involvement in the defence of 
the Pacific with Roosevelt. Lyons told the Imperial con-
ference that Roosevelt had promised "that if serious ttouble 
arose in the Pacific, the United States would be prepared to 
make common cause with the members of the Common-
wealth concerned".*^ Lyons seemed to accept without quali-
fication this statement as evidence that America was willing 
to enter into a new non-aggression pact. What he had in mind 
was a simple agreement simiUar to the 1922 Four Power 
Treaty. 
Eden, as foreign secretaty, was not impressed. In private, 
he told the United Kingdom delegation that Lyons did not 
seem to be making vety much sense and that his proposal was 
not "vety enlightening". Moreover, it could prove dangerous 
to British interests: it introduced the problem of Manchuria, 
and Eden was not inclined to see British power guaranteeing 
the territorial integrity of China.** As he told the con-
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ference, "we should be assuming a new, definite, and very 
grave commitment in joining any guarantee of the status 
quo " *' The virtues of Lyons's suggested pact were indeed 
difficult to see, yet if Lyons had been convinced that his 
proposals had value he could have argued for them more 
vigorously. Instead he surrendered to the United Kingdom's 
only thinly-disguised hostility and passed the initiative to 
them. A committee was formed to explore the proposals, and 
Lyons agreed that it was for the United Kingdom govern-
ment, in its discretion as to time and manner, to sound out 
American and Japanese opinion.*" Given Eden's views, 
positive action was not Ukely, but the Japanese move against 
China in the following month promptly solved Eden's prob-
lem. 
Even though the concept of a collective security pact 
which included Japan and America was dead, Lyons did 
possess Roosevelt's assurance of unilateral assistance in the 
event of "serious" trouble. This may have allowed Lyons to 
accept the Singapore strategy with more equanimity. But in 
reality it was not possible to forecast the course of American 
policy at any time up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Until 7 
December 1941, Anglo-American staff talks had proceeded 
cautiously and even with a little acerbity. The American 
naVal staff would not accept the validity of the Singapore 
strategy and flatly refused to divide their fleet between there 
and Pearl Harbor. Informal discussions were held in Januaty 
1938 and were resumed in May 1939. PreUminaty Anglo-
American staff conversations were held in London during 
September 1940, and more importantly in Washington be-
tween Januaty and March 1941. This led to the vital ABD 
Conference being held at Singapore in AprU.*' Apparently 
the potential allies were pursuing a vigorous attempt to work 
out a common course of action. In fact these conferences 
"consumed much time and thought, but had no substantial 
results".*^ Joint plans were one thing; a definite American 
commitment as to when they would be implemented was 
another.*^ Eight days before the Japanese did attack Pearl 
Harbor, Casey, the Australian ambassador in Washington, was 
unable to find out from Cordell HuU what America would do 
if the Japanese invaded Thailand.** As the joint committee 
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set up by the United States Congress to inquire into the Pearl 
Harbor attack concluded: 
A great deal of inquiry was made during the course of the procee-
dings to determine whether the Government of the United States 
had entered into an agreement with Great Britain and the Nether-
lands committing this nation to war upon Japan in the event British 
and Dutch possessions were attacked by the Japanese. It is clear 
from evidence before the Committee that no agreement was entered 
into in this regard. ^ ^ 
In 1937, therefore, Roosevelt's assurance of quick assistance 
given to Lyons was not a reUable prediction of American 
action. 
ParkhUl may have reaUzed this: his anxiety was revealed in 
an attempt to strengthen the framework of Imperial defence. 
ParkhUl proposed that the 1923 Imperial Defence resolutions 
should be redefined: the accepted view of local defence was 
misleading and could be dangerous.** British interests in the 
Far East could only be protected, he argued, if the line of 
communication between Britain and Singapore was secured. 
The defence of this line "transcended any Umited conception 
of a member's security being purely local".*'' ParkhUl asked 
the conference to accept this argument as a truism, and with-
out committing forces, to be prepared to make joint plans at 
once for common defence. As he argued in a classic state-
ment on Imperial defence, the security of the whole was 
indivisible from the part, and the detaUs of each part's 
"individual defence measures and attendant problems were 
not only of mutual interest, but even of vital importance to 
each other".** 
ParkhUl must have reaUzed that Hankey's 1934 apprecia-
tion required reexamination and that untU 1941—42 the 
balance of power lay with the Japanese. But it was left to 
Savage, the New Zealand prime minister, to ask how in these 
circumstances the Singapore sttategy was
 expected to func-
tion. He was not clear, he said, why a fleet could not be 
stationed at Singapore in peacetime. Savage wanted to know 
why the United Kingdom, so sure that a fleet would be sent 
there in an emergency, had to wait untU then. If it were 
necessaty to wait, then Savage wanted to obtain "the positive 
statement that a British fleet of sufficient strength wiU move 
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out to the Far East Ui the event of Japan taking offensive 
action against us, even if we are embroUed in Europe".*' 
Without doubt Savage remained unclear: Baldwin as Prime 
Minister had no intention of answering such a direct 
question. AU he could say was: 
It is very difficult to know what was in the minds of the Japanese. 
For his own part he had always felt that Japan would not run amok 
unless there were war in Europe. As long, therefore, as the peace 
could be kept in Europe all would probably be well. Nevertheless, 
we could not exclude altogether the possibility of Japan running 
amok, and in that case it was hard to know on what Dominion the 
attack might faU.''" 
Such a statement, one might expect, could scarcely support 
the hope of AustraUa and New Zealand that their security 
would be found through the Singapore strategy. 
Reflection, however, would have shown why a fleet could 
not be stationed at Singapore in peacetime. As Ernie Chat-
field, the First Sea Lord between 1933 and 1938, was to 
point out after the war, once the fleet went to Singapore it 
would have to stay there. Thus the security of the United 
Kingdom would be placed in perU.''' And Baldwin found it 
difficult to give a straight answer because now, after fifteen 
years of theoty, it did look as though a fleet might vety well 
have to be dispatched. As Duff Cooper when First Lord was 
to advise cabinet in Februaty 1938, "our relations with the 
most important naval power with whom we are Ukely to find 
ourselves in conflict have already deteriorated and we have 
been compelled to contemplate the despatch of a Fleet to the 
Far East as a possibiUty no longer remote".''^ As Duff 
Cooper recalls in his autobiography, he was forced to fight 
with the Treasuty throughout 1938 while at the same time 
suffering from the "continual obsession" that unless the 
United Kingdom adopted a two-fleet standard then a single-
handed fight with Germany, Italy, and Japan would be 
lost.''3 
It was not, however, until the Munich crisis that Lyons, 
briefly, recognized reaUty. He had left the 1937 Imperial 
Conference on a note which was oddly enthusiastic. As he 
told it: 
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It was the duty of those assembled at the Imperial Conference in the 
interests of the Empire as a whole, and in the interests of the world 
at large, to accept wholeheartedly and loyally the general principles 
in regard to national affairs which had been laid down and foUowed 
with so much courage, generosity and wisdom by the United King-
dom; to support without qualifications the declarations on the sub-
jects which that Government had made, to stand soUdly behind that 
Government, and to co-operate in the fuUest possible measure with 
the efforts of that Government to secure world appeasement and 
peace. ''* 
Yet at the height of the Munich crisis, Bruce became a con-
stant visitor to the office of the First Sea Lord apparently in 
an effort, prompted by Lyons, to get some assurance that 
Australian interests should not be neglected.''* By Novem-
ber, Whiskard, United Kingdom high commissioner, could 
report that Lyons had "worked himself up into some kind of 
desperate anxiety about the defence of Australia against 
Japan" and had become convinced that no help would come 
from the United Kingdom in the event of war.'' ^  Had Lyons 
known the response in Whitehall to Whiskard's advice, then 
his worst fears would have been confirmed. The operational 
state of the British force of capital ships at the time of 
Munich has already been noted. None of the new capital 
ships approved in the 1937 building programme had been 
completed. In 1938, however, Earle Page claims that Neville 
Chamberlain had promised that within ninety days of the 
outbreak of war, four British battleships would be operating 
from Singapore.'''' At some indefinite date later, Bruce was 
apparently told that seven capital ships would be sent to 
Singapore even if the Empire were facing a combination of 
Germany, Italy, and Japan.''* It seems that some such 
guarantee had the backing of a British Chiefs of Staff appreci-
ation sent to Australia shortly afterwards.''' Whiskard's letter 
led to an immediate reappreciation. As the C.I.G.S., Ismay, 
noted, "personally, I should be sorty to see the Chiefs of 
Staff repudiate what really amounts to an absolute promise 
to send an adequate fleet to the Far East if Japan is 
hostile".*" But as John Slessor in the Plans Division of the 
Air Staff was to point out to Ismay, "I gather that the C.N.S. 
has gone back on his original views — possibly as a result of 
consulting his staff".*' 
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UntU the documents become available, it will not 
be possible to know what these original views precise-
ly were, or indeed how the United Kingdom extricated 
itself from the commitment. Certainly the AusttaUan Naval 
Board was arguing by March 1939 that "Britain cannot 
afford not to send a fleet to Singapore", in a manner which 
suggests doubt that a commitment did exist.* ^  There was 
certainly no hint of a definite promise at the Australian-New 
Zealand-United Kingdom defence conference held in Welling-
ton m April 1939. This is not surprising: it was a New 
Zealand initiative which brought about the conference and 
the United Kingdom representative attended determined to 
limit discussion on the Singapore sttategy as much as 
possible.*^ And AustraUa itself had no wish to attend the 
conference at aU. Although New Zealand wanted a practical 
investigation of the Singapore strategy, Lyons refused a 
specific New Zealand request to send a minister.** Instead 
Admiral Colvin, a Royal Navy Officer and Chief of the Aust-
ralian Naval Staff, represented both AustraUa and the United 
Kingdom. Obviously Colvin was safe and would not help to 
give substance to the fears of Street, who as minister for 
defence felt that another pubUc discussion of the Singapore 
strategy might give rise to further opposition to sending Aust-
ralian forces overseas.** Thus the report which came from 
the Wellington Conference was suitably guarded. It noted 
that: 
Considerable discussion centred around the question of the size of 
the British Fleet and the date of its arrival at Sit^apore. It was 
accepted that this would necessarily depend on the moment when 
Japan entered the war, and upon losses, tf any, which our opponents 
or the United Kingdom had previously sustained . . . ^^ 
In July and August 1939, the British ambassadors at both 
Tokyo and Shanghai urged that British naval strength be in-
creased in the Far East. At the height of the Tientsin dispute. 
Sir Richard Craigie pointed out: 
It is, of course, cold comfort to me to know that a fighting ship 
squadron might be sent after the outbreak of war, or in 1942: what I 
have urged is that such action should be taken as a deterrent in order 
to remove dangerous misconceptions which may itself be a contribu-
tion to outbreak of war if Anglo-Japanese relations continue to 
deteriorate. *'' 
146 Australian Defence and British Sea Power 
A force could not be sent: in March 1939 the Admiralty 
had advised the American naval staff that the need to watch 
the Mediterranean precluded the possibUity of sending a fleet 
to Singapore.* * It was thus an odd irony that the Chief of 
the AustraUan Naval Staff recommended that a 6-inch cruiser 
be sent to the Meditertanean in September 1939 because 
such an effort might influence the United Kingdom "to 
accelerate the dispatch of strong Royal Navy Forces" to the 
Far East when they were required.*' 
British poUcy was constantly shifting. When Chamberlain's 
scheme of attempting to detach Italy from Germany failed in 
Januaty 1939, he was forced to a,dmit to the Committee of 
Imperial Defence that in certain circumstances it would be 
impossible to send a fleet to Singapore.'" This was con-
firmed at WelUngton. Yet in November 1939, the Admiralty 
accepted "the fuU responsibUity of defending Australia, New 
Zealand, or Singapore from Japanese attack". The 1937 
assurance that British interests would be sacrificed in the 
Mediterranean to do so was repeated." By June 1940, the 
loss of the French fleet resulted in this promise being with-
drawn, and New Zealand claimed that they had regarded this 
as a possibiUty.'^ By August 1940, the dispatch of a naval 
force to Singapore hinged upon successful action against 
Italian naval forces. In Januaty 1941, Menzies, who grew 
proud of his insight some twenty-six years later and reminded 
his reader that this was ten months before Pearl Harbor, 
requested from the United Kingdom that "some positive 
commitment be entered into regarding the naval reinforce-
ment of Singapore".'^ Bruche, Lavarack, and Savage had all 
previously urged a simUiar guarantee. It simply proved im-
possible to give. When Repulse and Prince of Wales finally did 
arrive, they represented little more than a gesture to the func-
tioning of the Singapore strategy. 
On 23 Januaty 1942, John Curtin, prime minister since the 
previous October, cabled Churchill. He indignantly argued 
"after aU the assurances we have been given the evacuation of 
Singapore would be regarded here and elsewhere as an inex-
cusable betrayal. Singapore is a central fortress in the system 
of Empire and local defence."'* Curtin, as he pointed out, 
StiU understood that "it was to be made impregnable, and in 
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any event capable of holding out for a prolonged period until 
the artival of the main fleet". Singapore was not evacuated: 
on 15 Februaty 1942 it was surtendered. In theory, AustraUa 
now lay open to direct Japanese attack: this was the end 
result of cooperation in Imperial defence which extended 
back to 1885. The disaster so clearly foreseen had become 
reality. The fact that AustraUa was not invaded in 1942 had 
nothing to do with either British or AustraUan defence poUcy 
between the wars and it is on this point that the policy must 
be judged. 
Epilogue 
When required to make defence policy decisions 
between the wars, successive Australian governments suffered 
from a chronic lack of self-reliance. The advice of the United 
Kingdom was usually sought and often foUowed without 
serious critical thought. The most important result of this 
poUcy was the trust placed in the ability of the United King-
dom to send to Singapore a naval force of sufficient strength 
to protect AustraUa from direct Japanese attack. Certainly 
there was occasional conflict over defence and foreign poUcy 
between the Australian and the United Kingdom govern-
ments. Bruce made his point bluntly at the 1923 Imperial 
Conference and SculUn refused to spend money on the navy 
in 1930. Australia was most stubborn in its stand when con-
fronted with the Empire air maU scheme in 1934. Both 
Lyons and Menzies refused to yield to British pressure in 
1936 when asked to exclude General Motors-Holden's from 
the then forming Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation, and 
the Wirraway was manufactured despite British protests. But 
these disagreements must not disguise the fact that the 
United Kingdom's wishes on local defence preparations were 
usually foUowed. 
AustraUa did not possess an independent defence and 
foreign poUcy and the low politico-mUitary status this fact 
implied was largely accepted without question by the Aust-
ralian government. Japan's power and ambition posed a 
definite threat to Australia's territorial integrity: the United 
Kingdom was the obvious and traditional power to act on 
Austtalia's behalf. Thus the Foreign Office usually settled the 
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main lines of Austtalia's foreign policy and received formal 
thanks for doing so at the foUowing Imperial conference. 
Australian initiative was rare. In 1935 and again in 1937, 
Lyons did suggest the appeasement of Japan but on both 
occasions he met with a tepid or hostile United Kingdom 
response. Consequently, and regardless of other factors, the 
proposals lapsed. 
As long as AustraUa remained inside the framework of 
Imperial defence a viable alternative to sea power and the 
British diplomatic position could not really be formulated. 
Neutrality would not have been endorsed by the greater part 
of the AustraUan electorate and certainly was never con-
sidered. Besides, the poUtical difficulties of any bi-lateral 
Austtalian-Japanese agreement would have been great: trade 
concessions would not have been accepted by the United 
Kingdom, while any mUitaty clause would have been viewed 
with hostiUty by the United States. With this said, however, 
one may still wonder at the failure of interwar AustraUan 
governments to question seriously the abUity of the United 
Kingdom to provide for AusttaUan security. 
Belief in the efficacy of Imperial sea power as a weapons 
system helped to retard the development of AustraUan local 
defence forces, and particularly the air force. It might be 
supposed that, given the Labor party's defence premises, a 
powerful air defence force designed to protect "Fortress 
Austtalia" would have existed by 1939 if only the Labor 
party had been in office for much of the interwar period. Yet 
one doubts it. The risk of relying upon aircraft for defence 
would have been great: there was no guarantee that aircraft 
coiUd sink battleships under war conditions. The range of 
prewar aircraft precluded their use over the ocean lines of 
communication and no Australian or British chief of staff 
suggested that air power should be regarded as the primary 
form of Austtalian defence. Curtin's call for a fifty squadron 
air force should also be viewed against the practical problem 
of implementing it. By the mid and late thirties, aircraft 
could not be bought to equip such a force and besides it 
would have cost some $60 million at a time when the defence 
vote for 1937-38 was only $19 million. 
It has been argued that the Imperial defence arrangements 
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were of little real value to Australia between the wars. On 3 
September 1939, Menzies, then Austtalian prime minister, 
extended the philosophy of Imperial defence to its con-
clusion: as Britam was at war, so therefore was AustraUa. It 
foUowed that the Austtalian armed forces had to become 
involved in the European war. There were sound strategic-
poUtical principles to justify such involvement. The theoty, 
expressed throughout the interwar years, was that Japan 
would not attack British interests in the Far East unless the 
United Kingdom's miUtaty forces were preoccupied in 
Europe. It followed that if Germany could be contained or 
even defeated before Japan recovered from its diplomatic 
reversal of August 1939, then Australia would be secure from 
territorial attack. By June 1940, the absence of German sea 
power m the Pacific or Indian Oceans had allowed the 
government to release eleven of the sixteen combat units in 
the AusttaUan fleet for service outside Australian home 
waters. By the same time, an Army Corps which included the 
6th and 7th Divisions had been raised and most of the 6th 
Division had already left AustraUa for the Middle East. Three 
months after the outbreak of war, Austtalia entered into the 
Empire Air Training Scheme. As a result, the air force, always 
seen as a home defence force, was converted into a training 
organization for the Royal Air Force which, by October 
1941, had supplied 14,000 trained air crew to the United 
Kingdom. 
A detaUed study of such actions will have to await a 
further analysis of Australia and Imperial defence, but finally 
in 1942 it became clear that neither sentiment nor the 
previous commitment of forces determined the actions of the 
United Kingdom towards the problem of defending AusttaUa. 
Thomas Mcllwraith, "taught to look sharp" by 1888, had 
seen that interests shaped British poUcy, and argued that 
Australia's interests were not always those of the United 
Kingdom. Curtin obviously reaUzed this fact himself as he 
anxiously regarded AustraUa's perU forty-six years later. 
Notes to Text 
INTRODUCTION 
1. See B. R. Penny, "The Age of Empire: An AustraUan Episode", 
Historical Studies Australia and New Zealand 11 (November 
1963). 
2. Sydney Morning Herald, 27 February 1885. 
3. New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates 16:9 . 
4. Boomerang, 4 February 1888. 
5. S.M.H., 23 November 1887. 
6. Boow^rawg, 14 January 1888. 
7. New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates 100:1504. 
8. Papers of the Parliament of Great Britain, 1904, 40: Cd. 1789, 
89. 
9. See the interesting article by M. C. Parsons, "Was Australia's Con-
tribution to World War I in Her National Interests", RMC His-
torical Journal 2 (1973):37-40. 
10. Norman Angell, The Defence of the Empire (London, 1937), pp. 
29-30. 
11. The most recent critical survey is Robin Higham, The Military 
Intellectuals in Britain: 1918-1939 (New Jersey, 1967), pp. 
71-106. 
12. General Guilio Douhet, The Command of the Air (New York, 
1942), p. 26. 
13. Telegraph (Brisbane), 17 March 1888. 
CHAPTER 1 
1. Certainly there was a decision made in 1923 to equip the Royal 
Air Force with fifty-two squadrons for home defence and as a 
counter to French air power. But the scheme was hardly imple-
mented. In 1934 the Royal Air Force possessed a home defence 
force of 420 aircraft compared to the French 1,210. See Robin 
Higham, Armed Forces in Peacetime: Britain, 1918—1939, A 
Case Study (London, 1962), pp. 162-64. 
152 Notes to Pages 7—10 
2. Captain S. W. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, I, The 
Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919—1929 (London, 
1968), 1:270. 
3. Quoted in G. Hermon Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1939—42, 
Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series 2 (Navy), 2 vols. (Can-
berra, 1957), 1:2. 
4. Memorandum from Hutton to Minister for Defence, 29 February 
1904, Department of Defence S/204, 1385, cited by D.C.S. 
Sissons, "Attitudes to Japan and Defence, 1890-1923", M.A. 
Thesis, University of Melbourne, 1956, p. 32. 
5. Neil Gow, "The Formulation of Australian Defence Policy 
1918-1923", M.A. Thesis, University of Western Australia, 1972, 
pp. 5-6. 
6. Ibid., p. 21. See also D. K. Dignan, "Australia and British Rela-
tions with Japan, 1914—1921", Australian Outlook 21 (August 
1967): 135-50. 
7. Jellicoe's world tour is best covered in Roskill, Naval Policy, 
pp. 275—88. For the fact that Jellicoe prepared his report on the 
defence of the Pacific at the request of the AustraUan government 
see C.A.O., CRS A 981, item Imperial Defence 350, Department 
of External Affairs (2), Correspondence File, "Imperial Defence 
Naval Papers 1918-1921", Watt to JelUcoe, 2 May 1919. Also 
Adm 116-1834, Admiralty to First Lord, 31 October 1919. 
8. Details of the suggested fleet may be found in Roskill, Naval 
Policy, p. 279 ff., and Gill, Royal Australian Navy, p. 10. 
9. See "Report of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, 
on Naval Mission to the Commonwealth of Australia", Common-
wealth Parliamentary Papers, 4, no. 177 (1917—18—19): 
471—566. The unpubUshed and secret part of the report may be 
sighted at Historical Section, Department of the Navy, Mel-
bourne. 
10. Adm 116-1834, Admiralty to First Lord, 31 October 1919. 
11. Cab 21—188, "Co-operation of the Dominions and Colonies in 
the System of Imperial Defence", Admiralty, November 1919, 
circulated to the Dominions prior to the 1921 Imperial Con-
ference. 
12. Cab 21-187, "Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation", Ad-
miralty, February 1921. 
13. It was argued that the main requirement would be that any 
renewal could not make an overt mention of military co-
operation. See M. G. Fry, "The North Atlantic Triangle and the 
Abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese AHmnce", Journal of Modern 
History 39 (March 1967): 46-65. 
14. The C.I.G.S. had written to Hankey protesting at the folly of 
aUowing the aUiance to lapse. Hankey agreed that it had been 
regrettable but pointed to this lack of choice. Cab 21-369, 
Hankey to Montgomergy-Massingberd, 22 September 1933. 
Notes to Pages 10-12 153 
15. For a different view see Paul Hasluck, The Government and the 
People 1939-1941, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series 4 
(Civil), 5 vols. (Canberra, 1952), 1:12-13. Hasluck is right in 
saying that Australia had the opportunity of presenting her views 
to the United Kingdom and that she used it. The point at debate, 
however, is the effect it had upon poUcy or could have had in the 
circumstances. 
16. Cab 24-248, C.P.78 (34), "Attitude of the Dominions in Regard 
to the termination of the Anglo-Japanese AlUance", Dominions 
Office, 15 March 1934. This document outUnes in detail the 
views of the Dominions as expressed at the 1921 Imperial Con-
ference. See also Hasluck, Government and People, 1:11—13, 
Dignan, Australia and British Relations and Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Debates, 94 (7 AprU 1921): 7263-69. Both sides 
of the House agreed that American friendship was most impor-
tant. As F. G. Tudor, leader of the Labor party, argued, Aust-
ralia's salvation in a Pacific war would depend upon the United 
States as would the maintenance of the White Australia policy. 
C.P.D., 94 (7 AprU 1921): 7394. 
17. There is naturally a considerable body of writing on America's 
China poUcy but the most concise and penetrating account of its 
formation may be found in George F. Kennan^ American Dip-
lomacy 1900-1950 (Mentor, 1951), especiaUy pp. 23-37. 
British policy in the same period may be followed in R. G. Neale, 
Great Britain and United States Expansion: 1898—1900 (East 
Lansing, Mich., 1966). 
18. The text of this agreement may be consulted in A. B. Keith, 
Speeches and Documents on International Affairs 1918—1937, 2 
vols. (Oxford, 1938), 1:74-77. 
19. See Roskill, Naval Policy, pp. 204-33, 300-30. 
20. The argument here is that the United States required naval forces 
for both the Atlantic and the Pacific. The United Kingdom had to 
provide forces not only in these two oceans but also in the Indian 
Ocean and the Mediterranean. Japan's sole concern was in the 
Pacific and thus she was able to provide concentration of force. 
Relative to commitments, the ratio was more of the order of 
2'/i:l:3. 
21. See H. Th. de Booy, "The Naval Arm of Diplomacy in the 
Pacific", Pacific Affairs 8 (March 1935): 5-20. 
22. See below, pp.'24-26. 
23. C.P.D., 99 (2 August 1922): 1013. 
24. CO. 886—9 (Dom 82), Admiralty to the Dominions, 28 July 
1922. Document circulated as "The Washington Conference and 
its Effect upon Empire Naval PoUcy and Cooperation", C.I.D. 
Paper 166-C, 28 July 1922. 
25. Adm 116—3165, Minutes of Meeting C.I.D. Standing Defence 
Sub-Committee, 30 November 1922. 
26. Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, Midway: The Battle 
154 Notes to Pages 12-15 
That Doomed Japan (Arrow, 1961), pp. 39-40. 
27. C.P.D., 99 (26 July 1922): 789 
28. Ibid., (26 July 1922): 792. 
29. Ibid., (26 July 1922): 790. 
30. C.A.O., CRS A 2029, CouncU of Defence, Minutes of Meeting, 22 
March 1923, Department of Defence 11, Council of Defence. Just 
before Bruce sailed he called the councU together again and ex-
pressed simiUar views. See ibid., 30 August 1923. 
31. C.P.P., Session 1923-24, vol. 2, General, p. 633 for "Summary 
of Proceedings, 1923 Imperial Conference", 27 March 1924. 
32. Recently opened documents held in the PubUc Record Office 
have been consulted in D. Walder, The Chanak Affair (London, 
1969). 
33. Cab 32-9, Imperial Conference 1923, Stenographic Notes, 4th 
Meeting. This nationalist attitude might weU seem odd coming 
from Bruce who had so little faith in the Australian advisers with 
him that he contacted Lord Milner, whom he had never met, and 
asked him for guidailce. See CecU Edwards, Bruce of Melbourne: 
Man of Two Worlds (London, 1965), pp. 100-101. 
34. "Summary of Proceedings, 1923 Imperial Conference", p. 633. 
35. How serious Bruce's remarks regarding ending defence coopera-
tion were might be judged from the fact that the Australian Chief 
of the General Staff, Sir Harry Chauvel, found it necessary to 
minute in 1926: "It must not be overlooked that the strength, 
organization and control of the Australian Military Forces are 
subject to the will of the AustraUan Government and ParUament, 
and they are not available automatically for the attainment of 
any general Imperial object." Air Historical Branch File, "Papers 
Dealing with the Early Organization of the R.A.A.F.: 
1920-1926", Chauvel to Secretary, Defence Committee, 8 June 
1926. 
36. Quoted in Lionel Curtis, World War: Its Cause and Its Cure (Ox-
ford, 1945), pp. 51-52. 
37. Cab 32—46, Imperial Conference 1926, Stenographic Notes, 12th 
Meeting, 15 November 1926. 
38. At the 1909 Imperial Conference New Zealand made a proposal 
that special army reserves should be available in the Dominions in 
case there was an episode simiUar to the South African war. Aust-
raUa rejected the idea out of hand. See C. E. W. Bean, Anzac to 
Amiens (Canberra, 1961), 4th ed., p. 16. 
39. Mitchell Library, MSS 1431/28, Sir John Northcott, Papers, 
Army Records, Imperial Defence CoUege 1935. Paper entitled 
"Imperial Defence". 
40. See M. Hooper, "The Naval Defence Agreement 1887", Aust-
ralian Journal of Politics and History 14 (AprU 1968): 52—74. 
For a wider examination see R. A. Shields, "Australian Opinion 
and the Defence of the Empire: A Study in Imperial Relations 
1880—1890", Australian Journal of Politics and History 10 (April 
1964). 
Notes to Pages 15-19 155 
41. Quoted in Luke Trainor, "British Imperial Defence PoUcy and the 
Australian Colonies, 1892—96", Historical Studies 14 (April 
1970): 206. 
42. The $400,000 annual tribute continued to be paid after 1909 but 
was reduced to $350,000 in 1912-13. See C.A.O., Department 
of Defence File 401, item 534-401-1. 
43. Adm 116—3104, "Past History of Dominion Contributions to the 
Naval Defence of the Empire", Dominions Office, undated but c. 
1922, p. 12. 
44. Ibid., p. 13. 
45. Adm 116-1815, "Naval Defence of the British Empire", Ad-
miralty memoranda for the War Cabinet, 17 May 1918. 
46. Adm 116-1815, Borden to Geddes, 15 August 1918. 
47. In 1931 when Scullin reduced the pay of the armed services 
twenty-four British naval officers on loan were affected. Adm 
116—2813, SculUn to secretary of state for Dominion affairs, 27 
February 1931. 
48. Cab 21-187, "Empire Naval PoUcy and Cooperation", Ad-
miralty, February 1921, p. 16. 
49. Cab 21—187, The Standing Defence Sub-Committee, "Summary 
of Admiralty Recommendations in Regard to Dominion Naval 
Policy", June 1921, p. 3. 
50. Cab 32—9, Imperial Conference 1923, Stenographic Notes, 9th 
Meeting, 15 October 1923. 
51. Ibid. 
52. Cab 21-187, Madden to Hankey, 21 November 1928. 
53. Cab 32—77, Cabinet PoUcy Committee, Minutes of Second 
Meeting, 7 May 1930, p. 5. 
54. D.O. 114-32, Alexander to J. H. Thomas (Dominions Office), 4 
July 1931. 
55. Adm 116-2087, ScuUin to First Lord, 2 December 1930. 
56. Air 8—115, Minute, Chiefs of Staff to prime minister, 29 October 
1930. 
57. Air 8—115, "Proposed Resolutions on Defence for Submission to 
the Imperial Conference 1930", Chiefs of Staff, October 1929. 
58. Air 8—115, Imperial Defence Policy, Statement made by the 
C.I.G.S. at the 251st Meeting, Chiefs of Staff sub-committee, 28 
November 1930. 
59. Ibid. Canada would be partly responsible for the West Atlantic, 
Bermuda and the West Indian region. 
60. Air 8-115, Hankey to Sir John Salmond, 13 November 1930. 
61. Hasluck, Government and People 1:25. 
62. "Note by M. P. A. Hankey, Secretary to the Committee of Im-
perial Defence on the basis of the Service Estimates, 2 July 
1928", in Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, "Annexes 
and Appendices", The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 
1939-45, History of the Second Worid War, United Kingdom 
Miliury Series, 4 vols. (London 1961), 4:84. 
156 Notes to Pages 19-23 
63. Ibid., p. 85. 
64. Vice Admiral B. B. Schofield, British Sea Power: Naval Policy in 
the Twentieth Century (London, 1967), p. 102. 
65. Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Chatfield, It Might Happen Again 
(London, 1947), p. 11. See also pp. 113 and 122 for further 
comment. 
66. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor, The Central 
Blue: Recollections and Reflections (London, 1956), p. 481. 
67. Interview (Melbourne, 1968). 
68. R. Butier, D. Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, "The Far Eastern Crisis 
1931-1932", Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 
Second Series, 9 (London, 1965), 9:677—78, prints a summary of 
the report dated 22 February 1932. The committee consisted of: 
Sir Maurice Hankey, Vice Admiral F. Dreyer, Major General 
W. H. Bartholomew, and Air Vice Marshal C. S. Burnett. 
69. For German air policy and the development of the Luftwaffe at 
this time see J. KUlen, The Luftwaffe: A History (London, 1967), 
pp. 49-61. 
70. Slessor, Central Blue, pp. 163-64. 
CHAPTER 2 
1. The Salmond report was presented in two parts: The Organiza-
tion, Administration, Training and General Policy of the Develop-
ment of the Royal Australian Air Force (Melbourne, 1928) cons-
tituted part 1; The Employment of the Royal Australian Air 
Force in the Defence of the Commonwealth (Melbourne, 1928) 
constituted part 2. Part 1 of the report was circulated; part 2 of it 
was secret. Hereafter these documents will be referred to as 
Salmond, Report, pt. 1 or pt. 2. The quotation is from Salmond, 
Report, pt. 1, p. 7. 
2. For the various types of aircraft given to Australia, see Aircraft 2 
(May 1921): 201-202. For aviation war surplus in the United 
Kingdom see Higham, Armed Forces in Peacetime: Britain 
1918-1939, A Case Study (London, 1962), p. 202. 
3. Aircraft 12 (January 1934): 5. The Wapiti and the Bulldog was 
ordered in response to Salmond's report. 
4. Commonwealth of Australia Official Year Book 22 (1929): 583. 
5. T. B. Millar, Australia's Defence, 2nd ed. (Melbourne, 1969), 
Appendix B, pp. 200-201. See also Gavin Long, To Benghazi, 
Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series 1 (Army), 7 vols. 
(Canberra, 1952), 1:13 for a table of comparative strengths of the 
three armed services between 1914 and 1938. 
6. C.P.D., 94 (7 April 1921): 7265. 
7. Ibid., 103 (29 June 1923): 532. 
8. Argus, 22 November 1921. 
9. C.P.D., 194 (27 July 1923): 1735-36. 
10. Herald, 9 March 1921. 
Notes to Pages 23-25 157 
11. Air Historical Branch, FUe 91, Naval and Military Aviation 
Minutes, "Naval and MiUtary Aviation: Minority Report", 30 
October 1918. 
12. There is more than a hint contained in the senior officer's report 
of 1920. This may be consulted in National Library, Pearce 
Papers, MS 1827, item 14, Report on Military Defence of Aust-
ralia, 1920, 6 February 1920. For a strongly worded appre-
hension that AustraUa might have to rely upon its land and air 
forces in the event of attack, see C.A.O., Assn C.P/ 754, Depart-
ment of Defence FUe 464—401—151, Adjutant General to Sec-
retary, MUitary Board, 6 January 1926. 
13. See chapter 3, pp. 58—62. 
14. Herald, 17 November 1923. 
15. They were Norman Bearley, managing director. Western Aust-
raUan Airways; Nigel Love and H. E. Broadsmith from the Aust-
raUan Aircraft and Engineering Co. Ltd.; Hudson Fysh of Qantas; 
Captain Larkin of Larkin Aircraft Supply Co. Ltd.; and Major 
H. T. Shaw of Shaw Aviation. 
16. Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Report on the Expenditure 
upon the Air Services (Melbourne 1923). 
17. See the article on AustraUa's defence poUcy by Hudson Fysh in 
Aircraft 8 (May 1930): 2 and H. T. Shaw "Australia Must Have 
Adequate Air Defence", Aircraft 12 (November 1933): 12, 27. 
18. These trials have been very well covered, but for a first-hand 
account see Brigadier General W. Mitchell, "The Bombing of 
Battleships - 1921", Air Power Historian (April 1957). 
19. Air 9—26 (2) contains the American Joint Board Report 349, 18 
August 1921 which covered these trials. 
20. Air 9—26 (21), "Notes on Bombing, Torpedo Atteck by Aircraft 
and Counter-measures, Anti-Aircraft Gunnery and Gun Bombard-
ment", Air Staff, 8 March 1938. This document gives a fuU 
account of the trials held to that date as well as information 
gleaned as to the effect of air attacks on shipping in the Spanish 
civU war. See also Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars (Lon-
don, 1968), vol.1, pp. 247-49. 
21. Cab 32—9, Imperial Conference 1923, Stenographic Notes, 9th 
Meeting, 15 October 1923, p. 4. 
22. Ibid. 
23. C.P.D., 107 (27 June 1924): 1708. 
24. Cab 32—47, "Empire Naval PoUcy and Co-operation", Admiralty, 
10 May 1926. Memorandum prepared for the 1926 Imperial Con-
ference. 
25. Air 8-69 (4), "Statement by Wing Commander P. Van Rynveld 
regarding meeting of Dominion Premiers at the Admiralty, 29 
October 1926". 
26. Beatty certainly misled his listeners as far as the anti-aircraft 
equipment was concerned. In fact the first order for the multiple-
barrelled "Pom-Pom" was not placed with Vickers untU 1928. 
158 Notes to Pages 25-30 
See RoskiU, Naval Policy, p. 345 n. 
27. Air 8-69, Stenographic Notes of a Meeting at the Air Ministry, 2 
November 1926, p. 23. 
28. Cab 21-397, Hankey to Baldwin, 19 September 1933. 
29. Cab 21-397, Notes of a Conference held at the Admiralty, 19 
September 1933. 
30. See chapter 3, pp. 55—63. 
31. Major General Sir Frederick Sykes, From Many Angles: An Auto-
biography (London, 1942), Appendix 8, pp. 566-67. 
32. Air 5-166, "Air Defence and Suggested Lines of Development 
for Dominion Air Forces", C.I.D. Paper 132-C, February 1921. 
33. Air 8-69, Trenchard's speech at the 1923 Imperial Conference, 
typescript, n.d. 
34. Cab 32-47, "Air Power and Imperial Defence", Air Staff, Oc-
tober 1926. 
35. Air 9-56, "Notes on the R.A.A.F. prepared by the Director of 
Plans for the 1926 Imperial Conference", October 1926. 
36. Salmond, Report, pt. 1, p. 5. 
37. Air 9—56 (22), "The Most Effective Apportionment of Monies 
avaUable in AustraUa for the Purposes of Defence", Air Staff, 31 
May 1932. 
38. A further examination of this point is undertaken in chapter 3, 
pp. 76, 80-81. 
39. Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939—41. AustraUa in 
the War of 1939-1945, Series 4 (CivU), 5 vols. (Canberra, 1952) 
1:439. 
40. C.P.D., 103 (29 June 1923): 533. 
41. Interview, Sir Richard WUUams (Melbourne, 1968). 
42. Air Historical Branch, File 91, MUitary and Naval Aviation, 
Minutes, "Naval and MiUtary Aviation: Minority Report", Major 
General J. G. Legge, 30 October 1918. 
43. The relationship between the Air CouncU and the Air Board may 
best be followed in Report on the Expenditure Upon the Air 
Services, pp. 4—5 and in the evidence given by A. C. Joyce, the 
finance member of the Air Board before the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Public Works. See Report together with 
Minutes of Evidence in Relation to the Proposed Establishment 
of Royal Australian Air Force Aircraft Depot at Laverton, 
Victoria (Melbourne, 1924), pp. 28—30. Hereafter referred to as 
Minutes of Evidence (Laverton). 
44. Air 8—69, "Notes for the Minister on the Fleet Air Arm", May 
1926. 
45. Air 8—69, Hall-Thompson to Minister for Defence, 4 June 1926. 
46. According to Williams the Air CouncU "fizzled out" once the 
army and navy began to send junior officers to its meetings when 
the Defence Committee was formed. 
47. Air 8-69, Williams to Trenchard, 11 August 1926. 
48. When the Council of Defence met in November 1929 to consider 
Notes to Pages 30 -31 159 
a vital aspect of Royal Australian Air Force development, 
"PotentiaUties of Air Forces in National Defence", the following 
members were present: president, J. ScuUin, prime minister; E. G. 
Theodore; A. E. Green; Rear Admiral Munro Kerr; Captain L. G. 
Holbrook; Rear Admiral E. R. G. R. Evans; General Sir Harry 
Chauvel; Brigadier General T. H. Dodds; General Sir John 
Monash; Major General C. B. White; and Group Captain R. 
WUUams. Air Historical Branch File, Early History of the 
R.A.A.F. Misc, Agenda and Minutes of General Meeting of the 
CouncU of Defence held at Commonwealth Offices, Melbourne, 
Tuesday 12 November 1929. For the normal composition of the 
Council of Defence see C.A.O., Department of Defence File 
449—401—36, Statement of Defence Planning Structure prepared 
for the 1930 Imperial Conference, 1930. 
49. SM« (Sydney), 13 November 1923. 
50. Parliamentary Standing Committee on PubUc Works, Report to-
gether with Minutes of Evidence in Relation to the Proposed 
Establishment of Royal Australian Air Force Squadron (No. 2) at 
Richmond, New South Wales, 19 June 1925 (Melbourne, 1925), 
p. 5. Hereafter referred to zs Minutes of Evidence (Richmond). 
51. C.P.D., 187 (4 July 1946): 2200. 
52. For Hankey's visit see chapter 3, pp. 55—63. The reactivated 
CouncU of Defence met in May 1935 to consider Hankey's 
proposal to reduce the size of the Australian army. By November 
1938, the councU had sufficient influence to provoke an ex-
Minister, T. W. White, into questioning the functions "of that 
mysterious body of which Parliament never hears, and which 
Cabinet seldom sees". (C.P.D., 158 [23 November 1938]: 1937.) 
The CouncU of Defence grew in importance until war came when 
it was transformed with little difficulty into a War Cabinet. 
(Hasluck, Government and People 1:439.) 
53. See chapter 3, pp. 7 0 - 7 1 for a discussion of this point. In 1935, 
Lavarack, Chief of the General Staff, wrote to E. L. Piesse, "The 
General Staff views and those of the R.A.A.F. agree, I think, in 
the main but their views hardly coincide at all with those of the 
R.A.N.", Lavarack to Piesse, n.d., c. March 1935. AustraUan 
National Library, Piesse Papers, Assn 882, Box 4. 
54. Air 8—69, "Imperial Conference — 1926, Air Matters", Memoran-
dum by P. E. Coleman, secretary of the Air Board, n.d., c. May 
1926. 
55. Air 9—15 (32), Minute, Deputy Director of Plans to Deputy Chief 
of the Au: Staff, 6 February 1935. 
56. Douhet argues for civil aviation to be organized in a manner "as 
to be utilised as a complement to mUitary aviation in case of 
war". He saw a state equipped with a "powerful fleet of trans-
ports" which could quickly be converted into bombers. No copy 
of Douhet's work was held in the ParUamentary Library in the 
1920s. This is not surprising as it has been shown that Douhet's 
160 Notes to Pages 31-34 
Command of the Air was not avaUable in Britain untU the mid-
thirties. See Robin Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain: 
1918-1939 (New Jersey, 1967) Appendix C, pp. 257-59. 
57. Herald, 29 ]vXy 1921. 
58. Stanley Brogden, Australia's Two-Airline Policy (Melbourne, 
1968), pp. 12-13. 
59. Minutes of Evidence (Laverton), p. 26. 
60. S.M.H., 29 March 1921. 
61. Ibid., 15 AprU 1921. 
62. Courier, 19 April 1921. 
63. Herald, 18 March 1921. 
64. Brisbane Mail, 20 April 1921. 
65. C.P.D., 94 (8 AprU 1921): 7304. 
66. Minutes of Evidence (Laverton), p. 7. 
67. Report on the Expenditure Upon the Air Services, p. 9. 
68. HeraW, 18 AprU 1921. 
69. See the editorial comment "CivU Training Units Must Be Con-
sidered in the Defence Scheme", Aircraft 17 (August 1939): 7, 
38. 
70. Commonwealth of Australia Official Year Book 22 (1929): 583. 
71. In comparison, Canada operated 2,014 Km. See A. E. W. Salt, 
Imperial Air Routes (London, 1930), pp. 182-200. 
72. For an account of operating under these conditions, see Gordon 
Taylor, The Sky Beyond (Harmondsworth, Mddx., Penguin, 
1966), pp. 36-48. 
73. E. J. Hart, "The First Five Years of CivU Control", Aircraft 7 
(January 1926): 252. 
74. The DH50 operated at a speed between 137 and 145 Km/h. If 
Japan were the only enemy to consider, then by 1926 Mitsubishi 
were producing a naval fighter which had a top speed of 230 
Km/h and a cHmb to 4,500 m. fully armed in 14 minutes 10 
seconds. See F. H. Brackley, comp., Brackles: Memoirs of a 
Pioneer of Civil Aviation (London, 1952), p. 178. 
75. For an account of the various naval and mUitary schemes, see 
Douglas GiUison, The Royal Australian Air Force 1939—42, Aus-
traUa in the War of 1939-1945, Series 3 (Air), 4 vols. (Canberra, 
1962), 1:1-6 
76. CorelU Barnett, The Sword Bearers: Studies in Supreme 
Command in the First World War (London, 1963), pp. 153—55. 
77. Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939—42 1:11. 
78. Department of the Navy, Explanatory Statement on the Naval 
Estimates, 1921-22 (Melbourne, 1921), p. 3. 
79. Minutes of Evidence (Laverton), p. 34. 
80. Ibid., p. 35. 
81. See Chauvel's recollections of his proposals to the minister made 
at this time. Air Historical Branch, Early History of the R.A.A.F., 
Misc., Summary and Proceedings of General Meeting of the 
CouncU of Defence, 12 November 1929. 
Notes to Pages 34—40 161 
82. C.P.D., 103 (29 June 1923): 533-34. 
83. Age, 28 August 1923. 
84. Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby, "The Air Battle", Journal of the 
Royal United Service Institution 98 (February 1953). 
85. W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, "Plans and Early Operations January 
1939 to August 1942", The Army Air Forces in World War II, 7 
vols. (Chicago, 1948), 1:35. 
86. Air 8-69, WUUams to Trenchard, 11 August 1926. 
87. Air 8-69, HaU-Thompson to Minister for Defence, 4 June 1926. 
The army supported the navy, and according to WUUams, at once 
demanded the creation of a separate army air force. WUUams to 
Trenchard, 11 August 1926. 
88. Air 8-69, WiUiams to Minister for Defence, 25 June 1926. 
89. Air 8—69, Air Staff Notes on Cooperation with the Royal Aust-
ralian Navy, 2 September 1926. 
90. Air 8-69, WiUiams to Trenchard, 11 August 1926. 
91. See RoskiU, Naval Policy, chapters 10 and 11. 
92. Air 8-69, Trenchard to WUUams, 7 October 1926. 
93. Air 8—69, Stenographic Notes of a Meeting of Defence Ministers, 
Air Ministry, 2 November 1926, p. 5. 
94. Aircraft 30 (October 1951): 19. 
95. Adm 116—2787, Royal Australian Navy: Constitution and 
Policy, 11 August, 1930. 
96. Interview, Sir Richard Williams (Melbourne, 1968). 
97. Air Historical Branch FUe, Early History of the R.A.A.F., Misc., 
quoted in "Notes on the question of alternative status of the 
R.A.A.F.", Chief of the Air Staff, 10 March 1932. 
98. Air Historical Branch File, Early History of the R.A.A.F., Misc., 
Summary and Proceedings, General Meeting of the CouncU of 
Defence, held in Melbourne, 12 November 1929. 
99. Ibid., "Notes on the question of alternative status of the 
R.A.A.F." contains a summary of this sub-committee's findings. 
Its own report cannot be located. 
100. Air 9-56, Bullock to Burnett, 21 AprU 1932. 
101. Air 9-56, Burnett to BuUock, 21 April 1932. 
102. Air 9-56, Londonderry to Latham, 23 AprU 1932. 
103. Air Historical Branch File, Early History of the R.A.A.F., Misc., 
"Notes on the Question of Alternative Status of the Royal Aust-
raUan Air Force", Chief of the Air Staff, 10 March 1932. 
104. Air 2—648, WUUams to Salmond, Personal and Private Cable, 23 
May 1932. 
105. GiUison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939-42 1:38. 
106. Australian National Library, Piesse Papers, Assn 882, Box 4, 
Lavarack to Piesse, 5 May 1935. 
107. C.A.O., AA 1971/216, item 1/1936, CouncU of Defence Agenda, 
"Observations of the Chief of the Naval Staff on the Importance 
of Maintaining the Naval Programme", 19 July, 1935. 
108. Air 9—56, WiUiams to Burnett, Personal and Confidential Letter, 
162 Notes to Pages 40-45 
1 April 1932. 
109. Air 9—56, Memorandum on Disarmament Proposals, Air Vice 
Marshal Burnett, 2 May 1932. 
110. Cab 24—230, C.P. 164 (32), Disarmament, Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for Fore^n Affairs, 26 May 1932. 
111. Adm 116—2944, Cabinet Committee on Preparations for the Dis-
armament Conference, Draft Conclusions of 6th Meeting, 15 
January 1932, p. 14. 
112. Adm 116-2944, p. 18. 
113. Cab 24—230, C.P. 164 (32), Disarmament, Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 26 May 1932. 
114. Cab 24-230, C.P. 185 (32), Disarmament Proposals. 
115. Cab 24-230, C.P. 176 (32), Memorandum by the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, 30 May 1932. 
116. Cab 24-230, C.P. 185 (32) Memorandum by the First Lord, 30 
May 1932. 
117. Cab 24-230, C.P. 192 (32), Memorandum by the Secretary of 
Sute for Air, 29 AprU 1932. 
118. Cab 24-230, C.P. 185 (32), Cable from Secreury of State for 
Dominion Affairs to Dominions, 1 June 1932. 
119. WiUiams was told that it was proposed to abolish aerial bombing 
not mUitary flying. Interview (Melbourne, 1968). 
120. Cab 24-230, C.P. 192, Notes of a Meeting between the Cabinet 
Committee on the Disarmament Conference and Representatives 
of the Dominions and India, 6 June 1932. 
121. Cab 24-230. 
122. AustraUan National Library, Pearce Papers, Assn 1927, item 497, 
Shedden to Shepherd, 3 July 1932. 
123. "The Royal New Zealand Air Force", Air Annual of the British 
Empire 1938 (London, 1938), pp. 77-80. Also Squadron Leader 
J. M. S. Ross, Royal New Zealand Air Force, Official History of 
New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-45 (WelUngton, 
1955), pp. 7-27. 
124. L. Roberts, There Shall Be Wings: A History of the Royal 
Canadian Air Force (Toronto, 1959), pp. 51—70. 
125. Cab 24-230, C.P. 192 (32), quoted in "Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for Air", 29 April 1932. 
CHAPTER 3 
1. Admiral Mahan m many places had preached the doctrine of 
offensive sea power: interception and consequent destruction led 
to the command of the sea. See M. T. Sprout, "Mahan: Evangelist 
of Sea Power", in E. M. Earle, ed.. Makers of Modern Strategy: 
Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, 1943), 
pp. 429-36. Commodore Hyde, the Acting First Naval Member 
of the AustraUan Naval Board, had argued in 1923 "the battle 
Notes to Pages 45—49 163 
which vnll decide the fate of this country will probably be fought 
somewhere East of Singapore, in the PhiUppines, or that direc-
tion". Minutes of Evidence (Laverton), p. 21. 
2. The Penang Conference, attended by the C. in C. East Indies, 
China and AustraUan squadrons, was called by the Admiralty to 
discuss the strategic possibiUties in the Pacific and to report on 
the Singapore proposals. It was thought that the conclusions 
would be useful to put before the 1921 Imperial Conference. 
With foresight the report noted that "the invasion of the Malay 
Peninsula with a view to capturing Singapore is very probable 
unless a strong garrison is maintained or quickly moved there 
from India or elsewhere". See Adm 116—3100 Penang Con-
ference, Report, March 1921. 
3. Adm 116—2100, Overseas Defence Committee, Memorandum, 
"Singapore: Development of Naval Base", 7 June 1921. 
4. Cab 32—9, Imperial Conference 1923, Stenographic Notes, 8th 
Meeting, p. 12. 
5. Cab 32-9, 9th Meeting, p. 9. 
6. And they did. When Japanese forces attacked Shanghai in 1932, 
Hong Kong's fixed-gun defences were outdated, there were few 
mines, no anti-submarine defences, insufficient anti-aircraft guns 
and a shortage of aircraft. Eden made this admission of weakness 
at the 1937 Imperial Conference when harried by the New 
Zealand prime minister, Savage, for failure to act against the 
Japanese in 1932. See Cab 32—128, Imperial Conference 1937, 
Stenographic Notes, 12th Meeting, p. 10. 
7. The assumption made here is that France would be involved in a 
European conflict as weU as the United Kingdom before Japan 
would attack French colonial possessions. If, of course, Japan did 
attack the PhUippines, the United States would be brought into a 
Pacific war. But the Japanese move into Indo-China in 1941 
showed that under the right conditions an attack on the PhUip-
pines was unnecessary in order to threaten Singapore. 
8. Cab 32—9, Imperial Conference 1923, Stenographic Notes, 11th 
Meeting, p. 5. 
9. Cab 32-9, 8th Meeting, pp. 19-20. 
10. Cab 32-9, 9th Meeting, p. 12. 
11. C.A.O, CRS A 2684, Singapore Defence Conference, Report of 
AustraUan Delegation, October 1940. 
12. House of Commons, Debates 171, cols. 321—25. 
13. Cab 32—46, Imperial Conference 1926, Stenographic Notes, 9th 
Meeting, p. 10. 
14. Cab 32—9, Imperial Conference 1923, Stenographic Notes, 8th 
Meeting, pp. 4—5. 
15. Cab 32—46, Imperial Conference 1926, Stenographic Notes, 2nd 
Meeting, pp. 30—31. 
16. Cab 32-46, 9th Meeting. 
17. Not only was the power to build new battleships restricted but 
164 Notes to Pages 49—52 
limits were placed on the construction of cruisers and destroyers. 
The United Kingdom was Umited to fifty cruisers of which 
twenty-two would be required to operate with one battlefleet. Of 
these fifty cruisers, six were in the Australian and New Zealand 
division. See Higham, Military Intellectuals, pp. 133—36; also 
Schofield, British Sea Power, pp. 105-8. 
18. Cab 32—77, "The Singapore Base", Overseas Defence Committee 
of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 4 June 1930. 
19. Adm 116-2807, "Singapore: The Need for a Naval Base", Memo-
randum, First Naval Member, 30 July 1930. 
20. In the absence of a plenary session on defence at the 1930 Im-
perial Conference, a committee consisting of representatives from 
the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia was assembled 
to consider the future of Singapore. The AustraUan represen-
tatives were SculUn, Frank Brennan, and R. G. Casey who at this 
time was "PoUtical Adviser" in London. It took only one meeting 
of this committee to decide the future of the base. For the views 
cited see Cab 32—91, Committee on the Singapore Base, Minutes 
of First Meeting, 16 October 1930. 
21. Cab 21-402, Note by Sir Maurice Hankey, 20 April 1934. 
22. Australian National Library, Pearce Papers, MS 1827, item 14, 
Report on Military Defence of Australia, 1920, 6 February 
1920. 
23. When the Japanese army was confronted with a plan to invade 
AustraUa prepared by navy planners early m 1942, it was con-
sidered that ten Japanese divisions would be required for the 
operation. See Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, Midway: 
The Battle That Doomed Japan (Arrow, 1961), p. 77. 
24. By 1939 the Chief of the General Staff, Lavarack, was asking for 
the establishment of such a force of 12,000 men. Air Historical 
Branch, Department of Defence FUe SF—11—L, Defence 
Development Programme, Revision, May 1939, "Defence Pro-
gramme: Army Appreciation for Resistance to Major Attack", J. 
Lavarack, 28 February 1939. 
25. Gavin Long, To Benghazi, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, 
Series 1 (Army), 7 vols. (Canberra, 1952), 1:14. 
26. Air Historical Branch, Department of Defence FUe 43—1—67, 
Disarmament Conference 1928, Chief of the Air Staff to Chief of 
the General Staff, 20 June 1927. 
27. Josiah Francis, "The Citizen Military Forces", Australian Army 
Journal (October, 1952): 10-11. Francis at this time was 
minister for the army. 
28. Archdale ParkhiU, Statement of the Government's Policy 
Regarding the Defence of Australia, Speech deUvered at Mosman 
2 December 1935 (Canberra, 1935), p. 19. 
29. C.P.D., 136 (14 October 1932): 1287. W. C. Hankinson, the 
United Kingdom representative in Canberra, was sufficiently im-
pressed with this speech to send a copy of it to London with the 
Notes to Pages 52-56 165 
comment that it represented "an acute appreciation of the 
present defence position in Australia". See Cab 21—397, Hankin-
son to Dominions Office, 25 October 1932. 
30. C.P.D., 107 (27 June 1924): 1706 ff. 
31. Cab 21—187, "Empire Naval PoUcy and Co-operation", Ad-
miralty, February 1921. 
32. Adm 116-2807, Munro Kerr to Sir Charles Madden, 5 December, 
1929. 
33. Adm 116—2807, "Memorandum r^arding the proposed com-
missioning of another cruiser", Munro Kerr, 6 December 1929. 
34. Adm 116-2807, Minute by the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, 
6 January 1930. 
35. Adm 116-2807, Minute by the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, 
9 December 1929. 
36. Adm 116—2807, "Australian Squadron: Future Composition", 
Memorandum, Munro Kerr, n.d-, c. March 1930. 
37. Naval Archives Branch, Assn 109, "R.A.N. Submarine Service — 
Establishment and Abandonment", n.d. 
38. AustraUan National Library, Pearce Papers, Assn 1927, item 514, 
Pearce to Bruce, 13 December 1932. 
39. G. Hermon GiU, Royal Australian Navy 1939—42, AustraUa in 
the War of 1939-1945, Series 2 (Navy), 2 vols. (Canberra), 1:32. 
40. The Scullin government suspended compulsory military training 
for the militia. The defence vote also was reduced from 
$12,794,000 in 1928-29 to $7,376,000 in 1930-31. Figures 
cited in T. B. Millar, Australia's Defence, 2nd ed. (Melbourne, 
1969), Appendix A, Table 1, p. 196. 
41. Cab 21-397, "The Defence of Australia", Air Vice Marshal R. 
WUliams, 3 May 1935, notes this cabinet decision. 
42. Cab 21-397, "Report on the Defence of Australia", Chiefs of 
Staff Sub-Committee, 30 August 1932. 
43. Cab 21—397, Notes of a Conference Held at the Admiralty, 19 
September 1933. 
44. Cab 21—397, Notes of a Conference Held at the Admiralty, 19 
September 1933. 
45. Cab 21-386, Hankey to MacDonald, 15 November 1934 for his 
impressions of the poUtical climate. As far as the purpose of his 
visit was concerned, he pointed out "everyone I meet wonders 
what I am up to". This is not surprising: a professional defence 
planner could have had Uttle concern with Melbourne's cen-
tenary. The Commonwealth was meeting his expenses. 
46. According to Hankey, he made a "diluted statement" to Scullin 
and Page. Cab 63-70, Hankey to Baldwin, 26 October 1934. 
47. Cab 21-286, Hankey to Parkhill, 15 November 1934 for this 
outUne of activity. 
48. Cab 21—386, "Report by Sir Maurice Hankey on Certain Aspects 
of Australian Defence", 15 November 1934. 
49. Cab 21-398, Hankey to Baldwin, 30 July 1934. 
166 Notes to Pages 56—60 
50. Cab 21-397, Hankey to Baldwin, Personal and Secret Letter, 3 
August 1934. 
51. Hankey mentions this conversation with Chamberlain in his letter 
to Baldvnn cited above but no other record can be found. For 
ChurchUl's vigorous opposition to the expense of Singapore see 
Cab 2-4, Committee of Imperial Defence, Minutes, 193rd 
meeting, 5 January 1925, 198th meeting, 30 March 1925, 215th 
meeting, 22 July 1926. 
52. Cab 21-397, Aide Memoire, initialled S.B., 4 August 1934. 
53. Cab 21-398, Hankey to Baldwin, 2 September 1934. 
54. Cab 21-386, "Report by Sir Maurice Hankey on Certain Aspects 
of Australian Defence", 15 November 1934. 
55. Cab 63—70, Hankey to DUl (Director of MUitary Operations and 
InteUigence, War Office), 30 October 1934. 
56. Cambridge University Library, Baldwin Papers, vol. 1, Hankey to 
Baldwin, 17 November 1934. Why the army in particular chose to 
remain sUent might be difficult to understand. It is Ukely, how-
ever, that a direct confrontation with Hankey was expected to 
have no positive value and thus it was better politics for the army 
to appear to be in agreement with the other services. After all, 
Hankey, with his prestige, was not a man it was easy to disagree 
with in personal debate. 
57. Cab 21-397, "Memorandum by the Chief of the General Staff on 
the Report by Sir Maurice Hankey on Certain Aspects of Aust-
ralian Defence", 5 March 1935, p. 1. Hereafter cited as "Memo-
randum by the Chief of the General Staff". 
58. Cab 21—397, "Memorandum by Colonel J. D. Lavarack, Chief of 
the General Staff Designate, on Report on Certain Aspects of 
Australian Defence, by Sir Maurice Hankey", 14 March 1935, 
p. 2. Hereafter referred to as Lavarack, Memorandum. 
59. Cab 21—397, Memorandum on the Defence of Australia, 3 May 
1935. 
60. Hyde was prepared to use most arguments to back the naval 
claim. As he told the Council of Defence in 1935, any increase in 
Australia's mUitary or air power could only indicate to the world 
that "the one country which Australia feared was Japan". No 
one, however, could object to an increase in British or Australian 
naval strength. The reasoning appears obscure. C.A.O. AA 
1971/216, item 1/1936, CouncU of Defence Agenda, "Observa-
tions of the Chief of the Naval Staff on the Importance of Main-
taining the Naval Programme", 19 July 1935. 
61. Cab 21-397, "Australian Defence Policy", Chief of the Naval 
Staff, 3 AprU 1935. One factor in shattering morale, Hyde argued 
in an otherwise quite serious appreciation, would be the pro-
longed shortage of "cinematograph fUms". This would "damp the 
spirits of our race of inveterate fUm-goers more perhaps than any 
other action". 
62. The emphasis is Admiral Hyde's. 
Notes to Pages 60-64 167 
63. Hyde fell out of favour with ParkhiU. Certainly by early 1937 
Parkhill was telling the Admiralty that Hyde was "becoming 
ossified" and consequently badly wanted the Admiralty to 
replace him. Adm 1—1934, Discussion of Naval Questions with 
the Australian Minister for Defence 1937—38, Minutes of 
Meeting, 17 June 1937. 
64. Adm 116-2807, Air Staff Notes on Singapore, c. March 1930. 
These notes were prepared by WilUams for the guidance of ScuUin 
at the 1930 Imperial Conference. 
65. See the 1925 appreciation of the likely scale of attack on Aus-
tralian ports contained in CID 249—C in Air 9—56 (22), and the 
1932 appreciation CID 372—C which according to Bruce failed to 
answer or seriously consider this question. See Cab 2—5, Minutes, 
257th Meeting, Committee of Imperial Defence, 8 November 
1932. 
66. See chapter 3, pp. 69—70. 
67. La.vax3ick, Memorandum, p. i. 
68. Memorandum by the Chief of the General Staff, p. 4. 
69. C.A.O., AA1971/216, CouncU of Defence Meeting, 24 August 
1936. 
70. C.A.O., CRS A2671 14/1939, War CouncU Agenda, "Australian 
Co-operation in Empire Defence", 26 September 1939. 
The Dominions Office had suggested two political circumstances: 
a) That Japan is not only neutral but is adopting a friendly 
attitude towards the democratic countries 
b) That Japan is neutral and is reserving her attitude towards 
the democratic countries. 
CHAPTER 4 
1. C.A.O., CRS A664, item 415-401-155, Department of Defence 
File: "Manufacture of Aircraft in Australia". J. S. Scott-Fell, 
Ihresident of the British Empire Union in AustraUa, to Lyons, 18 
January 1937 mentions that "the apparent lack of harmony 
between Australia and the United Kingdom in certain vital 
matters" and the "antipathy to the Motherland by highly placed 
officials" was damaging the "spirit of Empire". Shepherd's 
comment was made in Shepherd to Secretary, Prime Minister's 
Department, 27 January 1937, ibid. See also Mitchell Library, 
MSS 1532, British Empire Union in Australia — Records 
1919—1965. Their usual annual prize title was "Why It Is Essen-
tial for Australia to Remain Part of the British Empure". 
2. For the full descriptive title of Salmond's report see chapter 2, n. 
1. Report by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Edward Elling-
ton, Inspector-General of the Royal Air Force, together with the 
Comments of the Air Board and the Civil Aviation Board and the 
Decisions and the Observations of the Commonwealth Govern-
ment (Canberra, 1939). An unprinted and unpublished report 
which was deemed to contain secret and confidential information 
168 Notes to Pages 6 4 - 6 6 
may be found in C.A.O., CRS 861, item 37/301/360, Department 
of Defence, Correspondence FUe: "ElUngton Report and most 
confidential note in relation thereto", 1938. The report con-
tained in this fUe is numbered 36. Hereafter the printed version 
wUl be referred to as ElUngton, Report and the unpublished 
version as Ellington, Report, Copy 36. 
3. Air 5—166, "Air Defence and Suggested Lines of Development 
for Dominion Air Forces", Appendix A, p. 13, Air Staff, Feb-
ruary 1921. 
4. Air 5—334, Co-ordination of Training of R.A.F. and Dominion 
Air Forces, Minutes of Conference held at the Air Ministry, 25 
January 1924. 
5. There is some debate as to who was and what factors were res-
ponsible for the strategic air-power doctrine of the Royal Air 
Force. This is not the place to attempt a further interpretation, 
but the historiography of the debate is covered in Robin Higham 
"The Place of Douhet", The Military Intellectuals in Britain: 
1918-1939 (New Jersey, 1967), Appendix C, pp. 257-59 . 
6. Aircraft 11 (March 1932): 21. For an account of the training 
programme at Point Cook and an eventual posting to an Royal 
Air Force squadron on a short-service commission, see Air Vice 
Marshal D. C. T. Bennett, Pathfinder (London: Panther, 1960). 
7. /Ir^Ms, 8July 1936. 
8. Aircraft 14 (June 1937): 9. 
9. EUington, Report, p. 19. 
10. EUington, Report, Copy 36. 
11. 5MK, 9 July 1938. 
12. Air 8 -221 , Note by the Air Staff (R.A.F.), AprU 1937. 
13. The only book published on what was called army cooperation 
between the wars was J. C. Slessor's Air Power and Armies {Lon-
don, 1936). This work fell short of a close support manual and 
dealt mainly with the use of air power during the 1918 aUied 
offensive. For the failure to study close support tactics between 
the wars, see also David Divine, The Blunted Sword (London, 
1964). The army cooperation course involved detaUed map 
reading, aerial photography, air-to-ground morse, artillery 
spotting, and long distance reconnaissance. It was most unpopular 
with pUots. See Richard Hillary, The Last Enemy (London, 
1959), pp. 66 -67 . 
14. Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil Embry, Mission Completed (London, 
1957), p. 89. 
15. Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against 
Germany 1939-45 (London, 1961), vol. 1, Preparation, 
pp. 115-16 . From the description contained here it would seem 
that the Royal Australian Air Force could itself have provided 
equally good aerial gunnery instruction. 
16. MitcheU Library, MSS 1431/28, Northcott Papers, "Imperial 
Defence College 1935". 
Notes to Pages 6 6 - 7 0 169 
17. Slessor, The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections (Lon-
don, 1956), pp. 83-100 . From 1931 to 1935, he was a member 
of the directing staff. See also Lieutenant Colonel F. W. Young, 
"A Hundred Years of Staff CoUege", Army Quarterly 16 (July 
1958): 178. 
18. Air 9—56 (6), Dominion Co-operation Schemes, Plans Division, 
November 1931. 
19. Air 2 -1320 to Air 2-1339, Air Liaison Letters, 1923-39. 
20. Air 2-1329, Minute, DSD to AMSO, October 1935. 
21. Air 2-1330, Minute 16 September 1936. 
22. DO 114—23, No. 110, Prime Minister to Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs, 11 January 1928. 
23. Interview, Sir Richard WilUams (Melbourne, May 1968). 
24. C.A.O., CRS A 664, item 449/401/la, Department of Defence, 
Correspondence File, "Memorandum re Air Defence of Aust-
ralia", 1925. 
25. Salmond, Report, pt. 2, p. 5. 
26. Ibid., pt 1, p. 17. 
27. The entire operational force in existence at the time of Salmond's 
visit was: No. 1 (Composite) Squadron, No. 2 (Composite) 
Squadron, and No. 101 (Fleet Cooperation) Flight. The com-
posite squadron was an aberration of the twenties. It consisted of 
three normal flights but each equipped with a different type of 
aircraft performing a different function: thus, a bomber flight, a 
fighter flight, and a reconnaissance flight. The Fleet Cooperation 
Flight was designed to fly seaplanes from Albatross. 
28. Salmond, Report, pt. 2, p. 6. 
29. Ibid., pt. 2, Appendixes 1 and 2; GiUison, The Royal Australian 
Air Force 1939-42, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series 3 
(Air), 4 vols. (Canberra, 1962), 1:31-34. 
30. In December 1941 it was realized by the Australian Chiefs of 
Staff that Darwin could not be reinforced except at the expense 
of seriously weakening the air defence of vital industrial areas in 
New South Wales. Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force, p. 239. 
31. See Slessor, The Central Blue, pp. 70 -74 . In 1929, Trenchard 
circulated his paper entitled "The Fuller Employment of Air 
Power in Imperial Defence". It produced a lively controversy. 
Among other things, it advocated the substitution of aircraft for 
fixed-gun defences. 
32. Air 9—4 (46). "Some notes on the use of aircraft in coast defence 
written for the information of Sir John Salmond in connection 
with his visit to Australia, 1928". Plans Division, Air Staff, May 
1928. 
33. Air 9—56, Air Staff Notes for a Meeting with Mr Bruce, 4 Sep-
tember 1933. These notes quote from C.I.D. 249C which was 
concerned with the defence of Australian ports. 
34. Salmond, Report, pt. 2, p. 5. 
35. Reasonable perhaps only in so far as it was a suggestion which the 
army might have accepted. In terms of defence, the smaller guns 
tm Notes to Pages 70-73 
might have been able to deal with any landing ships which did 
manage to get close to the shore, or indeed to land troops. If, 
however, aircraft had been able to sink the transports well away 
from the coast then the 6-inch guns would have been superfluous. 
The classic example of an invading force being stopped by air 
power alone occurred in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea when 
land-based aircraft sank twelve vessels bound for Lae in March 
1943. 
36. Report of the Inspector-General of the Australian Military 
Forces, Lieut-General Sir H. G. Chauvel, 31 May 1929 (Mel-
bourne, 1929). 
37. Air Historical Branch File, Early History of the R.A.A.F. — Misc., 
"Notes on the Question of Alteration of Status of the Royal 
Australian Air Force", 10 March 1932, p. 19. 
38. C.A.O. AA 1971/215, CouncU of Defence Agenda, 1-1935, 3 
May 1935. 
39. It would have been a radical decision for the government to have 
decided differently. The air weapon was stiU unproven and sub-
ject in bad weather to operational difficulties. On the other hand, 
the only attempted landing successfully repulsed by fixed 
defences throughout the Pacific war was at Wake Island. The 
Japanese returned later in strength and overwhelmed these 
defences. 
40. Air Historical Branch File, Early History of the R.A.A.F., Misc., 
"Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff on the Functions of 
the Air Force, Its Development to Date, and the Further Develop-
ment StiU Pending", 4 January 1938. 
41. Air 8—221, AustraUan Air Staff note to AustraUan Air Liaison 
Officer, quoted in "The Strength and Organisation of the Royal 
Australian Air Force", Air Staff, [R.A.F.] April 1937. 
42. Air 8-221, Williams to Chief of the Air Staff [R.A.F.], Notes on 
the Defence of the Commonwealth of Australia, 4 March 1937, 
Appendix B. 
43. Cadre squadrons consisted of one-third permanent R.A.A.F. 
personnel and two-thirds Citizen Air Force. In a typical squadron, 
the station headquarters and one flight would be made up of 
regular officers and other ranks and the remaining two flights 
would be manned by the Citizen Air Force. 
44. Air 8—221, Notes on the Defence of AustraUa, Chief of the Air 
Staff [R.A.A.F.] to Chief of the Air Staff [R.A.F.], 4 March 
1937. 
45. Air Historical Branch File, Naval and Military Aviation: Minutes 
etc., "OutUne of PoUcy Suggested for the MiUtary Air Force of 
AustraUa", 25 June 1918. 
46. Air 9-15 (3), Notes on Air Forces Required, Air Staff, [R.A.F.] 
11 July 1921. 
47. Minutes of Evidence (Richmond), p. 3. 
Notes to Pages 73-77 171 
48. Air 8-69, Air Staff [R.A.A.F.] Memorandum, 1926 Imperial 
Conference, Appendix 3, p. 2. 
49. Aircraft 4 (March 1925): 156. 
50. Department of Defence, Estimates of Expenditure 1926—27, Ex-
planatory Statement (Melbourne, 1926), p. 11. 
51. Air 8—69, Air Staff Memorandum, 1926 Imperial Conference, 
Appendix 1, p. 2. 
52. Salmond, Report, pt. 1, p. 6. 
53. A general-purpose squadron was equipped with aircraft designed 
to function either as fighter-bombers or as reconnaissance types. 
54. C.A.O., AA 1971/216, CouncU of Defence Agenda 5/1936, Park-
hiU to WilUams, 27 May 1935. 
55. WUliams felt strongly enough that this was true to make himself 
personaUy responsible for operational training throughout the air 
force. Previously this had been the responsibiUty of the air 
member for personnel. The transfer was effected in October 
1934. See C.A.O. CRS 816, item 37/301/360, Memorandum by 
the minister for defence, 19 December 1938. 
56. Air 8—221, AustraUan Delegation Paper No. 11, Extract from 
minute by the Defence Committee. 
57. C.A.O. AA 1971/216, CouncU of Defence Meeting, 24 August 
1936. 
58. Ibid. 
59. Air 8-221, Note by the Air Staff [R.A.F.] headed "The ParkhiU 
Edition", June 1937. 
60. Air 9—56 (34), Notes on the Royal Australian Air Force, 28 July 
1934. 
61. Air Historical Branch File, Air Ministry Discussions — Second 
Three Year Development Plan, "Royal AustraUan Air Force — 
Further Development", Note by the Chief of the Air Staff 
[R.A.F.] 15 May 1936. 
62. Air Historical Branch File, Appointment of AustraUan Staff 
Officer to H.Q. R.A.F. Far East, NewaU to WilUams, Secret and 
Personal, 8 January 1938. 
63. For a discussion of ElUngton's visit and its consequences see 
pp. 84-92. 
64. Air Historical Branch File, ibid.. Appointment of Australian Staff 
Officer to H.Q. R.A.F. Far East, NewaU to Goble, Secret and 
Personal, 22 February 1939. 
65. For the published correspondence which passed between the 
United Kingdom and the Dominions see Cmd. 5414. For the 
Australian reaction see D. M. Hocking and C. P. Haddon-Cave, Air 
Transport in Australia (Sydney, 1951), pp. 86—91. For the world 
operation of the scheme see Robin Higham, Britain's Imperial Air 
Routes 1918—1939: The Story of Britain's Overseas Airlines 
(London 1960). 
66. C.P.D., 140 (4 July 1933): 2778. 
67. Cab 24-250, C.P. 200 (34), Memorandum by the Secretary of 
172 Notes to Pages 7 7 - 7 9 
State for Dominion Affairs, July 1934. 
68. C.A.O. AA 1971/216, CouncU of Defence Agenda 1/1936, "The 
Empire Air MaU Scheme", WUliams to Secretary, Department for 
Defence, 25 February 1936. For a further expression of simUiar 
views see Air 8—221, "Note by the Air Staff on the Empire Air 
Mail Scheme from an Air Defence Point of View", Memorandum 
prepared by WilUams as part of the AustraUan delegation paper 
no. 14 prepared for use at the 1937 Imperial Conference and 
dated March 1937. 
69. Interview, Sir Richard Williams. In this view he showed himself to 
be at least five years ahead of United Kingdom thinking. It was 
only in August 1933 that Plans Division came to the same con-
clusion and consequently felt that an efficient substitute for 
flying-boats would have to be found. See Air 9—34, Plans to 
D.C.A.S., August 1933. 
70. Again Williams was proved right. By November 1940, the Singa-
pore Conference decided that Australian strategic air routes 
would have to be developed in order to provide Singapore with 
air reinforcements. See C.A.O. CRS A2684/135, Singapore 
Defence Conference 1940, Report by the AustraUan Chiefs of 
Staff, 18 November 1940, p. 3. 
71. Avia 2—1912, E. T. Crutchley to Under Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs, 23 April 1935. Crutchley had enjoyed a 
"private talk" with R. G. Casey, Assistant Treasurer at this time, 
and soon to be Treasurer, and Casey had told him what had been 
going on in cabinet. From this source, Crutchley got the im-
pression that Johnston and Shepherd were at the back of the 
opposition. Johnston had become Director of CivU Aviation after 
Brinsmead had been kiUed in an air accident in 1933. What 
Crutchley called his "obstinate attitude" made him most un-
popular. F. L. G. Bertram held a poor opinion of him: he was "a 
very ignorant feUow with the mentality of a weak man quite 
unable to delegate responsibUity". Bertram felt that Brinsmead's 
death had been "a tragedy for CivU Aviation in AustraUa". Avia 
2-2912, Bertram to Shelmerdine, 2 March 1935. 
72. Robin Higham, Britain's Imperial Air Routes, p. 2 32. 
73. Avia 2-1912, Crutchley to Under Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs, 5 February 1935. 
74. Avia 2-1912, Dominions Office to Crutchley, 14 February 1935. 
75. Avia 2-1912, Bertram to Shelmerdine, 2 March 1935. 
76. Argus, 22 December 1936. 
77. Avia 2-1912, Minutes, 18th Meeting, I.D.C.I.A.C, 5 February 
1936. This committee was formed in 1934 and its function was 
to coordinate the work of those departments concerned with 
overseas air communication. 
78. The nearest date which can be fixed for when these orders were 
placed is "mid 1934". See Higham, Britain's Imperial Air Routes, 
p. 86. Short Bros, did not reply to my own enquiry. 
Notes to Pages 79 -82 173 
79. In March 1936 it was announced that twenty-eight aircraft were 
on order. House of Commons Debates 309, col. 2333, 12 March 
1936. 
80. Air 8 - 2 2 1 , Harris to D.C.A.S., 10 May 1937. 
81. Air 8—221, "The Empire Air Mail Scheme from an Air Defence 
Point of View", Note from ElUngton to Swinton, 10 May 1937. 
82. Air 8 -221 , Swinton to ElUngton, 10 June 1937. 
83. Air 8 - 2 2 1 , Ellington to Swinton, 16 June 1937. 
84. Air 8 - 2 2 1 , "The Flying-Boat Air Mail Route as a Line of 
Communication in War, Its Security, and the Use of Its 
Resources". Note by the Air Staff forwarded under letter Elling-
ton to Parkhill, 19 June 1937. Both WilUams and Harris appeared 
right in their prediction that the land plane was a defence invest-
ment superior to the flying boat. It was found during the battle 
of the Atlantic that the Liberator with its very long range was 
more effective than the Sunderland. See in particular Captain 
S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-45, (London, 1956), 
2:77—90. As far as the commercial aspects of flying-boat opera-
tions were concerned, it did not take long for Imperial Airways to 
realize their mistake, or "gaffe". Just before war broke out they 
were planning a change-over to a land plane service. See R. E. G. 
Davies, A History of the World's Airlines (London 1964), p. 226. 
85. Archdale Parkhill, Empire Civil Aviation and Aircraft Manufac-
ture, Speech delivered at Manly, 29 July 1937 (Melbourne, 
1937), p. 1. 
86. See chapter 6, pp. 142—43. 
87. Air 8 - 2 2 1 , WilUams to ElUngton, 4 March 1937. 
88. Air Historical Branch File, Air Ministry Discussions — Second 
Three-Year Development Plan, "Royal AustraUan Air Force — 
Further Development", Air Board to Secretary, Department of 
Defence, 19 August 1936. 
89. Air 8 -221 , Australian Delegation Paper no. 12, 8 March 1937, 
p. 2. 
90. S.M.H., 22 October 1937. 
91 . ParkhiU's defeat by an Independent candidate, Percy Spender, 
had nothing to do with his defence policy regardless of what 
Spender argues in his recent biography. Politics and a Man 
(Sydney 1972). At this time the United AustraUa party in New 
South Wales was being troubled by the election of Independents 
standing as a protest mainly against the policy of pre-selection. 
Already the blue-ribbon United Australia party seats of Vaucluse 
and WooUahra had been lost in state by-elections, but Parkhill 
was to be the most prominent casualty. 
92. Age, 25 March 1938. 
93. G. A. Street, Australian Defence Policy, Speech deUvered to the 
House of Representatives, 6 December 1938 (Melbourne, 1938). 
94. Air 9 -56 , Whiskard to Harding, 28 November 1938. 
95. For a statement on the role of the army see Street, Australian 
174 Notes to Pages 82—85 
Defence Policy. Also Statement by the Hon. G. 4 . Street, 
Minister for Defence on the First Report by Lieut-Gen E. K. 
Squires, Inspector-General of the Australian Military Forces, 14 
March 1939 (Melbourne 1939), pp. 1-2. 
96. C.A.O. CRS A 816 14/301/108, "Basis of Australian Defence 
Policy", Defence Programme — Army Appreciation for Resis-
tence to Major Attack, 28 February 1939. 
97. "First-Une" meant those aircraft of service type which formed the 
normal complement of fighting squadrons. Behind the first-line 
aircraft were supposed to be 50 per cent reserves for service 
squadrons and 100 per cent reserves for training squadrons. 
98. Air 9-56, AustraUan Liaison Officer (London) to Plans Division 
[R.A.F.], 17 January 1939. 
99. In particular the way in which he resisted British pressure when it 
was decided to build American aircraft in AustraUa. See chapter 
5, pp. 124-25. 
100. Earle Page, Truant Surgeon: The Inside Story of Forty Years of 
Australian Political Life (Sydney, 1963), p. 258. 
101. Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939—41, AustraUa in 
the War of 1939-1945, Series 4 (CivU), vol. 1 (Canberra, 1952), 
p. 107. 
102. G. Hermon GUI, Royal Australian Navy 1939—42, AustraUa in 
the War of 1939-1942, Series 2 (Navy), 2 vols. (Canberra), 1:42. 
There was a lack of reaUty in this suggestion. After the 1937 
Imperial Conference it should have been obvious that Britain 
would have been unable to supply such a ship. See chapter 
6, pp. 137-38 
103. See the articles which Thorby contributed to the Sun-Herald 
during December 1957 and January 1958. Thorby says that he 
was "utterly unprepared for the shocks in store for me when I 
took over the portfoUo". {Sun-Herald, 5 January 1958). 
104. Hasluck, Government and the People 1:107. 
105. Air 9-56, Whiskard to Harding, 28 November 1938. 
106. GUlison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939—42, p. 48. 
107. Interview, Sir George Jones (Canberra, 1971). 
108. No fUes could be found in the Public Record Office regarding 
ElUngton's inspection and considerable opposition had to be over-
come to sight ElUngton's confidential report in the AustraUan 
Archives, Canberra. 
109. C.A.O., CRS 816. Memorandum by the Minister for Defence, 19 
December 1938. Hereafter cited as Street, Cabinet Memorandum. 
110. C.A.O. CRS A 816, item 14/301/49, Department of Defence, 
Correspondence FUe: "Defence — ParUamentary Debates con-
cerning", 1938, Note by the Air Board, 3 July 1938. 
111. Street, Cabinet Memorandum. 
112. Ibid. 
113. C.P.D., 156 (28 June 1938): 2748-52, (29 June 1938): 
Notes to Pages 8 5 - 9 0 175 
2863—64, for comments by two Labor party members carrying 
these implications. 
114. C.P.D., 158 (24 November 1938): 1997. 
115. Argus, 16 June 1938. 
116. Interview, Sir Richard WUliams. ElUngton, for example, when 
asked to inspect the Wirraway refused to see the aircraft fly al-
though the pUot, later Air Chief Marshal Scherger, was flying 
overhead at the time.. Clearly WUUams resented being treated as a 
"colonial". 
117. Air Historical Branch FUe, unnumbered and untitled, containing 
"Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff for Sir Edward 
ElUngton", 1 June 1938. 
118. Ellington,/?eport, pp. 1—2. 
119. ElUngton, Report, Copy 36, para. 2. 
120. Before ElUngton left England, he had been given a paper which 
stressed the importance of developing Darwin "as a starting point 
for AustraUan air force squadrons which we hope wUl be dis-
patched to augment the air defences of Singapore". See Air 
9 -56 , "The Strategic Importance of Port Darwin", Plans 
Division, 23 May 1938. 
121. Ellington, Report, Copy 36, para. 2. 
122. For the quotation, ibid. The Air Board had replied to ElUngton 
with a CouncU of Defence ruUng, Agenda No. 2/1938 dated 24 
February 1938, that the role of the air force was "to act in close 
co-operation with the Navy and Army, to defend Australia and its 
territories against raids on territory or on trade". Perhaps this 
haphazard method of communication was endemic in the 
relationship between the, government and the services. Thorby 
says that he had "practically no means of finding out what was 
happening in the Services for which [he] was responsible". Sun-
Herald, 5 January 1958. 
123. ElUngton, Report, Copy 36, para. 10. 
124. C.A.O., CRS 816, item 37/301/360, Air Board to Minister for 
Defence, 21 September 1938. 
125. Ansons, for example, were not fitted with instruments for bUnd-
flying and bUnd-flying hoods were not available for the Demons. 
It was necessary, therefore, to practise blind-flying in cloud. 
126. EUington, Report, para. 7. 
127. ElUngton, Report, Copy 36, para. 7. Street somewhat grudgingly 
noted that the "Air Board's explanation appears satisfactory". 
128. Ibid., para. 10. 
129. Ibid. 
130. C.A.O., AA63-39, Item 37/301/360, Air Board to Minister for 
Defence, 21 Septmeber 1938. 
131. Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939—42, p. 53. 
132. C.A.O., AA63-39, Item 37/301/360, Air Board to Minister for 
Defence, 21 September 1938. 
133. Argus, 1 September 1938. 
176 Notes to Pages 90—94 
134. >l^e, 2 September 1938. 
135. S.M.H. 3 September 1938. Fairbairn suggested in the House 
{C.P.D., 158 [24 November 1938]: 1996. that to reach such 
conclusions from the report the press must have been given 
additional information. There is no evidence to support this state-
ment, and one can only assume that Fairbairn himself had read 
Ellington's comments with little imagination. 
136. The appointments held by service officers were. Chief of the Air 
Staff: operations, intelligence, organization and staff duties, 
works, buildings and signals; air member for personnel: personal 
services, manning, training, medical services; air member for 
supply: equipment, technical services, aeronautical inspection, 
finance and stores. 
137. Interview, Air Vice Marshal E. C. Wackett. 
138. Interview, Air Marshal Sir George Jones. They never did. During 
the war WUliams took up his appointment with Coastal Command 
in the Royal Air Force and upon his return Goble went to Canada 
to work with the Empire Air Training Scheme. At the end of the 
war, both were retired. 
139. Street, Cabinet Memorandum. 
140. Ibid. 
141. Ellington, Report, Appendix 6, Press statement, 16 January 
1939. This statement followed very closely the recommendations 
made by Street in December. 
142. Williams, in this respect, was no Trenchard, but has been Ukened 
to him. See Stanley Brogden, Australia's Two-Airline Policy (Mel-
bourne, 1968), p. 57. 
143. EUington, Report, para. 10. 
CHAPTER 5 
1. Air Historical Branch, FUe 91, Naval and MUitary Aviation 
Minutes etc., "Memorandum on the Air Service in Australian 
Defence", Major General J. G. Legge, 29 April 1918. 
2. Ibid., Note initialled by W. H. Watt, the acting prime minister, 30 
April 1918. 
3. Air Historical Branch, File 91, Maguire to Secretary, Naval Board, 
9 May 1918. 
4. Ibid., Commonwealth Government to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 12 June 1918; Chief of the General Staff to Secretary, 
Department of Defence, 8 November 1918. 
5. Air 5-166, "Air Defence and Supested Lines of Development 
for Dominion Air Forces", Air Ministry, February 1921, p. 16. 
6. Air 9-15 (3), "Notes on Air Forces Required for Defence" Air 
Staff, [R.A.F.], 11 July 1921. 
7. Sun, 25 January 1922. 
8. Joint Committee of PubUc Accounts, Report on the Expenditure 
upon the Air Services (Melbourne, 1923), p. 15. 
Notes to Pages 9 4 - 9 9 177 
9. Minutes of Evidence (Laverton), p. 29. 
10. Minutes of Evidence (Richmond), p. 7. 
11. Report on Expenditure upon Air Services, p. 9. 
12. Herald, 30 January 1921. 
13. Minutes of Evidence (Laverton), p. 28. 
14. C.P.D., 103 (13 July 1923): 1128. 
15. For example see Aircraft 9 (September 1931): 11 (December 
1933); 12 (January 1934). 
16. Aircraft 9 (February 1931): 35. 
17. Cab 21 — 397, "Memorandum on the Defence of Australia", 
Williams to ParkhUl, 3 May 1935. 
18. Archdale Parkhill, A Statement of the Government's Policy 
Regarding the Defence of Australia, p. 18. 
19. See chapter 2, p. 21. 
20. Commonwealth of Australia Official Year Book 22 (1929): 314. 
21. A. S. Butler, "Australia and the British Aircraft Manufacturer", 
Aircraft 3 (February 1925): 103. 
22. Air Historical Branch File, Early History of the R.A.A.F. — Misc., 
contains a copy of the agreement dated 20 September 1921. The 
total cost of the six airframes was $14,200. 
23. Avia 2—87, "CivU Aviation in AustraUa", Controller of Civil Avia-
tion, General Report no. 4, 31 August 1921. 
24. S.M.H., 3 March 1922. 
25. Ibid., 16 September 1922. 
26. Telegraph, 30 January 1923. 
27. Age, 12 AprU 1923. 
28. Interview (Melbourne 1968). 
29. J. V. Connolly, "The History of Aeronautical Engineering in 
Austrailia.", Aeroplane 4 (September 1938): 382. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Aeroplane 4 (September 1938): 368-69. 
32. Department of Defence, Estimates of Expenditure, Explanatory 
Statement Prepared by Direction of the Minister for Defence 
1924-25 (Melbourne, 1924), p. 7. 
33. Air 5—166, "Air Defence and Suggested Lines of Development 
for Dominion Air Forces", Air Ministry, February 1921. 
34. Herald, 15 January 1924. 
35. See Connolly, "Aeronautical Engineering", for an account of the 
engineering details involved. 
36. Interview (Melbourne, 1968). Wackett claims that he was joined 
at Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation by former members of 
the Experimental Section. 
37. Salmond, Report, pt. 1, p. 14. 
38. Interview. See also, L. J. Wackett, Aircraft Pioneer: An Autobio-
graphy (Sydney, 1972), pp. 101—2. This explanation is shared by 
Sir Lawrence's brother. Air Vice Marshal E. C. Wackett. 
39. Avia 2—87, Department of Overseas Trade (Development and 
InteUigence) to Air Ministry, 20 August 1921. 
178 Notes to Pages 9 9 - 1 0 3 
40. Cab 32-46, Imperial Conference 1926, Stenographic Notes, 12th 
Meeting, 15 November 1926, p. 11. 
41. National Archives (Washington), Record Group 165, War Depart-
ment File 2746, Sir John Salmond's Report on the Royal Aust-
ralian Air Force, 21 November 1928. 
42. Lawrence Wackett, Autobiography (typescript made available by 
Sir Lawrence and later edited for publication as cited in n.38). 
43. Air Commodore C. R. Taylor who later worked with Wackett on 
the first Wirraway has said that Wackett ran the Experimental 
Section as a benevolent autocrat. He lived close to the workshop 
and often worked through the night on his projects. He disliked 
any attempt at interference. Interview, Air Commodore C. R. 
Taylor, Canberra, December 1970. 
44. C.P.P., General and Finance Session 1 9 2 9 - 3 0 - 3 1 , 4 :47 -49 
"Report of the Auditor-General 1928-29 ; 4 :55 -56 , "Annual 
Report of the Auditor-General Upon the Treasurer's State of 
Receipts and Expenditure for the Year Ended 30 June 1930". 
45. Salmond, Report, pt. 1, p. 14. 
46. Minutes of Evidence (Richmond), pp. 7—8. 
47. Munitions Supply Board, Annual Reports, 1925—1928 (Mel-
bourne, 1926, 1927, 1928). 
48. For particulars of these aircraft see Connolly, "Aeronautical En-
gineering", and J. L. Watkins, "From 'Smithy' to To-Morrow", 
Aircraft 40 (December I960): 23 -24 . 
49. Air Historical Branch, Department of Defence FUe 1—501—32, 
Disclosure of Information re Aircraft Purchased for Australia, 
Secretary, Air Board to H. L. Shepherd, 18 March 1936. This gives 
the aircraft ordered and the delivery date. 
50. Air 8—221, Imperial Conference 1937, Misc. Papers, Australian 
Delegation Paper no. 11, "The Royal Australian Air Force — 
Organization, Priority of Development, and Equipment", 8 March 
1937. 
51. C.P.D. 157 (2 November 1938): 1107. 
52. Ibid., 151 (17 September 1936): 261. 
53. Air 8 - 2 2 1 . 
54. Air 8 -221 , "Aircraft Orders Placed in the United Kingdom", 
Note by the A.M.S.O., 13 May 1937. 
55. C.A.O., CRS A 816, item 11/302/2, Department of Defence, 
Correspondence File, "Munitions Requirements", 1937 contains 
a note of Lyons's approach to London. The deUvery date is in Air 
9—118, "Supply of Arms to Foreign Powers: Statement of Air-
craft and Aero Engines under consideration and released for 
sale", Air Ministry, 20 June 1939. 
56. See C.P.D. 188 (9 August 1946): 4209. 
57. M. M. Postan, British War Production, History of the Second 
Worid War, United Kingdom CivU Series (London, 1952), 
pp. 14—23 gives detaUs of these various expansion schemes. 
Notes to Pages 103-7 179 
58. For the vicissitudes of the British aircraft industry between the 
wars see Higham, Armed Forces in Peacetime: Britain 
1918-1939, A Case Study (London, 1962), pp. 201-7. 
59. See the remarks of F. Handley-Page (Chairman of the Society of 
British Aircraft Constructors) in Air Annual of the British Empire 
1938 (London, 1938), p. 129. 
60. Slessor, Air Power and Armies (London, 1936), pp. 20, 50. 
61. MacKenzie King objected to two items: the interchange of per-
sonnel and standardization of equipment. Apart from the politi-
cal reasons, Canada had no mUitary air force, and besides BES 
standards did not apply there. 
62. DO 114—1, Minutes of Conference held at Air Ministry, 22 
October 1924, p. 93. 
63. Cab 32—46, Imperial Conference 1926, Stenographic Notes, 12th 
Meeting, 15 November 1926, p. 7. 
64. A. E. Leighton, the Controller-General of Munitions, exercised a 
quite different poUcy. As he told P. Liesching, the official secre-
tary in the office of the United Kingdom high commissioner in 
1936, "he made it a standing rule that [members of his depart-
ment] were not permitted to visit America either on the way to 
England or on the way back". Avia 2—2118, Liesching to Syers, 4 
August 1936. 
65. Aircraft 10 (March 1932): 20. 
66. National Archives (Washington), Record Group 165, War Depart-
ment FUe 300—W—100 gives an itinerary and notes his im-
pressions. 
67. For an official account of this poUcy see Archdale Parkhill, 
Speech on Australian Civil Aviation, DeUvered at Mosman, 3 
February 1936 (Melbourne, 1936), p. 15. See also Aircraft 14 
(January 1936): 5. 
68. Avia 2—2118, Dalton to Department of Overseas Trade, 18 July 
1935. 
69. Avia 2—2118, J. R. Adams to Department of Overseas Trade, 31 
July 1935. 
70. Avia 2-2118, A. E. Overton to E. G. S. Machtig (Dominions 
Office), 20 July 1935. 
71. Avia 2—2118, Under Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to 
E. T. Crutchley, 29 July 1935. 
72. Avia 2—2118, Crutchley to Under Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs, 6 August 1935. 
73. Avia 2-2118, Crutchley to Batterbee, 28 November 1935. 
74. Brogden, Australia's Two-Airline Policy (Melbourne, 1968), 
p. 20. The documents concerning the organization of this air race 
and the messages which passed between the ground and the air-
craft are held in the Air Historical Branch. 
75. Avia 2-2118, Hankinson to Batterbee, 28 November 1935. 
76. Avia 2—2118, Hankinson to Batterbee, Personal and Confidential, 
4 February 1936. Three Stinson aircraft were delivered to the 
company by March 1936. 
ma Notes to Pages 107-10 
77. Avia 2-2118, Liesching to Syers, 2 June 1936. 
78. Avia 2 -2118 , "Australia: Aircraft Industry - Danger of Loss of 
Markets by United Kingdom Manufacturers", extract of notes of 
28th Meeting I.D.C.I.A.C, 27 July 1936. 
79. Avia 2-2118, Whiskard to Batterbee, 16 September 1936. 
80. DO 114-72, Whiskard to Dominions Office, 8 July 1936. 
81. Aeroplane 54 (AprU 1937): 412. NevUle Chamberlain flew to 
Munich in an Electra. 
82. Avia 2-1329, Air Liaison Letter, 14 November 1935. 
83. Air Historical Branch, Department of Defence FUe 1—501—24, 
co-ordination of Orders Placed in the United Kingdom, Shepherd 
to Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 3 March 1936. By this 
time Shepherd had clashed with Liesching. He felt that Shepherd 
was no particular friend to British interests and that the only way 
to deal with him on occasions was to be "downright rude". Avia 
2—2118, Extract from a secret letter from Liesching to Batterbee, 
22 May 1936. 
84. Avia 2—2118, Statement prepared by Director of Equipment, Air 
Ministry, 17 December 1935. See also Air 8—221, Aircraft Orders 
placed in the United Kingdom, note by A.M.S.O., 13 May 1937. 
85. Air 8—221, Australian Delegation Paper No. 12, Aircraft Orders 
Placed in the United Kingdom, 8 March 1937. 
86. Aeroplane 55 (October 1938): 468. 
87. Air 8—221, Aircraft Orders Placed in the United Kingdom, note 
by A.M.S.O., 13 May 1937. 
88. Aeroplane 56 (May 1939): 641. 
89. Air 9—118, Supply of Arms to Foreign Powers — Statement of 
Aircraft and Aero Engines under Consideration and Released for 
Sale, Air Ministry, 20 June 1939. 
90. See Air 9 -118 , "PoUtical Importance of Foreign Countries 
Requiring Assistance from the United Kingdom", Memorandum 
by the Foreign Office, June 1939. Also "Relative Strategic Im-
portance of Countries Requiring Arms from the United King-
dom", Memorandum by the Committee of Imperial Defence 
Joint Planning Sub-Committee, June 1939. 
91. Cab 24-270, C.P. 161, "Unpublished Conclusions of the 1937 
Imperial Conference", Secretary of State, Dominion Affairs, 25 
June 1937. 
92. Archdale ParkhiU, The Defence Estimates 1937-38 (Melbourne, 
1937), p. 9. 
93. For the number of Ansons under charter see EUington, Report, 
Copy 36, secret comments by the Air Board, paras. 13 and 14. 
The Air Board pointed out that as soon as the Beaufort became 
available, the Ansons would be transferred to a training role and 
those aircraft under charter would be returned to England. It is 
not known if they were; more likely they were kept in Australia 
when the Empire Air Training Scheme began. The basis of the 
charter was that the Commonwealth government paid the freight 
Notes to Pages 110-113 181 
each way and a depreciation charge for each mUe flown. See Air 
Historical Branch, Department of Defence File SF—11—K, 
Defence Development Programme, Revision, May 1939. Air 
Force Expansion, Scheme X, "Explanatory Statement and Items 
Included in Further Development Programme", 5 December 
1938. 
94. C.P.D. 158 (18 November 1938): 1718. 
95. Air 8—221, quoted in Australian Delegation Paper no. 11, 8 
March 1937. 
96. C.P.D. 157 (2 November 1938): 1107. C.A.O. CRS A2671 
28/1939, War Cabinet Agendum 28/1939, "Delivery of Lockheed 
Aircraft from the United States", Memorandum by the Minister 
for Defence, 20 October 1939 notes an expected delivery date of 
March 1940. This order came as a "complete surprise" to Lock-
heed. As they advised Brown and Dureau, their Australian agents, 
they had quite given up hope of getting an AustraUan order for 
mUitary machines. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation FUes, Box 
A5184, "AustraUa", Lockheed Aircraft Corporation to Brown 
and Dureau, 21 November 1938. 
97. Air 8—235, Acceleration of Expansion Schemes, Minute by the 
Chief of the Air Staff, 18 October 1938. 
98. Avia 2—2118, Adams to Department of Overseas Trade, 3 July 
1935. 
99. C TurnbuU, Essington Lewis (Melbourne, 1963), p. 20. 
100. D. P. Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, AustraUa in the 
War of 1939-1945, Series 4 (CivU), (Canberra, 1958), 5:381. 
101. G. Blainey, ed., / / / Remember Rightly: The Memoirs ofW. S. 
Robinson 1876-1963 (Melbourne, 1967), pp. 174-75 . 
102. L. J. Hartnett (as told to John Veitch), Big Wheels and Little 
Wheels (Melbourne, 1964), p. 89. 
103. Interview. 
104. D.O. 114, Crutchley to Dominions Office, 6 November 1935. 
105. Avia 2—2118, Hankinson to Batterbee, Personal and Confidential, 
4 February 1936. 
106. The Department of Overseas Trade was advised by F. W. Colman, 
Acting Senior Trade Commissioner, that negotiations were taking 
place in January 1936. See Avia 2—2118, Colman to Comptroller-
General, Department of Overseas Trade, 7 January 1936. 
107. Dalton advised that he had learnt from a "secret" source that 
cabinet had refused to negotiate with Essington Lewis while 
General Motors-Holden's were involved, and it was only when 
Lewis exerted pressure that the government relented. Avia 
2—2118, Dalton to Department of Overseas Trade, 14 February 
1936. 
108. D.O. 114—36, Commonwealth Government to Dominions Office, 
11 February 1936. 
109. D.O. 114—38, Commonwealth Government to Dominions Office, 
6 March 1936. 
182 Notes to Pages 113—17 
110. Blainey, / / / Remember Rightly, p. 175. 
111. Avia 2-2118, Report of a meeting held at the Dominions Office, 
20 February 1936 to consider Australian proposals for the manu-
facture of aircraft. 
112. D.O. 114-46, Notes of a meeting with Dr. Earle Page and Mr. 
Menzies 26 March 1936. 
113. D.O. 114-40, Dominions Office to Commonwealth of Australia, 
10 March 1936. 
114. Avia 2-2118, J. S. Ross to Sir Edward Harding, 24 AprU 1936. 
115. Avia 2—2118, Report of a meeting held at the Dominions Office, 
20 February 1926 to consider Australian proposals for the manu-
facture of aircraft. 
116. Bla.mey,If I Remember Rightly, p. 174. 
117. See Avia 2-2118. At the meeting held 20 February 1936 to 
consider the AustraUan proposals, the Board of Trade represen-
tative pointed out that he had told Bruce that United Kingdom 
motor car exports had to be protected from American competi-
tion, and that the inclusion of General Motors-Holden's could 
lead to a situation which could damage the balance of trade. 
118. Avia 2—2118, Notes of a talk with Mr. Bruce by Sir Harry Batter-
bee, 9 March 1936. 
119. Lawrence Wackett, Autobiography, typescript, p. 17. 
120. Casey had done this before. See chapter 4, n.71. He may have 
well argued that his dual allegiance to the Crown and to the 
AustraUan government gave him constitutional sanction for what 
otherwise may only be regarded as a disloyal action towards his 
leader. 
121. See in particular D.O. 114-51, Whiskard to Dominions Office, 20 
AprU 1936 and D.O. 114-57, Whiskard to Dominions Office, 4 
May 1936. 
122. Avia 2-2118, Liesching to C G. L. Syers (Private Secretary to 
the Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury), 23 June 
1936. Personal and Private letter. In 1949 Liesching was to 
become Permanent Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Office. 
123. Avia 2—2118, Note of an interview with Brian Lewis, 16 March 
1936, enclosed in letter Whiskard to Malcolm MacDonald, 17 
March 1936. Lewis told Liesching of his activities. 
124. Avia 2—2118, Note of an interview with Brian Lewis held 30 
March, enclosed in Whiskard to Malcolm MacDonald, 30 March 
1936. 
125. D.O. 114-42, Whiskard to Dominions Office, 19 March 1936. 
Lyons had told Whiskard also that "Hartnett's services were seen 
as essential to the success of the proposed company". 
126. For further detaUs of the activities of Page and Menzies in Lon-
don see Earle Page, Truant Surgeon: The Inside Story of Forty 
Years of Australian Political Life (Sydney, 1963), pp. 243—53. 
The discussions regarding the aircraft factory are not mentioned. 
Notes to Pages 117-22 183 
127. Harrison was a recently retired Royal Australian Air Force tech-
nical officer and Murphy a serving technical officer on loan from 
the Royal AustraUan Air Force. 
128. Avia 2—2118, Final Note of Meeting regarding the Proposed Air-
craft Factory, 26 March 1936. 
129. Ibid. 
130. D.O. 114-47, Lyons to Baldwdn, 14 AprU 1936. 
131. D.O. 114-50, Whiskard to Dominions Office, 17 April 1936. 
132. Avia 2-2118, J. S. Ross to Sir Edward Hardmg, 21 AprU 1936. 
133. D.O. 114-54, Baldwin to Lyons, 22 AprU 1936. 
134. Avia 2—2118, "Summary of a Conference held at the Dominions 
Office between Malcolm MacDonald, J. S. Ross, Mr. Menzies and 
Dr. Earle Page, 22 AprU 1936". 
135. D.O. 114-56, Whiskard to Dominions Office, 24 AprU 1936. 
Lyons was right, and the Dominions Office was forced to admit 
this confidentiaUy to Whiskard, D.O. 114—60, Harding to 
Whiskard, 1 May 1936. 
136. Avia 2—2118, WilUams to EUington, Private and Personal, 11 May 
1936. 
137. Avia 2-2118, Liesching to Batterbee, 22 May 1936. 
138. Avia 2—2118, Note by Sir Harry Batterbee of an interview with 
Keith Officer on the AustraUan Aircraft Factory, 27 AprU 1936. 
139. D.O. 114-57, Harding to Whiskard, 1 May 1936. 
140. D.O. 114-52, Lyons to Baldwin, 1 June 1936, and D.O. 114-67, 
Baldwin to Lyons, 9 June 1936. 
141. Hartnett had been assigned the job as "factory lay-out expert" 
and Wackett was being considered as managing director. See D.O. 
114-61, Whiskard to Harding, 27 May 1936. 
142. Avia 2—2118, Sir Robert McLean (Chairman of the Society of 
British Aircraft Constructors) to F. W. Musson (Air Ministry), 13 
March 1936. 
143. Ibid, recording the views of the society. 
144. Avia 2—2118, "Proposals from Hawker-Siddeley for Co-operation 
in AustraUa", Whiskard to Malcolm MacDonald, 30 March 1936. 
145. Avia 2-2118, Liesching to Syers, 4 August 1936. 
146. D.O. 114—74, Commonwealth Government to Dominions Office, 
24 September 1936. 
147. Air Historical Branch File, Establishment of Aircraft Industry in 
AustraUa, Whiskard to Earle Page (Deputy Prime Minister), 1 
October 1936. 
148. D.O. 114/75/76, Dominions Office to Whiskard. 
149. Big Wheels and Little Wheels, p. 95. 
150. Smith's Weekly, 16 January 1937. 
151. It was a natural reaction for Dalton to present the strongest case 
possible and quite likely Wackett had spoken to Hartnett about 
aircraft before he left. Dalton possibly heard this and allowed the 
above interpretation to colour his dispatch. There is not the sligh-
test intention to cast any doubt on the integrity of Sir Lawrence 
184 Notes to Pages 122-24 
Wackett or indeed on Dalton. One was a most capable business-
man of the highest probity, the other a first-rate civU servant. For 
Dalton's views, however, see D.O. 114—61, Whiskard to Sir 
Edward Harding, 27 May 1936. 
152. Mellor, Science and Industry, p. 383. 
153. North American-Rockwell Corporation File, Contract Brief 51. 
154. Air Historical Branch File, Copies of Bonds and Agreements, 
Agreement between A. V. Roe & Co. Ltd., and the Common-
wealth of AustraUa, 24 October 1935. It was not unusual for a 
licence to be secured by the Department of Defence when a type 
of aircraft was purchased. The cost of the licence was often, it 
seems included in the purchase price as a formaUty. 
155. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation FUes, Box A5184 "Australia", 
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation to Brown and Dureau, 25 June 
1936. 
156. Wackett, Autobiography, typescript, n.p. Wackett says that this 
aircraft was finally sold to Mitsubishi who developed the Zero 
from it. 
157. D.O. 114—74, Commonwealth Government to the Dominions 
Office, 24 September 1936 rejecting the suggestion. 
158. Air 8—259, "Assistance to Turkey", Memorandum by the Chief 
of the Air Staff to Secretary of State for Air, 13 July 1939. 
159. Air Historical Branch File, The Establishment of the Aircraft 
Industry in AustraUa, Aide Memoire, enclosed in Whiskard to 
Earle Page, 1 October 1936. 
160. Whiskard had received this information and these instructions the 
previous evening in an urgent cable from the Dominions Office. 
D.O. 114-75, Dominions Office to Whiskard, 30 September 
1936. 
161. Air Historical Branch FUe, Establishment of Aircraft Industry in 
AustraUa, "Comments by the Air Board on the Notes by the Air 
Ministry on the Westland A39/34", 18 November 1936. Wackett 
naturally strongly supported the Air Board: as he advised "the 
Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation's technical experts are en-
tirely in agreement with the opinions so ably expressed by the Air 
Board", Ibid., L. J. Wackett (Manager, Commonwealth Aircraft 
Corporation) to Secretary, Department of Defence, 19 November 
1936. It was now that the Air Liaison Letters proved useful to 
Williams. Through them he had been able to follow the difficul-
ties encountered with the Lysander and the Mercury engine. 
162. See Archdale ParkhiU, The Manufacture of Aircraft and Engines 
in Australia, Address to the Warringah Electoral Conference, 4 
February 1937 (Canberra, 1937), pp. 4 -5 for the official reasons 
for rejection. ParkhUl closely follows the Air Board's advice while 
WilUams (Interview) confirms ParkhUl's comment that cabinet 
returned the recommendation three times to the Air Board for 
reconsideration. 
163. D.O. 114-80, Liesching to Batterbee, 8 October 1936. 
Notes to Pages 125-28 185 
164. D.O. 114-79, Liesching to Batterbee, 6 October 1936. 
165. D.O. 114—98, Commonwealth Government to Dominions Office, 
25 November 1936. 
166. D.O. 114-102, Lyons to Baldwin, 26 November 1936. 
167. D.O. 114-193, Baldwin to Lyons, 9 December 1936. 
168. House of Commons, Debates 319, (27 January 1937), cols. 
925-26. 
169. Aircraft 17 (May 1939): 10. 
170. Gillison, The Royal Australian Air Force 1939—42, AustraUa in 
the War of 1939-1942, Series 3 (Air), 4 vols. (Canberra, 1962), 
1:354. 
171. L. J. Wackett, "Some Experiences of a Pioneer in the Aircraft 
Industry in AustraUa", Journal of the Royal Aeronautical 
Society, 63 (May 1959): 312. 
172. Big Wheels and Little Wheels, p. 100. 
173. Interview. 
174. A Brief History of Operations Immediately Prior to and During 
World War II, p. 4. gives details of these aircraft and their often 
confusing numbering. This document is an unpublished account 
prepared by North American for its own guidance. 
175. National Archives (Washington), War Department File 
452—1-3295, Box 1031, North American Aviation Inc. to Chief 
of the Air Corps, 27 July 1937, notes the signing with AustraUa 
of the contract covering the NA16—2K. 
176. Mentioned casually in discussion with a group of North 
American-Rockwell employees. 
177. Interview, Mr. Alex Burton, North American-Rockwell, President 
in Charge of Eastern Operations. Burton in 1936 had demonstra-
ted the NA16 to Wackett. He also pointed out that the contract 
was almost a personal one between Wackett and Kindleberger. 
178. L. J. Wackett, Autobiography, typescript p. 15. Wackett makes it 
clear that it was his recommendation. According to him, the 
other members of the mission — Murphy and Harrison — were 
"merely passengers" and "quite without a constructive idea 
unless I suggested it earlier". Ibid. 
179. Argus, 9 January 1937. 
180. ParkhiU, The Manufacture of Aircraft and Engines in Australia, 
p. 6. 
181. Aircraft 16 (February 1937): 5. 
182. Advertiser {I^dehiids), 21 January 1937. 
183. Air 8—221, Note by the Air Staff [R.A.F.] on Australian Govern-
ment Paper no. 11, 16 June 1937. 
184. EUington, Report, para. 4. 
185. Aircraft 17 (May 1939): 16. 
186. Cab 32—127, Imperial Conference 1937, Cabinet Meeting on 
Imperial Conference, Minutes of First Meeting, p. 19. 
187. Cab 24-281, C.P. 294 (38). The appendix to this Cabinet Paper 
notes Bruce's initiative. "Manufacture of Aircraft in Australia", 
185 Notes to Pages 128-30 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air, 15 December 
1938. 
188. Ibid. 
189. This agreement is covered in detaU in S. J. ButUn, War Economy 
1939-42, AustraUa in the War of 1939-45, Series 4 (CivU) (Can-
berra, 1955), 3:267-68 and Mellor, Science and Industry, p. 385. 
190. Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939-42, p. 57. 
CHAPTER 6 
1. A. Parkhill, Statement of the Government's Policy regarding the 
Defence of Australia, Speech delivered at Mosman, 2 December 
1935 (Canberra, 1935). Shedden for the secretary of the Depart-
ment of Defence sent this statement to Hankey with the note 
that it was the first comprehensive pronouncement of defence 
principles and their application to come from the Lyons govern-
ment. Cab 21-397, Shedden to Hankey, 17 December 1935. 
2. Cab 21-386, Hankey to MacDonald, 17 January 1936. 
3. Cab 32—128, Imperial Conference 1937, Stenographic Notes, 
12th Meeting, 3 June 1937. 
4. Zelman Cowen, Sir John Latham and Other Papers (Melbourne, 
1965), p. 25. 
5. Premier 1—175, Defence Requirements Sub-Committee, Report, 
28 February 1934. The members of this sub-Committee were: 
Hankey (chairman), Ernie Chatfield (First Sea Lord), 
Montgomery-Massingberd (C.I.G.S.), Vansittart (Foreign Office), 
and Warren Fisher (Treasury). It was as a member that 
Montgomery-Massingberd raised the question of the termination 
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with Hankey. See chapter 1, 
p. 10. 
6. Adm 116—3606, The General Strategic Situation in the Western 
Pacific, Appendix D, MiUtary and Air Force Requirements, 
Report, 27 February 1935. 
7. Cab 32—125, Meetings of the British Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers, Minutes, 2nd Meeting, 7 May 1935. 
8. C.A.O. A2029, CouncU of Defence Meeting, Agendum No. 1, 
Memorandum by Admiral Hyde, 19 June 1935. 
9. ML MSS 863, Mark Morrison Papers, items 1 and 2, typescript, 
"Japanese Conquest of Malaya". Morrison was an Australian 
lawyer who practised in Malaya from 1928 to when he escaped in 
February 1942. His account was written within a few days of his 
escape and sent to the AustraUan government. It contains useful 
insights into the social and poUtical structure of the island. 
10. C.A.O. CRS A 2684/135, Singapore Defence Conference 1940, 
"Report by the Australian Chiefs of Staff", 18 November 1940. 
11. Ibid., War Cabinet Minute 254/1940, 26 November 1940. 
Menzies's visit is examined in J. M. McCarthy, "Australia: A 
Notes to Pages 130-33 187 
View from WhitehaU 1939-45", Australian Outlook 28 
(December 1974). 
12. Ibid., Commonwealth Government to Prime Minister of New 
Zealand and Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1 December 
1940. 
13. CA.O. CRS A 2684, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to 
Prime Minister of AustraUa, 28 January 1941. 
14. When in August 1940, the British Chiefs of Staff felt that it was 
absolutely essential to strengthen the defences of Malaya, this 
task, in the absence of the fleet, was given to the air force. At this 
time there were only 84 first-line aircraft on the peninsula com-
pared to 336 considered necessary "to give a fair degree of 
security". See "Appreciation by the United Kingdom Chiefs of 
Staff on the Situation in the Far East", August 1940, Documents 
Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War 
1939-45, 3 vols. (WelUngton, 1963), vol 3, Appendix 4. This 
figure was repeated to Menzies in January 1941 (C.A.O. CRS A 
2684/135, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Prime 
Minister of AustraUa, 28 January 1941) but when the Japanese 
attack came Royal Air Force strength vras stUl only 158 aircraft 
of which 24 were obsolete. See "Singapore Defences", Memoran-
dum by Lieutenant General Sir Henry Pownall, printed in W. S. 
Churchill, "The Hinge of Fate", The Second World War, 6 vols. 
(London, 1956), vol. 4, Appendix D. This was a classic result of a 
clash of vital interests: the territorial integrity of both countries 
was threatened. In fact the United Kingdom felt it was facing 
invasion at least until Germany attacked the Soviet Union. 
15. Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, AustraUa in the War of 
1939-1945, Series 1 (Army) (Canberra, 1957), 4:164. 
16. ChurchUl, Second World War, 4:55. 
17. Captain Russell Grenfell, Main Fleet to Singapore (London, 
1951). 
18. Memorandum by the Chief of the General Staff, pp. 6—7. 
19. Admiral Sir Richard Webb, "The Change in the Naval Situation", 
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 75 (November 
1930): 735. 
20. Cab 24-250, C.P. 223 (34), "The Future of Anglo-Japanese 
Relations", J.S. and N.C, 16 October 1934. 
21. Cab 29—151, Notes of Conversations with Representatives of the 
Dominions, 18 December 1934. 
22. Cab 32-125, "Imperial Defence PoUcy", Chiefs of Staff, 29 AprU 
1935. 
23. Ibid., quoted p. 5. 
24. Cab 24-259 (CP. 26 [36] ) (DRC 36), Committee of Imperial 
Defence, Defence Requirements Sub-Committee, "Progranmies of 
the Defence Services", Third Report, November 1935, p. 10. 
25. Robin Higham, Armed Forces in Peactime. Britain 1918—1939, A 
Case Study (London 1962), p. 221 ff for the discussions 
188 Notes to Pages 133-35 
concerning the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement 
dated 18 June 1935. 
26. At the time of Munich the modernization of "ageing and out-of-
date ships" was the main task of the Admiralty. A month before 
Munich, five out of the fifteen battleships were out of action. 
This task had been completed, however, by September 1939. See 
"Early Days to Matapan", A Sailor's Odyssey, The Autobio-
graphy of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of 
Hyndhope, 2 vols. 2, (Arrow, 1961), pp. 139-40. Also A. Duff 
Cooper, Old Men Forget (London, 1953), p. 225. 
27. Cab 32—125, "Memorandum Respecting the Situation in the Far 
East", Foreign Office, March 1935. 
28. Cab 32—125, Meetings of the British Commonwealth I^ime 
Ministers, Stenographic Notes, 2nd Meeting, 7 May 1935. 
29. This was Menzies's first visit to England. As Hankey wrote to the 
C.I.G.S.: "I doubt if you wiU get very far with Lyons. He is a 
charming old boy, who will agree with you all the way and it 
would be just as well to have him with you: but I would not 
count on him for doing a thing. The man you ought to get hold 
of is Menzies, the Attorney General, who is coming over wdth 
Lyons, though actuaUy for a Privy CouncU case. Menzies is new 
to Commonwealth poUtics, though he has been for a long time in 
Victorian state politics. He is generally regarded as the coming 
man and a future Prime Minister. He is rather a rough diamond 
but very patriotic, strong and determined. He is very ambitious to 
meet all the big people here, and my intention is to get you in 
touch with him." Cab 21—396, Hankey to Montgomery-
Massingberd, 31 January 1935. 
30. Cab 32—125, Meetings of the British Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers, Stenographic Notes, 2nd Meeting, 7 May 1935, 
pp. 3-4. 
31. E. M. Andrews, "The Australian Government and Appeasement", 
Australian Journal of Politics and History 22 (AprU, 1967) 
suggests that Lyons held an emotional attitude towards German 
appeasement and it was Menzies who supplied the pragmatic ex-
planation. Clearly Lyons was sufficiently pragmatic to appease 
Japan. 
32. Cab 32—125, Meetings of the British Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers, Stenographic Notes, 3rd Meeting, 9 May 1935, p. 3. 
33. Ibid., 4th Meeting, 23 May 1935, p. 4. 
34. Cab 24-259 (C.P. 26 [36] ) (D.R.C. 37), Committee of Imperial 
Defence, Defence Requirements Sub-Committee, Programmes of 
the Defence Services, Third Report, 21 November 1935. Members 
of this sub-committee were Hankey, Chatfield, ElUngton, 
Montgomery-Massingberd, Warren Fisher, and Vansittart. As 
Chatfield pointed out later "the committee was technically as 
powerful and well informed a one as the country could have 
Notes to Pages 135-37 189 
produced for the task". Chatfield, It Might Happen Again (Lon-
don, 1947), p. 79. 
35. Cab 24-259. 
36. A discussion of the cruiser policy is contained in Higham, Armed 
Forces in Peacetime, pp. 127—37. 
37. Cab 24-267 (CP. 40 [37] ), Progress in Defence Requirements, 
Memorandum by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, 1 
February 1937. The fuU extent of this decision was apparently 
not revealed at this time to AustraUa. On 27 April 1936, the 
secretary of state for Dominion affairs advised that the naval 
estimates for 1936 would include the laying down of two capital 
ships and five cruisers. C.A.O., CRS A 816, item 11/301/93, 
Department of Defence, Correspondence File, "London Naval 
Treaty, 1930", Covering Correspondence 18 November 1935 to 1 
October 1936, 1935-36. 
38. See Arthur Marder, "The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 
1915—36", American Historical Review 65 (June 1970). 
39. AustraUan National Library, Piesse Papers, A882, Box 4, type-
script of wireless talk given over 3LR, 29 November 1936. This 
had been a constant argument of Piesse since he pubUshed his 
Japan and the Defence of Australia under the pseudonym "Albat-
ross" in 1935. This examination of Australian defence largely 
reflected the army's viewpoint. In fact, Piesse sent a draft of his 
book to Lavarack's staff for comment. 
40. For an account of the 1937 federal election see Hasluck, The 
Government and the People 1939—41, AustraUa in the War of 
1939-1945, Series 4 (CivU) Canberra, 1952), 1:84-86. An 
account of the evolution of the Labor party's thinking on the 
Imperial connection may be found in E. M. Andrews, "AustraUan 
Labour and Foreign PoUcy: The Retreat from Isolationism, 
1935—1939", Labour History 9 (November 1965). Andrews here 
makes the point that the Labor movement, still split by the 
depression and the Spanish CivU War, did not find cohesion on 
foreign affairs untU after the Polish crisis. 
41. C.P.D., 154 (8 September 1937): 741-42. ParkhiU considered 
the cost of such an air force to be nearer $60 milUon, and he was 
right. A capital ship cost $20 mUUon and when all factors such as 
length of life and deterioration, capital and maintenance costs, 
were taken into account it was found that the cost of a battleship 
equalled the cost of operating forty-two twin-engined bombers. 
See Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, pp. 98-101. 
42. University of Queensland Library, A.C.V. Melbourne Papers, Mel-
bourne to E. Longfield Lloyd, 11 January 1937. 
43. Hasluck, Government and People 1939—41, 1:59 quotes a letter 
from ParkhUl to Casey. 
44. Cab 32-127 IC (F.P.), Cabinet Committee on Foreign PoUcy and 
Defence, Minutes, 19 March 1937. 
45. Cab 32-127, E(B)1, Cabinet Memorandum by the Secretary of 
190 Notes to Pages 137-41 
State for Dominion Affairs, 16 March 1937. 
46. Hasluck, Government and People 1939—41, 1:56—73. 
47. Cab 24—268, Committee of Imperial Defence, "Review of Im-
perial Defence", Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, 22 February 
1937, p. 17. 
48. Cab 32—128, Imperial Conference 1937, Stenographic Notes, 5th 
Meeting, 24 May 1937, p. 8. The difficulties which the British 
ship-building industry faced in meeting naval orders was one 
legacy of the "ten-year" rule. See Higham, Armed Forces in 
Peacetime, pp. 191—201. 
49. Cab 24-268, "Review of Imperial Defence", pp. 19-20. 
50. Cab 32—128, Imperial Conference 1937, Stenographic Notes, 5th 
Meeting, 24 May 1937, p. 8. 
51. Nine Troubled Years (London, 1954), pp. 210-11. This is an odd 
piece of special pleading to come from an ex-First Lord of the 
Admiralty, particularly since, when holding that office in 1936, 
he had felt that the Admiralty was so much in control of its own 
affairs that it hardly needed a poUtical head at all. See ibid., 
p. 255. 
52. Cab 32—128, Imperial Conference 1937, Stenographic Notes, 5th 
Meeting, 24 May 1937, p. 5. 
53. The Earl of Avon, "Facing the Dictators", The Eden Memoirs, 3 
vols. (London, 1962), 1:495-97. 
54. See the highly critical account of these conversations in Slessor, 
The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections (London, 1950), 
pp. 146-50. 
55. There is mention of these arrangements in E.J. Hammer, The 
Struggle for Indo-China 1940-1955 (Standford, 1964), 
pp. 16-17; and B. B. Fall, The Two Vietnams: A Political and 
Military Analysis (London, 1965), p. 41. 
56. Hammer, Indo-China. 
57. Cab 32-128, Imperial Conference 1937, Stenographic Notes, 4th 
Meeting, 22 May 1937, p. 8. 
58. Cab 32-127, Imperial Conference 1937, Stenographic notes, 4th 
Meeting, United Kingdom Delegates, 1 June 1^37. 
59. Cab 32—128, Imperial Conference 1937, Stenographic Notes, 4th 
Meeting, 22nd May 1937, p. 7. 
60. Ibid., Stenographic Notes, 15th Meeting, 8 June 1937, pp. 4 - 5 . 
61. For these conferences and staff discussions see Samuel EUot 
Morison, "The Rising Sun m the Pacific", History of the United 
States Naval Operations in World War II 15 vols. 3 (Boston, 
1965), 3:49-51. Also Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: 
The First Two Years, United States Army in Worid War II, The 
War in the Pacific (Washington 1962). 
62. Morison, United States Naval Operations, p. 48. 
63. For a British reaction see J. M. A. Gwyer and J. R. M. Butler, 
Grand Strategy June 1941-August 1942 3 pt. 2, History of the 
Notes to Pages 141-44 191 
Second World War, United Kingdom MiUtary Series, (London, 
1964). An American view is put in Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. 
Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941—42, United 
States Army in World War II (Washington, 1953). The best non-
official account may be found in Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl 
Harbor: The Coming of the War Between the United States and 
Japan (Princeton, 1950). 
64. Documents Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the 
Second World War 1939-1945, 3 vols. (WelUngton, 1953), 3:79. 
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime 
Minister of New Zealand, 29 November 1941. 
65. United States Congress, Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 
Report of the Joint Committee (Washington, 1946), p. 168. 
66. ParkhiU came close to the views of Sir George Milne expressed in 
1929-30 (See chapter 1, pp. 17-18). The first thought is that the 
United Kingdom had suggested to ParkhUl that he make these 
proposals as part of the overall strategy of showing a united 
Empire front. Hankey had suggested in 1935 that any Australian 
planning should be communicated to London, but there is no 
evidence that the United Kingdom refreshed this suggestion in 
1937. Besides, MUne had wanted a definite commitment of 
forces, and ParkhUl would not go as far as that. Another point is 
that Parkhill was unpopular in the United Kingdom at the time. 
67. Cab 32—128, Imperial Conference 1937, Stenographic Notes, 5th 
Meeting, 24 May 1937, p. 19 ff. For the whole of ParkhUl's draft 
TesolvitionsseeYizsluck, Government and People, 1:63—64. 
68. In spite of ParkhUl's logic, these proposals were not accepted by 
the conference. Although ParkhiU was anxious to point out that 
his scheme was purely optional, in no way infringed Dominion 
sovreignty, and was concerned only with the preparation of plans, 
Canada and South Africa were suspicious. Discussion then 
appeared to lapse. 
69. Cab 32-128, Imperial Conference 1937, Stenographic Notes, 5th 
Meeting, 24 May 1937, pp. 26-27. 
70. Ibid., Stenographic Notes, 15th Meeting, 8 June 1937, p. 10. 
71. Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, p. 174. 
72. Cab 24—27, Construction Programme, 1938, Memorandum by 
the First Lord of the Admiralty, 11 February 1938. 
73. A. Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget (London, 195^), p. 222 ff. 
74. Cab 32—128, Imperial Conference 1937, Stenographic Notes, 
10th Meeting, 1 June 1937, p. 10. 
75. Air 9-56, Backhouse (First Sea Lord) to Ismay (C.I.G.S.), 29 
December 1938. 
76. Air 9-56, Whiskard to Sir Edward Harding, 28 November 1938. 
77. Earle Page, Truant Surgeon, The Inside Story of Forty Years of 
Australian Political Life (Sydney, 1963), p. 258. 
78. This promise is referred to in Cab 53—10, Minutes of 267th 
Meeting, Chiefs of Staff, 13 January 1939. 
192 Notes to Pages 144—46 
79. This appreciation apparently is CO.S. 595. Access in the Public 
Record Office is closed untU 1988 and no trace of the document 
can be found in the Commonwealth Archives Office. 
80. Air 9-56, CI.G.S. to Ismay, undated draft, but c. 29 December 
1938. 
81. Air 9-56, Minute, 4 January 1939. 
82. Air Historical Branch, Department of Defence FUe SF—11—L, 
Defence Development Programme, Revision, May 1939, Air 
Force Expansion, Scheme X, General Policy, "The Basis of the 
Defence of Australia", Chief of the Naval Staff to Secretary, 
Department of Defence, 7 March 1939. His emphasis. The reason 
given in this document for not stationing a fleet at Singapore in 
peacetime is the need to maintain a balance between home and 
foreign service in the long-service personnel of the Royal Navy 
and the expense of maintaining the fleet with such long Unes of 
communication. There was no word that the Royal Navy might 
be overcommitted. 
83. Cab 53-10, 271st Meetmg, Chiefs of Staff, Minutes, 27 January 
1939. 
84. C.A.O. CRS A 816, item 11/301/213, Defence CouncU Meeting, 
10 February 1939. Savage to Lyons 31 March 1939. 
85. Ibid., Street to Lyons, 27 March 1939. 
86. Air Historical Branch, Defence Conference 1939, Report, WelUng-
ton 25 AprU 1939, Copy 28, Part 1, para. 3. The conference is 
covered in B. K. Gordon, New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power 
(Chicago, 1960). 
87. E. L. Woodward and R. Butler, eds. Documents on British 
Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Third Series, 9 "1939", (London, 
1955), Craigie to Halifax, 15 July 1939, p. 276. 
88. Morison, United States Naval Operations, p. 49. 
89. CA.O. CRS A 2671, War Cabinet Agenda 14/1939, "Australian 
Co-operation in Empire Defence", Chief of Naval Staff to 
Minister for Defence, 26 September 1939. 
90. Cab 2-9, Minutes, 348th Meetmg, Committee of Imperial 
Defence, 24 February 1939. 
91. Documents Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the 
Second World War 1939-1945, 1:535-36. 
92. Ibid., Governor-General to Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs, 13 June 1940. 
93. R. G. Menzies, Afternoon Light (Melbourne, 1967), p. 22. 
94. Quoted in ChurchUl, "The Hinge of Fate", p. 51. 
Notes to Sources 
It was suggested in the introduction to this book 
that an academic study of the armed forces m AustraUa has 
not been undertaken and that the historical analysis of 
defence policy has been neglected. One reason is that source 
material is vety difficult and at times impossible to acquire. 
Analysts have obviously concentrated their efforts on more 
potentiaUy rewarding areas. 
Before Januaty 1971 and the introduction of a thirty-year 
ruling, access to official documents held in the Australian 
Archives Office was restricted to material which origmated 
before 1923. Documents and fUes raised after this date could 
only be sighted with special permission of the government 
department concerned. The introduction of the thirty-year 
rule is not likely to make research easier immediately. 
Cabinet papers and documents relating to AustraUa's security 
are still restricted. It is understood from the Commonwealth 
Archives Office that this poUcy is under review but in the 
meantime it is safe to assume a considerable delay before 
material covering the interwar period is cleared for access. 
In Januaty 1971, however, the Department of Air did 
allow access to a limited amount of material held at the Air 
Historical Branch in Canberra. If further work is to be done 
on the armed services it is suggested that an early effort at 
the Air Historical Branch might prove vety beneficial. With 
only a small staff which is kept vety busy it is understandable 
that the records which cover the interwar years are not easily 
located, but the staff are most helpful and often produced 
unexpected but relevant files. No finding aids were avaUable. 
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The Air Board Agenda are kept there and not at the Aust-
ralian Archives Office, but only one file of miscellaneous 
material described as Air Board Minutes could be found. 
Possibly other fUes do exist. 
Some of the difficulty experienced in AusttaUa was over-
come by using the documents held in the Public Record 
Office in London. Obviously some danger is involved when 
United Kingdom documents are used to illustrate an Aust-
ralian attitude or poUcy particularly when it has been 
necessaty to quote a reported conversation at second hand. 
Where possible evety attempt has been made to check the 
United Kingdom's interpretation against the AustraUan. The 
records of the R.A.F. and of the ciyU aviation authorities are 
well indexed. Although the Director of Plans (Air 9) was 
responsible for Dominion air cooperation, material relating to 
AustraUan defence may be found in all the groups of files 
cited. In particular the files of the Chief of the Air Staff (Air 
8) should be consulted. Cabinet Office records (Cab) contain 
material which deals with Imperial defence and should be 
used in conjunction with Admiralty (Adm) files. CivU 
Aviation may be foUowed in the Air Ministty administrative 
files (Avia) and in the Dominions Office (DO) documents. 
War Office material is not so well organized and, working on 
the assumption that any important document would also be 
located in either Cabinet, Air, or Admiralty files, I tended to 
avoid the War Office coUection. 
A brief time was spent at the National Archives in 
Washington. My interest centred on the supply of aircraft to 
Australia and naturally the AustraUan market was not parti-
cularly important to the United States before the war. The 
files cited in the bibUography largely cover the government's 
attitude to the sale of aviation war material to foreign 
powers. Use was also made of the records of Lockheed Air-
craft Corporation and North American-Rockwell. An 
approach was made to the Commonwealth Aircraft Cor-
poration in AustraUa but I was told that the corporation 
intended to write its own histoty. 
Few AustraUan pubUc figures have published their 
memoirs and those that have are often disapointing. One is 
aware that
 Menzies and Casey, for example, reveal vety little. 
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Admiral Sir John Collins and Sir Sydney Rowell have 
produced recollections. ColUns's work is purely anecdotal 
whUe Rowell is frustratingly brief on the inter-war years. Air 
Marshal Sir Richard Williams has written his memoirs, and 
they will be pubUshed by the War Memorial in Canberra. The 
usual attempts were made to secure access to private papers 
but the only success was with Sir Lawrence Wackett. The 
Piesse papers held at the Australian National Libraty are a 
help to understanding the views of the army on prewar 
defence policy. Sir George Jones has deposited a few papers 
at the Australian War Museum. They are mostly concerned 
with his period as Chief of the Air Staff from 1942 to 1954. 
The Bruce papers, as mentioned in the text, are stUl not 
avaUable and there is no indication when they might be. The 
Dedman papers are held by the Austtalian National Univer-
sity but reveal nothing about prewar Labor party defence 
thinking. 
An attempt has been made to reduce the bibUography to a 
reasonable size. It would be unduly long and cumbersome if 
evety book or file consulted were included. Some titles are 
therefore merely mentioned in the text or in a footnote and 
this is particularly so if they only serve to Ulustrate what I 
have deemed to be a peripheral point or one that has been 
dealt with in detaU elsewhere. Neither have I listed in the 
bibliography evety newspaper consulted. It is hoped, how-
ever, that the bibUography might provide one basis for 
further work on poUtical-mUitaty relations in Australia. 
i^^J'^K 
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